Educating the Army's Jedi by Benson, Kevin Charles
  
 
EDUCATING THE ARMY’S JEDI 
The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into 
U.S. Army Doctrine 
1983-1994 
BY 
Kevin C.M. Benson 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of History and the Graduate 
Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
________________________________        
 Dr. Ted Wilson   Chairperson        
 
________________________________        
Dr. Roger Spiller 
________________________________        
Dr. Robert Baumann 
________________________________        
Dr. Jonathon Earle 
________________________________  
Dr. Brent Steele 
 
 
 
Date defended 25 March 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
The Dissertation Committee for Kevin C.M. Benson 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
 
Educating the Army’s JEDI  
The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into 
U.S. Army Doctrine 
1983-1994 
 
 
 
 
      Professor Theodore Wilson 
 Chairperson 
 
 
 
       
Date approved:_9/27/10__  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
EDUCATING THE ARMY’S JEDI: The School of Advanced Military Studies and the 
Introduction of Operational Art into Army Doctrine 1983-1994 
 
By Kevin C.M. Benson, Ph. D. 
Department of History, University of Kansas 
 
Professor Theodore A. Wilson, Advisor 
 
This dissertation examines the decisions taken during the development of the concept 
for the School of Advanced Military Studies and its subsequent refinement in the first ten 
years of its history.  The other line of inquiry in the dissertation is the development, 
introduction and refinement of the concept of operational art and the operational level of 
war into U.S. Army doctrine, primarily in the 1982, 1986 and 1993 versions of Field 
Manual 100-5, Operations. 
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Chapter One 
An Elite of Obligation and Contribution 
 
“Not satisfied that we were thinking creatively enough, I sent a message in early 
September to the Army requesting a fresh team of planners.  A four-man team of 
graduates from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the elite year-long 
program at Command and General Staff College that concentrated on campaign 
planning, arrived in the middle of the month.  We briefed them on our thinking to date 
and then I instructed: “Assume a ground attack will follow an air campaign.  I want you to 
study the enemy dispositions and the terrain and tell me the best way to drive Iraq out of 
Kuwait given the forces we have available.”  I gave them two weeks to come up with an 
answer.”1   
 
In the fall of 1990 General Schwarzkopf called for a team of Army officers 
educated at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) to energize the thinking in 
his headquarters.  Schwarzkopf and staff planners in his headquarters, U.S. Central 
Command, faced the challenge of how to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.  Why did 
he ask for SAMS educated officers?  The school established at Fort Leavenworth to 
enhance education in large unit, division and corps, operations had been in existence for 
only seven years and, while a few of its graduates had participated in the planning and 
execution of Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, the larger U.S. Army and 
defense establishment did not know much about the school or its alumnae.  Now a 
group SAMS graduates faced the challenge of planning a huge campaign.   
This dissertation tells the story of SAMS, and of the remarkable reputation so 
quickly acquired by its graduates, educated in a pre-World War II horse cavalry stable at 
Fort Leavenworth.  It is also the story of the doctrinal revolution in which SAMS played 
an important role, a doctrinal shift that energized how the U.S. Army thought about and 
fought its wars.  It may be claimed that the combination of a new, offensively oriented 
doctrine and educated practitioners significantly raised the level of tactical and 
                                                 
1
       H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero, New York: Bantam 
Books, 1992, p. 354. Emphasis added.   
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operational understanding in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 1994. 
This study explores the interrelationship between the School of Advanced Military 
Studies, the introduction of operational art into the doctrine of the U.S. Army, and how 
the graduates of the school sought to translate education and doctrine into action.  
Chapter One will highlight the decisions leading to the founding of the School of 
Advanced Military Studies.  Chapter two will review the conditions at the end of the 
Vietnam War and the challenges the Army faced at that time.  Chapter three focuses on 
the development of operational level of war as the bridge between linking tactical actions 
on the battlefield with strategic objectives derived from security policy.  Chapter four 
looks at the School of Advanced Military Studies immediately before Operations Just 
Cause and Desert Shield/Storm, and how the school was changing with the times.  
Chapters five and six focus on the first two wars faced by graduates of the school and 
how the graduates used operational level doctrine to frame the fights conducted during 
these combat operations.  Chapter seven focuses on three events in the turbulent period 
that followed the end of Operation Desert Storm, events that took place during the 
expected time of peace that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and during which 
graduates of the school applied doctrine to new challenges.  Chapter eight focuses on 
the School of Advanced Military Studies and how the school was under internal and 
external pressure to change in response to combat operations and operations other than 
war.  Chapter nine, the conclusion, juxtaposes the guidance of the first director with the 
guidance of the sixth director to highlight the changes in the school and how the school 
changed.  A central hypothesis of the dissertation is that the fundamental purpose of the 
school remained relatively unchanged during the first ten years of its existence.  
Exploring why that was the case provides a basis for understanding the contributions of 
the school and its graduates’ improvement of tactical and operational understanding 
within the Army. 
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The U.S. Army depends upon an explicitly-defined lexicon and a common 
understanding of the lexicon to ensure directives are translated into action.  Before the 
level of operational understanding could be raised in the Army, the term itself required 
definition.  The concept, “operational level of war,” was introduced into U.S. Army 
doctrine in the 1982 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations.  The operational level of 
war was called the “theory of large unit operations.“2  In the 1986 version of the field 
manual the term was further described as the use of, “available military resources to 
attain strategic goals within a theater of war.“  The term, operational art, was first defined 
in doctrine in the 1986 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations.  Operational art is, 
“the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater 
of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major 
operations.”  A campaign is, “a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic 
objective in a theater of war.”  A major operation comprises, “the coordinated actions of 
large forces in a single phase of a campaign or in a critical battle.”3  The word “joint” in 
the definition of campaign means that the actions of more than one service; Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps or Air Force, are a part of the campaign.  War itself is both simple and 
complex, and given the preceding array of definitions even a casual reader can 
understand the need for some form of schooling to put the definitions into both common 
use and common understanding.  The need for a unifying doctrine to face the conditions 
of the post-Vietnam era was reinforced by the complex conditions the Army and the 
nation faced at the time.   
The impetus to craft a new doctrine clearly derived from painful memories of the 
withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent defeat of South Vietnam by the North, the 
                                                 
2
     Department of the Army.  Field Manual 100-5, Operations.  20 August 1982, p. 2-3.  
Hereafter cited as FM 100-5, 1982. 
3
     Department of the Army.  Field Manual 100-5, Operations.  May, 1986, p. 10.  Hereafter cited 
as FM 100-5, 1986. 
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Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and the need to rebuild the U.S. Army in the post-Vietnam era.  
But what were the circumstances that led the U.S. Army’s senior leadership to 
authorized establishment of a school of advanced studies in warfare at Fort Leavenworth 
rather than seeking to modify the curriculum offered at the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College?  The world was growing more 
and more complex, and the conduct of warfare was changing just as dramatically.  
American power in the world was perceived by allies and enemies to be at a low point, 
and Soviet clients such as North Vietnam, had defeated the U.S. military.  During these 
years the U.S. Army was wracked by inter-racial strife, poor morale and drug use.  The 
Warsaw Pact forces in the central region of Europe looked formidable.  In the Arab-
Israeli war of 1973 the use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles indicated a change in 
the conduct of warfare.  Decisions had to be taken regarding how to rebuild the Army, 
how to equip it for high intensity conventional combat against a Soviet army that 
outnumbered North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.  These events and 
questions of strategy and force development had to be answered in order to determine 
what must be done to restore the Army of the Republic.  There were differences of 
opinion though on what ought to be done. 
The Review of Education and Training of Officers, or RETO was a study done in 
1978.4  There was no clear mandate or expression of the intent of the officer corps to 
increase the amount of time spent in school.  While Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, first 
director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, and others concluded that the pace 
of change in the conduct of warfare was so rapid that the Army needed to invest more 
time in educating its officers others in the officer corps did not.5  The RETO study, while 
                                                 
4
       U.S. Department of the Army.  General Staff. Officer Training and Education Review Group.  
Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), vol. 1-6 with appendices, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 30June1978.  Hereafter cited as RETO. 
5
       Wass de Czege graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1964 and was commissioned in 
  
5 
 
establishing a short staff officer course for captains had also taken a survey of officers in 
the Army ranging from lieutenants to colonels. The survey showed that most colonels 
and lieutenant colonels did not believe more time in school was necessary, that the 
Army needed more doers not thinkers.   
The RETO study--and it should be noted that Wass de Czege was a part-time 
member of this group--surveyed the Army officer corps in 1977 and 1978.  One of the 
questions on the survey asked the question of whether or not the U.S. Army should 
“select a small percentage of a given USACGSC-level (U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College) class to remain for an additional year of professional 
development in military thought, philosophy, and application.”6  The survey results 
showed that 21.1 percent of officers selected the response “The Army can’t afford this 
luxury; we need more do-ers,” and 17.9 percent feared the creation of an “elitist group,” 
condemning the proposal as a “bad idea.”7  The survey results showed though that three 
times as many lieutenants favored the proposal than did colonels.  The survey results 
also showed that the more senior the officer the less likely he/she was to support the 
idea of additional military education.8  The Army officer corps was not opposed to 
sending officers to advanced civil schooling for technical degrees but was wary of 
creating perceived elites.  In his report on staff college level training Wass de Czege 
countered this concern by writing that while the Army did not think it extraordinary to 
send an officer to school for two years to study the complexity of being a comptroller 
some officers “would hesitate to prepare those at the heart of the profession for service 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Infantry.  He served two tours of duty in Vietnam where he was decorated for valor three times.  He 
earned a Masters’ degree in Public Administration from Harvard and taught at the U.S. Military Academy 
in the Social Science Department from 1972 to 1975.  Wass de Czege commanded an infantry battalion 
from 1979 to 1981 and in 1981 he was selected to attend the U.S. Army War College.  Wass de Czege 
career information is drawn from the Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States 
Military Academy, West Point, New York.  The Register is published annually by the Association of 
Graduates, 698 Mills Road, West Point, NY, 10996-1607.  Hereafter cited as Register of Graduates. 
6
       RETO, p. L-1-58.  USACGSC is U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. 
7
       RETO, p. L-1-7. 
8
       RETO, p. L-2-16. 
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in a much more complex field, the conduct of war under modern conditions.”9  As 
persuasive as Wass de Czege’s report was he needed the support of Army senior 
leaders to move from concept to action.   
Instead of attending the Army War College, Wass de Czege was assigned to the 
Army War College as a War College Research Fellow and detailed to Fort Leavenworth.  
Wass de Czege was directed to write a study of the Army Staff College. His findings 
were published in the U.S. Army War College colloquium on war and, at least 
unofficially, distributed to selected senior officers.  This colloquium was established in 
the late 1970s and lasted as a forum for discussion until the mid 1980s.  Wass de Czege 
and others wrote papers that were based on personal experiences in Vietnam and 
studies of war in general.  These essays were significant influences on the development 
and refinement of the use of historical case studies in educating officers for war.  Wass 
de Czege’s report, “Army Staff College Level Training Study,” released in final form in 
1983, was influential in establishing what eventually would be named the Army’s School 
of Advanced Military Studies.   
The report focused on the changing complexity of warfare and the need to 
understand the theory of warfare.  Wass de Czege outlined the changes in warfare from 
World War II to the present time and noted that the pace of change was growing 
increasingly rapid.  He juxtaposed this increasing complexity with the amount of time 
other “first rate” armies took to educate their general staff officers. At the time of the 
report the U.S. Army suffered in comparison.   
Wass de Czege reported that the Israelis sent officers selected for staff college 
education to school for 46 weeks.  The Canadians sent all officers to school for 20 
weeks but then specially selected a smaller number for an additional 45 weeks.  The 
British and Germans sent their officers to school for “about 100 weeks …” and the 
                                                 
9
       WdC Report, p. F-2. 
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Russians “put their potential general staff officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of 
intensive education.”  The U.S Army sent officers to staff college level schooling for 42 
weeks.  Wass de Czege wrote, “the Army with the toughest missions in the world 
possesses the most austere school system of all first-rate armies.”10  This had not 
always been the case in the U.S. Army. 
In the paper Wass de Czege reminded the senior leaders of the Army that three 
times before in the history of general staff schooling the course had been two years in 
length.  From 1904 to the U.S. entry to World War I, 1919 to 1922 and finally from 1928 
to 1936, just prior to the great expansion of the U.S. Army for World War II the course of 
instruction at Fort Leavenworth was two years long.  Wass de Czege highlighted the 
graduates of the two year Leavenworth course that made a difference in staff and 
command positions in the U.S. Army, ranging from J. Lawton Collins and Ernest Harmon 
(Class of 1933) to Matthew Ridgway and  Maxwell Taylor (Class of 1936).  Wass de 
Czege concluded this short section of his report by noting that at some point in World 
War II every division (90) and corps (24) were commanded by, “2 year Leavenworth 
men.”11  Wass de Czege proposed that a second year of study for selected officers 
provide a “broad, deep military education in the science and art of war” that went beyond 
that provided by the existing Command and General Staff College course.  This new 
course would serve the Army by developing a group of officers better prepared for the 
demands of general staff work at division, corps and higher levels of command and 
“seed the Army with a number of officers annually who will provide a leavening influence 
                                                 
10
       Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Staff College Level Training Study.”  Final Report.  13 June 
1983, p. F-1/2.  Hereafter cited as WdC Report. 
11
       WdC Report, p. F-3.  J. Lawton Collins commanded a division and a corps in WWII and 
served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.  Ernest Harmon commanded two divisions and a corps in WWII.  
Matthew Ridgway commanded a division and a corps in WWII and also served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. 
Army.  Collins, Harmon and Ridgway were all West Point classmates.  Maxwell Taylor, also a West 
Pointer, served as a division commander in WWII as well as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Information drawn from the Register of Graduates. 
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on the Army by their competence …”12  Wass de Czege’s report went directly to key 
senior leaders in the Army. 
On 28 December 1982, based on Wass de Czege’s report, General Glen Otis, 
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, took the 
decision to approve a one year extension of the Command & General Staff College 
(CGSC) course for specially selected officers.  The first course, a pilot program, began in 
June 1983.13  The efforts leading to the founding of the school were based on the vision 
of many men, but principally came about due to the persistent energy and personal 
relationships with senior general officers of Colonel Huba Wass de Czege. 
Nothing in life is inevitable and in the Army especially regarding establishing a 
new school and finding funds for it this is doubly true.  There is an element of chance 
involved in any successful endeavor and regarding the establishment of SAMS this is 
also true.  Many officers and Staff College faculty members were thinking along the lines 
of improving the curriculum and the quality of the education provided the majors 
attending the course.  Call the element fate, chance or luck, whatever favored 
establishing a school at this particular time Wass de Czege was in the correct place at 
the correct time.  The need for officers to be able to plan for and execute large unit 
maneuvers in Europe was seen by senior officers looking at their staffs.  As will be 
shown in chapter two the question of defending Europe, raising the nuclear threshold 
and even fighting with tactical nuclear weapons supported the need for officers schooled 
at a higher level in regards to the handling of large units, corps and armies.  A decision 
on how to address the need was taken by senior leaders in the Army. 
 Many officers were involved in the decision to establish the School of Advanced 
Military Studies in 1983.  However, the establishment of a school of advanced military 
                                                 
12
       WdC Report, p. F-4. 
13
       A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983. Edited by Dr. John W. Partin, Combined 
Arms Center Historian, 15June1983 found at http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl 
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studies needed powerful patrons, general officers that agreed with the requirement for 
advanced military education and were in positions to ensure that once the decision was 
taken there was sufficient follow through to sustain the effort.  Fortunately once these 
initial decisions were taken there were senior officers in key positions with the force of 
will and character to give life to the vision and produce action as a result of decision.  
Three U.S. Army general officers were key decision makers and early supporters of the 
establishment of the school and these senior leaders were in command or served at Fort 
Leavenworth between 1979 and 1983.  These men are; Generals William R. 
Richardson, Jack Merritt, and Crosbie “Butch” Saint.  
General William R. Richardson served as the Commanding General of the 
Combined Arms Center from 1979 to 1981.  Richardson was the son of a missionary 
couple and had lived in China as a young boy, completed high school in the United 
States, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned in the Infantry 
in 1951.  By the time he assumed command of Fort Leavenworth he had been to war 
twice; in Korea and Vietnam.14  His service in command and high level staff positions led 
him to conclude that the increasing complexity of warfare demanded more intense study.  
Richardson also knew the decision for more study would receive only lukewarm 
acceptance in the Army without senior officer support.  He supported the decision to 
establish the School of Advanced Military Studies.  He described the course of studies 
as, “a step up from the normal CGSC (Command and General Staff College) curriculum 
and study war at the operational and strategic levels.”15  Richardson approved the 
structure of the course and the method of selection of officers as both instructors and 
students, saying,  
                                                 
14
       Register of Graduates. 
15
       U.S. Army Military History Institute.  Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 87-18, 
General William R. Richardson, USA, retired.  Interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Ackerman.  
Interview conducted at Carlisle Barracks, PA., pp. 322.  Hereafter cited as Richardson Interview.  
  
10 
 
“We used carefully selected fellows from the Army War College as 
facilitators and then hand picked the students out of the preceding CGSC 
class.  Students were officers who had the potential to go on to high 
positions in the Army and who had a broad view of things, not a 
specialized but a fairly broad view.  Most of them were in the combat 
arms, but there would be some from combat support and combat service 
support branches.”16   
 
Richardson saw the need for an extended course of study and insisted that the 
course be designed to return a level of study in the staff college that was dropped from 
the program of instruction before World War II, “an enhanced study of the art and 
science of war for young officers who were imaginative, could conceptualize, and whom 
the Army felt would go into staffs at Division and Corps immediately thereafter and stand 
apart by virtue of this additional year of training.”17  Richardson felt that this would be the 
equivalent of a Masters’ degree in war fighting.  Richardson left command of the 
Combined Arms Center but moved on to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Operations (DCSOPS) on the Army Staff.  This influential position enabled him to watch 
over the development of the course and ensure it remained on solid foundations.  He 
described these efforts, “It required my attention while I was the DCSOPS … to continue 
to argue that case with the personnel managers and the Chief of Staff to be sure that it 
was sold.  By getting started and our foot in the door with a pilot course, we made the 
case.”18  This active support by a key general officer on the Army staff ensured that 
succeeding Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army would accept the school as a required 
program that was vital to the success of the Army.  Richardson was able to continue his 
support for the school as the Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command, 
the position he held until his retirement in 1986.  Not stated but generally known was the 
reality that there would also be resistance to the school from the Army officer corps as 
                                                 
16
       Richardson Interview, p. 323. 
17
       Richardson Interview, p. 323. 
18
       Richardson Interview, p. 340. Parenthetical added by the author. 
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well. 
General Richardson realized that there would be resistance to the establishment 
of a second year program at the Command & General Staff College.  The RETO study 
had clearly shown that the Army officer corps did not think additional study was required.  
There was a degree of resistance from elements within the Army.  Regarding the RETO 
study and the decision to establish SAMS he said, “This was an idea between Huba 
Wass de Czege and myself.  It had nothing to do with the RETO study.”  The Army 
officer personnel assignment system did not take into account this school and the 
managers of the system resisted the decision.  The personnel system is designed to 
monitor the time officers spend away from troop unit assignments as well as ensuring 
the requirements of the larger Army are met by qualified officers.  Officers stepping out 
of this orderly flow for more schooling and then going immediately back to key troop 
assignments would upset the system.  Richardson’s counter argument, and one that 
carried weight in the arguments within the Army staff was, “they were speaking with a 
forked tongue.  On the one hand the Army sends officers off to get a graduate degree for 
engineers, West Point instructors, ORSA (Operations Research/Systems Analysis) 
needs … [so] ‘Why don’t we send some off for a year to graduate schooling in war 
fighting’?  They really didn’t have an argument against me on that score.”19  General 
Richardson left command of the Combined Arms Center just after the decision was 
taken to establish the pilot program of the school.  General Jack Merritt followed him to 
Fort Leavenworth, taking command of the Combined Arms Center. 
General Merritt was commissioned into the Army from Officer Candidate School.  
Merritt served in the Field Artillery.  He served two tours of duty in Vietnam and just prior 
to taking command of Fort Leavenworth he had commanded the U.S. Army War 
College.  He served as the commander of the Combined Arms Center from July 1982 to 
                                                 
19
       Richardson Interview, p. 340. Parenthetical added.  
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June 1983.20  This was a short time to be in command of the center but General Merritt 
participated in the key decisions on the developing curriculum of the school.  The 
decisions on the development of the curriculum were not easy.  Merritt had a very 
powerful individual serving him as the deputy commandant of the Command and 
General Staff College, then Major General Crosbie “Butch” Saint.  Merritt later described 
the command climate at Leavenworth, “I was commandant of the Command and 
General Staff College and the deputy commandant at the staff college was Butch Saint.  
Butch Saint kind of presided over the bulk of the people with this class and so forth.  I 
had to wrestle Butch every day to maintain command of the post because he was 
always figuring out ways to run the post for me.”21  Administering the post also extended 
into the decisions on the direction the curriculum for the new school of advanced military 
studies would follow.  Lieutenant Colonel Hal Winton, one of the officers assigned to 
assist Wass de Czege establish the school described one encounter between the 
Commandant, Merritt, and the Deputy Commandant, Saint.  Winton recalled that Merritt 
“was a White House Fellow,” and “… wanted sort of a junior Henry Kissinger kind of 
course,” whereas Saint preferred “a super dooper tacticians course.”22 
General Crosbie “Butch” Saint was commissioned into the U.S. Army and 
armored cavalry from West Point.  He served in Vietnam twice.  Butch Saint was a 
powerful character with an ego to match.  Prior to coming to Fort Leavenworth he 
commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany and also the Seventh Army 
Training Center.  He served as the deputy commandant of the Command and General 
                                                 
20
       U.S. Army Military History Institute.  Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 1997-
10, General Jack Merritt, USA, retired.  Interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Glover.  Interview 
conducted 7 March 1997 at Carlisle Barracks, PA, pp. ii/iv.  Hereafter cited as Merritt Interview.  
21
       Merritt Interview, p. 157.   
22
       U.S. Army Military History Institute.  Senior Officer Oral History Program, LTC Harold R. 
Winton, USA, retired.  Conducted by LTC Richard Mustion, 5APR01 at Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 7.  
Hereafter cited as Winton Interview.  Actually, Merritt was a finalist for a White House Fellowship, but 
was not selected; see the Merritt oral history transcript, p. 75.  
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Staff College from June 1981 to October 1983.  He was responsible for implementing 
the decision to establish SAMS.  He was engaged in updating the Staff College and 
refining the purpose of the College.  Saint arrived at Fort Leavenworth and asked the 
staff about the purpose of the College.  Saint determined that the purpose of the College 
was “Train war fighters.”  He also concluded that the College was not doing that, rather, 
“We were training individuals on certain staff procedures.”23  Saint was determined to 
change that about the Staff College.  He also began to think about a two year program. 
General Saint described the Army effort to develop operational and strategic 
level planners in the Army from the time he served as the deputy commandant.  He said, 
“When I was the deputy commandant at Leavenworth, General Richardson used to beat 
me up all the time about strategic planners and we don't have any.”  Saint had definite 
ideas on what it took to become a strategic planner.  In his view, “a strategic planner is 
one that has to understand region, has to understand the joint force capabilities, and 
understand the national decisionmaking system in order to come up with a strategic plan 
that involves the national military structure.”  Saint also knew there were other elements 
necessary in developing a corps of officers that could effectively serve at higher staff and 
command levels.  Saint knew that there was also a requirement to have an 
understanding of the interagency process that was a key part of the development of 
strategy and policy. 
Saint described his thoughts on this process and its inclusion into the course of 
studies in SAMS.  He said that a strategic planner “needs to know the inner agency 
capabilities because you don't do anything in a strategic plan without the other players.  
Now the military can be a major or a minor player.  It's just like I was talking about the 
system, if you don't know the levers to pull, and you don't understand how they interact, 
                                                 
23
       U.S. Army Military History Institute.  Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project 1994-3, 
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then you can't come up with a strategic plan.”24  Saint’s articulation of the requirements 
for a strategic planner was somewhat at odds with the guidance that Winton recalled 
receiving from Saint, the “super-dooper tactician’s course.”   
Based on this guidance and what he heard from Merritt, Winton developed “a 
super duper tactics course plus an operational art course appended onto what I called a 
preparation for war course … built with the broad issues army leaders have to think 
about before they design an army to go over and fight.”25    The outline of the course was 
a mixture of military theory and history, with courses on Army doctrine.  Winton followed 
the outlined proposed by Wass de Czege in his study but fleshed out the concepts 
based on the guidance from the generals.  Saint pondered the questions of how to 
prepare officers for these missions as well as what officers perform these types of tasks 
at higher levels of command.  Saint decided that SAMS was a necessary part of this 
process.   
Saint intended that SAMS should be designed “to give people the basic 
underpinnings so they can become strategic planners in addition to operational 
planners.”  Saint recognized that following schooling there had to be an assignment 
mechanism in place to ensure graduates of the school gained experience in operating at 
division and corps, as well as in a joint and interagency environment.  The development 
of strategic planners and leaders required career choices on the part of the officers 
involved in the process.  As Saint put it  “That's how you get them, whether we have 
enough of them or not it has to be a conscious process on whose going to be one of 
these guys.”26  The decision on the process and the curriculum came down to one 
briefing given by Winton to Saint and Merritt. 
In January 1983 Winton gave a presentation to Generals Merritt and Saint.  
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Winton prepared a curriculum overview that attempted to find the balance between 
Merritt’s desire for “junior Henry Kissingers” and Saint’s “super duper tacticians.”  The 
presentation outlined a course that balanced division and corps tactics with operational 
art.  Winton recalled that “Merritt was a little bit displeased,” but the Saint stepped in and 
said, “This is the kind of course that I said I wanted.  So if you have a problem, it’s not 
with the briefer, it’s with me.”27  The end result of the presentation was an outline of a 
broad based curriculum that began with military theory and ended with courses on 
preparing for war, a logical progression through the complexities of warfare.  Winton said 
that, “This was the rationale that satisfied both General Merritt and General Saint.”28 
The vision required the support of influential generals.  The development of the 
vision and the energy to implement the decision required the combined force of intellect 
of three dedicated officers. 
The three men directly responsible for articulating the vision for the school and 
then completing the hard work to develop the school and its curriculum, selecting the 
officers for the first class and then teaching them are; Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, 
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Johnson, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Winton.  These 
three individuals developed the School of Advanced Military Studies and placed the 
school on a path to successfully bringing the vision to life.  These three men took 
material Wass de Czege developed through research and advanced the notion of a 
school that would improve the understanding of warfare throughout the Army.  Wass de 
Czege was an Army Research Fellow charged with studying Staff College level 
schooling.  He was the visionary that saw the need for the school.  Winton and Johnson 
were assigned to Fort Leavenworth and were selected by Wass de Czege to assist him 
in refining the concept into reality.  More than this these three men developed the first 
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curriculum, selected the officers to attend the school, and taught it to the first two classes 
at this new Army school. 
Wass de Czege described how he came to begin thinking about the complexities 
of warfare.  He said the idea began even before he was named a research fellow, the 
first glimmer began, “… back on a hill in Vietnam wondering why all the field grade 
officers above me hadn't a clue about what they were sending me out to do.”  He was 
appointed to a study group established by then Lieutenant General (LTG) Richardson on 
combat decision-making and judgment.  Wass de Czege described this next point 
toward the idea of SAMS as, “… the "how to teach judgement" working group LTG 
Richardson established at CGSC, of whom I was the most junior member, and none of 
the "old" Colonels thought there was a problem.”29  Finally, in June of 1981 Wass de 
Czege accompanied Richardson on a trip to the People’s Republic of China.   Wass de 
Czege described a conversation he had with Richardson on the fantail of a river boat, 
“Then the moment in China on the Yangtze River with LTG Richardson when SAMS 
became the beginnings of its future reality.  There may be other theories of how SAMS 
got started, but before that moment in China, SAMS was in no one else's mind that I 
know of, at least no one I knew would even support my idea before I took it to LTG 
Richardson that day.”30  Wass de Czege’s vision for this school was not to create a 
“privileged elite” or educate officers to do select key jobs better but rather “to create a 
multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence as these officers would teach others.”31  
Articulating the notion that a strategy to manage uncertainty in future wars must be 
developed, Wass de Czege urged the Army to develop officers “able to apply sound 
military judgement across the entire spectrum of present and future U.S. Army missions 
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during the preparation for and conduct of war.”32  Wass de Czege believed that the Army 
required officers educated in the practice of the operational art, the level of war at which 
tactical successes were connected to strategy in the attainment of policy objectives. 
The RETO study reinforced this line of thinking in many ways.  The RETO study 
surveys indicated the officer corps favored education to a degree and had mixed 
feelings about extra education that could set up an elite or even a “General Staff” in the 
Army.33  Wass de Czege was realistic though as he wrote, “We are a pragmatic army.  
Education, even in our profession (or especially in our profession), is not highly valued.”34  
The notion of avoiding the taint of an elite group was taken very seriously.  The step that 
was taken, based on discussions between Wass de Czege, Richardson, and Lieutenant 
General Becton, was to educate the officers in SAMS and then not directly track the 
officers throughout their subsequent careers.  Becton and Richardson felt that there 
were too many developing elites in the Army.35  There would be no Army approved 
additional skill identifier (ASI) that would mark the SAMS graduate.  The result of this 
decision was that the graduates of SAMS would not receive an ASI and would either 
“sink or swim” based on their individual performance during their first utilization 
assignment after graduation.  In order to continue the education of the graduates, putting 
doctrine into practice under the tutelage of general officers Wass de Czege insisted that 
the graduates be assigned to division and corps planners’ positions immediately 
following graduation even if, in some cases, that conflicted with potential command 
assignments.36   
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Wass de Czege, supported by key general officers in the Army senior leadership, 
prevailed in establishing the School of Advanced Military Studies.  The effort to obtain 
support from the senior leadership of the Army was one part of the effort.  Once this 
decision was taken there was the hard work of getting a curriculum developed and 
approved.  This work was conducted by Lieutenant Colonels Hal Winton and Douglas 
Johnson. 
Lieutenant Colonel Hal Winton was commissioned into the Infantry after 
graduating from West Point in 1964.  He served two tours of duty in Vietnam, earned a 
Ph.D. in History from Stanford and taught in the U.S. Military Academy history 
department in 1974/77.  Just prior to being assigned to Fort Leavenworth he 
commanded an infantry battalion in Europe.37  Winton was assigned to the Command 
and General Staff College in 1981 as a member of the initial faculty of the Combined 
Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).  This staff officer course for Army captains was 
developed as a result of the RETO study.  The requirement for becoming a member of 
the faculty was successful battalion command.  He joined the effort of developing SAMS 
in the late summer of 1983.  Winton described this event as “sort of an accident of 
history.”38 
Looking back, Winton described his role in the development of SAMS in modest 
terms, “I referred to myself and Lieutenant Colonel Doug Johnson as curriculum 
carpenters.  We were not the visionaries.”39  Winton named Wass de Czege, among 
others, as one of the visionaries who developed and sold the idea of the school.  Wass 
de Czege was not assigned to Fort Leavenworth though, he worked for General 
Richardson.  Richardson appointed Wass de Czege as an Army War College Fellow to 
develop the idea of the school.  Wass de Czege did not “belong” to Saint due to this 
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assignment, but Winton did.  Winton said, “… General Saint wanted somebody who 
belonged to him to do the spade work, if you will, to translate this [vision of SAMS] into 
reality.”40  Winton’s road to the job as a curriculum carpenter was, as he called it, “an 
accident of history.” 
Winton believed that this assignment was the result of two accidents of history.  
The first was that he and Wass de Czege were West Point classmates.  The second was 
that Wass de Czege knew that Winton was a Ph. D. in History and was a former 
instructor at West Point.  Winton said that he believed Wass de Czege, “whispered in 
General Saint’s ear, “If you want someone who belongs to you to start doing the 
curriculum carpentry, that’s the guy you ought to get.  So I was duly invited and I duly 
accepted.”41   
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Johnson graduated from West Point in 1963.  He 
served two tours of duty in Vietnam, earned a masters’ degree in history from the 
University of Michigan and taught in the history department at West Point from 
1974/77.42  Johnson was assigned to Fort Leavenworth after a tour of duty in Germany.  
He arrived in 1981 and was assigned to the Fort Leavenworth office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for resource management.  Speaking of the assignment Johnson said, “I was 
tasked to do a lot of off-the wall things, such as rewrite the entire Ft. Leavenworth and 
CGSC Mobilization Plan.  The IG (Inspector General) had just failed the Installation on 
that bit.  I was also assigned the task of the Installation Master Development Planner – 
partly because the Chief of Staff did not personally like or trust the Installation engineer.  
In fact, the Installation Engineer was prohibited from signing contracts in excess of 
$10,000 without my personal approval – and I’m an Artilleryman – I only blow things to 
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hell and gone – I don’t build things!”43  Johnson was busy but not doing anything that 
really taxed him or drew on his experiences as a history professor at the U.S. Military 
Academy.  Johnson was also an avid horseman and this hobby brought Johnson into 
contact with Wass de Czege. 
Johnson was coordinating the construction of buildings all over Fort 
Leavenworth--from the prison to the new bachelor officers’ quarters.  He was also a 
member of the Leavenworth Hunt Club.  Asked what brought him to SAMS Johnson 
wrote, “What got me involved was the HUNT!  I was riding about one day with Huba and 
he asked me where I had my Master’s and on what.”  Johnson gave Wass de Czege his 
masters’ thesis and then events took a faster pace.  Winton also knew Johnson and 
believed his assignment on the installation staff was “an incredible waste of talent.”44  
Winton also played a role in securing Johnson’s role in the development of SAMS.  
Winton reviewed the requirements established by Training and Doctrine Command 
regarding the establishment of a curriculum.  He determined that he would need forty-
four people to get the work done in the time available, five months.  He also knew he 
really wanted Johnson as a part of the SAMS team.  Winton went to brief Saint on the 
process to develop the curriculum concept into reality.  Winton told Saint “there’s good 
news and bad news.”  Saint said to give him the bad news first.  Winton said “If we get 
forty-four people starting the first of February, we can have it all done by June.”  Saint 
said, “Disapproved.  What’s the good news?”  Winton said “The good news is we can get 
it done with two if we get the right guy.”  Saint asked who was the right guy and Winton 
said Johnson.45  Johnson was a member of the team as of that moment. 
Johnson recalled, “The next thing I knew, Hal Winton called me and told about 
the budding idea of SAMS and asked if I would be interested in joining as he and Huba 
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felt they needed a third who was an experienced instructor etc … [then] we three are 
standing before “Butch” Saint … I was a known quantity to Saint.  When the three of us 
walked into his office he threw up his hands and asked if it was the three Wise-Men or 
the Three Stooges? ... and that is how I joined this mob.”  Joining the “mob” was just one 
step on the path to developing and executing the curriculum of a school that did not 
have a class room.  Referring to the school Johnson wrote, “Hal Winton and I had talked 
about that idea for some years, but Huba [Wass de Czege] was the guy who had done 
the work to establish that as a defensible proposition.” 46  The approach to refining the 
concept into action was anything but routine. 
 Johnson and Winton had taught together in the History Department of the Military 
Academy.  They realized that Wass de Czege prepared the ground for the development 
of the school with his study, as well as garnering key general officer support for the idea 
of the school.  Turning the idea into a reality required the hard work of developing a 
curriculum that would educate officers in the theory of warfare.  The first decision taken 
in the development of the curriculum was to start at the division level of command and 
staff.  Johnson described the efforts, “We [Johnson and Winton] then took up what tools 
we had and established the “Curriculum Carpentry Corporation.”  We decided to work 
from the ground up – the fundamental theory of ground combat as far upward as time 
would allow, but focusing ultimately on the operational level – at that time very badly 
understood and not on the tips of the tongues of more than a very few people.  That 
meant we were going to develop planners at the division level and or above.”47   The 
Curriculum Carpentry Corporation now had an objective and a methodology.  The hard 
work of building the school remained. 
 Johnson joined Winton near the end of February 1983.  The two started the 
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process of hiring an administrative non-commissioned officer, a secretary, ordering 
books, and writing the actual curriculum.  The two had four months, from March to June, 
to complete this work.  Winton did a short study of the exact requirements for this effort, 
the requirements established by Training and Doctrine Command.  After this study of the 
development of tasks, conditions, standards, course goals and learning objectives, 
Winton decided to “deliberately divorce …” themselves from the established process.  
His rationale, “First, because we didn’t have the time…The second thing we said was 
that there’s some Auftragstaktik involved here.  You hired us to do this job.  You trust us 
to do this job.”  This was another important moment in the development of SAMS.  
Winton and Johnson established an element of trust in the school among the senior 
commanders at Fort Leavenworth.  They decided to establish a goal of developing 
character traits and knowledge areas for the school and its’ students.  The next step in 
the unique process that defined SAMS, as Winton said, was to trust the “genius, if you 
will, the savoir faire of the seminar leader to adjudicate that interaction between the 
students and the material.”   Winton and Johnson also put a burden on the SAMS’ 
student.  “We’re going to leave it to the enthusiasm and vigor of the students to dig into 
this material and learn stuff out of it that they think is important.”  This decision was the 
proximate cause of the streak of independence in SAMS that continues to the present 
time in the history of the school.  Winton and Johnson resisted the military’s bureaucratic 
tendency toward rigid bureaucratic control.  Winton said, “We didn’t insist that every 
single lesson begin with an exact articulation of how these twenty pages connect to this 
particular objective.”48  
 Curriculum development consumed Winton and Johnson from February through 
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June of 1983.  Once they decided to start conceptually from the division level of 
command and staff work and then move up to corps and army level the development of 
curriculum moved into refinement as the two had defined a path forward.  Johnson noted 
that, “We knew, intuitively, that we needed to get some travel into the program …” to 
avoid too much classroom time. 49   An integral part of the education of general staff 
officers and commanders, the two decided, included observing not only the Regular 
army in training but also the National Guard.  Johnson recalled, “We had done 
something of a survey and found that almost none of the CGSC students had any real 
contact with the ANG (Army National Guard).  We ended up sending the entire class out 
to visit two divisions in training – it was an eye-opening experience for them.”  The travel 
also included trips to visit U.S. based senior level headquarters with a focus on contact 
with officers in the Plans sections of the headquarters.  Finally Winton and Johnson 
decided that SAMS should also go to Europe to “get the guys involved in some kind of a 
real Army exercise.”  The trip to Europe included an Ardennes Battlefield Staff Ride as  
 
part of the NATO exercise trip.50 
 Trips were a necessary part of the curriculum and were directly related to the 
broad guidance Wass de Czege received when told to build the school.  Winton and 
Johnson clearly understood that Wass de Czege’s mission as the first director was to 
develop a program that would produce “broadly educated, tactical and operational 
planners and thinkers.”51  Wass de Czege’s vision on how to accomplish this mission 
was influenced by another officer with whom Wass de Czege had worked on a previous 
project, the development of the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual FM 100-5 Operations.  
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The officer was then Lieutenant Colonel L. Don Holder.  Winton, Johnson and Holder all 
had taught together in the History Department at West Point.  Holder’s collaboration with 
Wass de Czege on FM 100-5 convinced Wass de Czege of the utility of using military 
history along with military theory, doctrine, and hands on experience in some form as the 
best mixture of subjects for a broad based military education.52  Hands on experience, 
absent some form of large scale maneuvers, required a form of simulation. 
 Winton and Johnson knew that many of the officers in the Army at that time had 
never been a part of exercises larger than battalion-size unless they’d been stationed in 
Germany.  They knew some means was needed to show the scope of division level 
maneuvers.  The means that Winton and Johnson tested ranged from very new and 
untried computer war games to table top war games, the Dunn-Kempf war game, to 
sand tables.53  Johnson, Winton, and Wass de Czege tested each kind of war game they 
could find to see which type could be readily adapted into the SAMS curriculum.  As 
Johnson wrote, “We just kept coming up with ideas and, not having much in the way of 
adult supervision, we went out and tried one thing after another.”54   
 Trying one thing after another, along with strong support from General Saint, 
enabled the SAMS team to have a fairly well-developed curriculum by the time the first 
class reported in late June 1983.  Winton though recalled two incidents that highlighted 
the enormity of the task the three faced.  SAMS did not have a dedicated building or 
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even class rooms in the 1983 to 1984 academic year.  The teaching team, Winton, 
Johnson and Wass de Czege, had to coordinate for class rooms on a daily basis.  
Johnson and Winton taught the bulk of the military history and theory courses.  The 
curriculum concepts were “pretty well developed,” but there were times in that first year 
of SAMS that “the students would come out of class and be handed a sheet of paper 
and a book, and told read this for tomorrow.”  Winton recalled that while this did not 
happen too often it did happen and that the “students were very patient.”55   This type of 
circumstance also applied to Wass de Czege and his teaching of tactics. 
Winton and Johnson depended on Wass de Czege for the development of the 
tactical courses and exercises for the students in SAMS.  Wass de Czege’s work on 
tactical dynamics made this a natural fit and played to everyone’s strengths, something 
absolutely required in that first year of SAMS.  Wass de Czege was also involved, as 
Winton recalled “in a lot of politics and a whole lot of other things …” necessary for the 
continued survival of the school.56  This need to divide his time had an occasional effect 
on the conduct of tactical exercises.  On one memorable occasion, as Winton and 
Johnson recalled, Wass de Czege met the students one morning with an armful of 
maps.  Wass de Czege directed the students to follow him into the basement of Bell Hall 
(the main academic building of the Command and General Staff College) to find an 
empty corridor.  Wass de Czege split the students into two group; Red Forces and Blue 
Forces.  The directive was to put the maps together and then, “Red plan a defense and 
Blue plan an attack and I’ll be back in two hours and see how you are doing.”57   The 
students were also reminded that if a fork lift was seen coming by to make sure the 
maps were rolled up and secured so they could be re-used by future classes.  As Winton 
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put it, “It was a little bit on the fly and everybody put up with that and understood it.”58  
Testing the understanding of the material was the final hurdle the team faced in the 
completion of the development of the initial curriculum of SAMS.   
The officers selected as students for SAMS were required to write a masters’ 
thesis.  Wass de Czege, Johnson and Winton thought that this would be enough of a 
test and measure of the students understanding of the course material.  The director of 
graduate studies in the college at the time, Dr. Phil Brookes, told them that a form of final 
examination was also required in order to meet the accreditation requirements for 
permission to award a graduate degree.  Johnson proposed an oral examination that 
would cover the entire year.  His proposal was, “we put every concept we had exposed 
the students to during the course of the year on a 3X5 card.  One concept per card.”  
The students would be examined one at a time and would be handed a deck of cards 
and directed to an examination room.  The requirement was to arrange the cards in the 
most logical manner and then present a rational oral defense of why the concepts were 
arranged so with all supporting logic.  The time limit was 90 minutes.  The following oral 
defense also lasted 90 minutes.  Johnson recalled, “You could see how differently they 
each approached the task, but what similarities emerged as well.  We could tell from that 
exercise who was most likely to make it in the world to come and who wasn’t likely to get 
beyond second base.”59  Curriculum and final examination formed a critical part in the 
development of the school.  The final critical element was the selection of the students. 
 General Richardson’s guidance for selection was straightforward.  The students 
had to be, “officers who had the potential to go on to high positions in the Army and who 
had a broad view of things, not a specialized but a fairly broad view.”  The majority of 
officers in the school should be selected from, “the combat arms, but there would be 
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some from combat support and combat service support branches.”60  Winton recalled 
that in the first year of the school General Otis, the Training and Doctrine Command 
commanding general directed that officers selected for SAMS had to have the additional 
specialties of Operations (54), logistics (92), personnel management (41) or intelligence 
(35).61   Winton and Johnson both recall that the debates over selection lasted a long 
time.  Winton made the point that he, Johnson and Wass de Czege wanted officers who 
were “really hungry and thirsty to learn … we would have preferred more Sam Damons 
than Courtney Massengales.”62  The procedures of the selection process were also 
outlined in the period February to June 1983. 
The framework of the selection process for admission into SAMS is still in use.  
Wass de Czege, Winton and Johnson’s first decision was that they would not request a 
review of an officer’s performance file and they would not look at evaluation reports.  
Officers that wanted to apply were required to fill out an application and state why they 
wanted to attend the school.  The officer’s academic advisor was asked to give an 
evaluation of performance and a recommendation.  Since the application and selection 
process was conducted early in the academic year of the Staff College course the 
academic advisor comments were not really useful, save in a negative way.  All 
applicants were required to take a two part test.  The first part of the test was objective 
and tested the applicants’ knowledge of doctrinal terms, map symbols and unit 
organizations.  The second part of the test was subjective.  Applicants had to answer 
essay questions that included answering a tactical question that included a moral 
dilemma.  The intent was to see how an officer could answer a question to which there 
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was no correct or text book answer, and how well the officer could articulate a decision 
and the supporting rationale.  The final element of the application process was a twenty 
minute interview with the Director.  The purpose of the interview was simple, does the 
officer have the fortitude to “stand up as a major in front of a two star or a three star and 
say, “General, I recommend this course of action because …”   The results of the test 
and interview were reviewed by a panel of officers made up of the department heads of 
the Staff College and the Director of SAMS and chaired by the Deputy Commandant of 
the College.  The list of the officers selected to attend SAMS was then sent to 
Washington, DC for a final review by the Army Personnel Center. 63  Selection of the 
officers for the school was the final part in the preliminary development of the school.  
The performance of the officers while in school and more importantly upon arriving in 
their units after graduation would prove the principle. 
 Winton was present when General Edward “Shy” Meyers the Army Chief of Staff 
visited SAMS during that first academic year.  Meyers said SAMS was important to the 
Army because “When I was the DCSOPS [deputy chief of staff, operations] I was getting 
M1A1 kind of planning out of my Leavenworth graduates.  I wanted something more 
imaginative and creative than that, people who saw the planning process in a broader, 
wider format.”64  As senior, three and four star, generals would come to visit the school 
comments were remarkably similar, Winton recalled that almost universally these 
generals would remark, “Spot on, the Army should have done this 20 years ago.”  The 
views of Army one and two star generals, the generals that led Army divisions, were 
much different.  Prior to actually getting SAMS graduates into Army divisions these 
generals were vocal about asking if the Army either needed or could afford to be 
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spending this money and time in extra education, echoing the results of the RETO 
study.65  The observations would change once officers educated at SAMS proved 
themselves as valuable members of division and corps staffs, but this was in the future 
in 1983.   
Hard work resulted in decisions taken by senior generals that sustained the 
development effort required to build the school.  Further hard work produced a radical 
departure from stultifying format but set the basis for a broad education in military 
history, theory, doctrine and hands on experience in the art and science of war.  A 
rigorous selection process and graduation process ensured that the best suited officers 
were selected for this education and the best of that group graduated from the course of 
study.  The visionary work of Colonel Was de Czege, supplemented by the “Curriculum 
Carpentry Corporation” of Lieutenant Colonels Winton and Johnson combined to put 
sinew and muscle to the skeleton of the plan for the School of Advanced Military 
Studies.  The benefit to the Army at large would be seen in the performance of these 
graduates.  Wass de Czege, Winton and Johnson laid the foundation of a school that 
would produce an elite of sorts, not an elite of privilege and accelerated promotion.  The 
elite produced by SAMS would generally prove to be an elite of capability and 
contribution, officers that made valuable contributions to the U.S. Army. 
  
                                                 
65
    Winton Interview, p. 43. 
  
30 
 
Chapter Two 
The Context of the Times 
 
“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel.  
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark.  “That may be so,” he replied, “but 
it is also irrelevant.”66 
 
 
There has been a long debate among students of the U.S. Army about the 
lessons of Vietnam especially in the immediate aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam in 
1975.  Historians and theorists, inside and outside the services, have carried on this 
dialogue.  The purpose of this chapter is to review what historians and theorists thought 
were the important questions concerning U.S. Army doctrinal reform in the aftermath of 
the Vietnam War, from roughly the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s.  This chapter explores 
what these historians and theorists have said about the lessons from Vietnam, the Arab-
Israeli wars and investigates how and why they have formulated such contrasting 
“lessons” about that conflict and its implications for shaping doctrine.  It also seeks to 
make clear how the Army AirLand Battle doctrine, the concept that, when put into 
practice by graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies influenced by and, as 
well, repudiating the experience of Vietnam, redefined the Army’s approach to 
warfighting.  A lesson is not a lesson learned until it is acted on and embodied in action.  
The major portion of the chapter will look at post Vietnam U.S. ideas about military 
reform.  Given focus in this review are works by Stephen Rosen and Barry Posen to 
Russell Weigley, among others.  Each arguably contributed to a crucial reorientation of 
American military doctrine as well as to the U.S. Army’s education on war.  Other major 
contributors to the overall strategic scene in this period were Thomas Schelling and 
                                                 
66
    Harry G. Summers, On Strategy A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.  Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1982, p. 1.  This was a conversation in Hanoi on 25 April 1975 between Colonel Summers 
and Colonel Tu of the North Vietnamese Army.  Hereafter cited as Summers. 
  
31 
 
Kenneth Waltz.  These specialists in nuclear weapons theory while not contributing 
directly to the debate on reforming the Army did help establish the strategic framework in 
which the Army had to fit.  The chapter will also explore U.S. Army officers’ thoughts on 
the role of the post-Vietnam Army.  The different schools of thought will be identified and 
reviewed.  The basis for these schools of thought were founded on the writings of 
historians and political scientists and the experiences of the officers who fought in the 
war and thought about the impact of the war on the Army.  The thrust of the schools of 
thought was presented in terms of either incorporating the lessons of Vietnam into 
doctrine or putting the “small war” behind the Army and focusing on conventional war.  
There was also a debate on the source of change in doctrine and whether the Army 
could change itself or required civilian interference to overcome organizational inertia.  
All of this debate contributed to the decisions taken in this period after the Vietnam War 
and answering the question, what should be done to refocus the Army? 
This is not to say that all of these works were directly contributive to the 
development of both the School of Advanced Military Studies and the introduction of 
operational art into U.S. Army doctrine.  Some works illustrate the debate on what to do 
with the lessons of Vietnam and how to recast strategic thinking in the U.S. Army as well 
as the role of the Army in attaining policy goals.  Others framed the great debates on the 
use and non-use of nuclear weapons in Europe, which fueled the need on how to raise 
the nuclear threshold with conventional force.  All of these debates; the lessons of 
Vietnam, the use of the U.S. Army, nuclear weapons use on the European battlefield, 
and the role of conventional force as both additive to the deterrent in Europe and the 
larger role of the Army in strategy framed the debates of the 1970s and 1980s.  The use 
of force as an extension of policy in the post-Vietnam period of American policy was the 
overall environmental context of the debates and set the stage for a renewed level of 
intellectual effort in and out of the Army.  The books presented in this chapter are 
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illustrative of the depth of the thinking and writing going on in this turbulent period.   
Colonel Wesley Yale, Major General ID White, and General Hasso von 
Manteuffel wrote, Alternative to Armageddon, in 1970.  This book written by retired 
officers proposed a modern version of “blitzkrieg” as a means of avoiding lengthy 
conflicts like Vietnam.  These three officers had broad experience in war, the mobile war 
that characterized combat in Europe.  Their view was that the advent of the nuclear age 
had made war too terrible and presented a concept of war that would preclude the use 
of nuclear weapons.  The alternative they proposed was that the West and the United 
States develop a conventional means of war that would rely on a refined form of 
blitzkrieg.  They wrote, “If the nuclear deterrent is not to be used, then a credible and 
effective deterrent must replace it…the most practical deterrent…is a capability to wage 
immediate, decisive and highly mobile, or “lightning” warfare.”67    The book was also a 
glimpse of future internal and external arguments concerning the role of the Army as a 
deterrent.  Concerning Army doctrine they wrote, “…doctrine is largely shaped by the 
static battle and jungle experience of Korea and Vietnam.”  The emphasis on Special 
Forces and counter-insurgency was dismissed as, “a type that has its place but is based 
on conditions the geopolitical and military policies of the western world must seek to 
avoid.”  Finally, the authors contended that this emphasis on “small wars” was, 
“unproductive in the larger sense but also it detracts from efforts to build a real deterrent 
to major confrontations.”68  The thrust of the book was tactical in nature.  The authors did 
not make a strong link between tactical actions, the conduct of modern “blitzkrieg” and 
attaining strategic objectives.    
Russell Weigley’s work, American Way of War was written in 1973.  The book 
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was hailed as the definitive expression of a historical view on how America made war.  
This book was and remains widely used in all military history programs from ROTC and 
USMA to the Staff and War Colleges.  Weigley had a profound influence on the schools 
of thought within the military on how to proceed in reforming and refocusing the Army.  
Weigley’s work came at a momentous time in the history of the U.S. Army.  The 
Army was struggling to come to grips with its bitter experience in the jungles of Vietnam.  
Weigley pointed out that prior to 1945, “the United States possessed no national 
strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain political ends…”69  
Weigley’s review of the history of military strategy and policy from 1775 to 1973 led him 
to conclude that since the Cold War and especially after the Korean War there had been 
a trend toward the formation of a national strategy to further American interests as well 
as defend the Republic.  This review informed the internal and external debate about 
Army reform.   
In Weigley’s view the broadening of the concept of American strategy from purely 
military to a consideration of all elements of national power came about at the time when 
advances in technology, the atomic and hydrogen bombs in particular, were depriving 
modern war of its ability to produce decisive results.  Military strategy had to produce 
results that worked in accord with other elements of national power to attain a decision in 
war.  Nonetheless the Army had to consider how it would fight and even against whom it 
would focus because, as Weigley wrote, “the preservation of national values demands 
that the use of combats …still be contemplated by the makers of national strategy…”70  
Weigley outlined the movement of American military strategy from that of attrition, used 
primarily when the nation did not have the means to reach a quick decision in warfare to 
one of annihilation after the nation became a Great Power.  Weigley concluded his tour 
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of the development of American military strategy and policy in a sobering fashion by 
summing up the nature of nuclear deterrence that was the basis for strategy at that time 
between the contending super powers, the U.S. and USSR.  He concluded that should 
deterrence fail a strategy of annihilation would be catastrophic.  He also wrote that 
nonnuclear limited wars could not produce a favorable decision in a short enough time or 
at an acceptable cost.  Warfare or a resort to violence, it appeared to Weigley, was 
becoming less and less useful to attain national objectives.  At the conclusion of his work 
Weigley wrote, “Because of the record of nonnuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable 
decisions at tolerable cost…the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its 
end.”71  Weigley’s thinking on combat provided an historical basis for the start of the 
development of the concept of operational art.72 
At the same time Russell Weigley published his history of American military 
strategy and policy two events took place that shaped thinking about the Army’s role in 
the wars of the future.  First, the Congress of the United States passed the War Powers 
Act, over the veto of President Nixon.  The second event was the Yom Kippur war 
between Israel and the Arab States in the Middle East.  The development of the new 
doctrine for the Army and the establishment of a school for advanced military studies 
took place in light of study and reflection on this policy designed to limit the use of force 
by the executive branch and study of this war that highlight the high rate of losses when 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles were introduced into the calculus of war.   
The War Powers Act sought to limit the role of the President in committing 
American forces to war.  Specifically designed to force the President to report to the 
Congress on the use of military forces the act also stated,  
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Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required 
to be submitted…the President shall terminate any use of United States 
Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or 
required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or 
has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed 
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically 
unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. 
Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional 
thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in 
writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United 
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in 
the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.73  
 
The War Powers Act entered into the calculations of how to reform the Army from 
the physical means to get a mission done within 60-90 days cited in the act, how to 
ensure the support of the people and Congress for action when required and even 
whether or not the Army engages in national strategy or simply adheres to its Title X, 
U.S. Code responsibilities to train and prepare Army units for war.   
The Yom Kippur War of 1973 demonstrated the lethality of the first precision 
guided munitions, the strength of anti-aircraft missile defenses, and the continuing need 
for the coordinated use of armor, infantry, artillery, and aircraft in achieving victory on the 
battlefield.  This war pitted American weapons against Soviet weapons, a war by proxy 
to an extent.  This was a conventional war and the tactics of this war, on both the Israeli 
and Arab side, were deeply studied by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO for their 
potential impact on how a war of massed armies would be fought in Western Europe.      
Many works of international relations and political science influenced the debate 
on the use of force in the nuclear age and the need for both the operational level of war 
as well as a school to study the linkage of tactical and operational art in this period, 
setting the tone for the use of conventional forces in a nuclear age.  Two are particularly 
relevant to the debate on Army reform; Thomas C. Schelling and Kenneth Waltz.  
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Schelling wrote Arms and Influence in 1966.  Kenneth Waltz wrote Theory of 
International Politics in 1979.  Waltz outlined the nature of international politics as one of 
anarchy in which the major powers would seek to balance each other.  In the aftermath 
of World War II he predicted that the U.S. and USSR would dominate the world for the 
foreseeable future.74  Balance would require raising the nuclear threshold higher and the 
means of doing that was a conventional military force that could operate in a state of 
anarchy and accomplish policy objectives without resort to nuclear weapons.  Waltz 
defined the Realist school of thought in diplomacy, only policy objectives that directly 
contributed to balance were worthy of effort.75    
Schelling’s book really defined the realm of deterrence as a strategy.  In the 
nuclear age Schelling described military strategy and that it could no longer be viewed 
as the sole province of military victory.  Policy makers and military officers had to deal 
with the “art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence.”76  Schelling described the path the 
United States and Soviet Union followed in fashioning the dialogue of nuclear diplomacy.  
Schelling defined deterrence and compellence, essentially deterrence was both a threat 
and a promise.  If an adversary does something we will counter but if the adversary does 
not act in a manner contrary to what we desire there is a promise of cooperation on 
another topic.  Compellence involves an act of punishment that continues until the 
adversary acts to stop the punishment.77    Schelling wrote of war saying, “War no longer 
looks like just a contest of strength.  War and the brink of war are more a contest of 
nerve and risk-taking, of pain and endurance.”  In a reference to Vietnam and possibly 
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the wars of the future Schelling wrote, “Small wars embody the threat of larger war; they 
are not just military engagements but “crisis diplomacy.””78  Schelling’s seminal work on 
the theory and language of deterrence in the nuclear age informed the debate on the 
development of force and the use of force.  Waltz and Schelling were describing a new 
language of politics and as Clausewitz wrote at the end of Book Eight, Chapter Six of 
ON WAR, “the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of 
politics.”79   
The transformation of the art of war and politics included the language of 
deterrence, both nuclear, as Schelling and Waltz wrote, and at the operational level, the 
use of nuclear weapons in Europe.  Strategic nuclear weapons would serve to deter war 
to the ultimate limit, but how would tactical nuclear weapons be integrated into both the 
defense of Europe, primarily, and if deterrence failed then how would these weapons 
actually be used in the conduct of a defense.  This concept was, to put it mildly, studied 
very deeply. In the view of a theater level of war, Europe, there was both nuclear 
deterrence and conventional deterrence. 
Nuclear weapons were an integral part of the defense of Western Europe against 
the Warsaw Pact.  NATO Forces needed to conduct a successful defense long enough 
for reinforcements from the United States to arrive.  This defense of Western Europe 
required a balance of early detection/alert and mobilization, forward conventional 
defense, conventional deterrence and the integration of tactical nuclear weapons.  The 
challenge of balance was chiefly an issue of political control.  The release and the 
ultimate authorization for use of these weapons was a political decision.  Charles Daniel, 
in his work, Nuclear Planning in NATO PitfalIs of First Use, wrote about Secretary of 
Defense McNamara’s proposal for a “flexible response” strategy.  The purpose of 
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Flexible Response was to state that the alliance is willing to use nuclear weapons but 
will work to avoid situations that provoke aggression and the dilemma of either 
appeasement/surrender or use of nuclear weapons.80 
The Flexible Response strategy sounded good as a public statement but the 
detail underpinning the actual execution of the strategy required a great deal of work 
within NATO, Europe and the U.S in the form of the development and rehearsal of plans 
as well as tactical exercises.  Writing in 1989, Stephen Cimbala’s work, NATO Strategy 
and Nuclear Escalation, cited deficiencies in the Flexible Response strategy.  These 
deficiencies, covered in further detail in chapter three, ranged from an understanding of 
terms between U.S. and European leaders to conventional force ratio discrepancies.  
NATO planners also had rising concerns over the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Operational 
Maneuver Group, OMG.  The real challenge of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact 
Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) was, according to C.N. Donnelly, it presented 
NATO with a problem, “at precisely that level with which it is at present least well 
organized to cope – the operational level.”81  The OMG was a concept coming into 
practice that could disrupt NATO defenses and preclude nuclear strikes.82  Donnelly’s 
warning flags over the OMG and the operational level of planning highlighted the need 
for officers who could plan for and execute large unit operations, and contributed to the 
impetus for SAMS.  The concern over the OMG led to the development of the NATO 
concept of Forward Defense. 
In 1987 Charles Daniel reviewed a series of works on nuclear planning and 
concluded that a Soviet/Warsaw Pact first strike on U.S. theater nuclear forces and 
                                                 
80
     Charles Daniel, Nuclear Planning In NATO Pitfalls of First Use. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 
Publishing Co., 1987, p. 15.  Hereafter cited as Daniel.   
81
     European Security Study (ESECS).  Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: 
Proposals for the 1980s.  A report of the Steering Group.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 133.  
Hereafter cited as ESECS.   
82
     Stephen J. Cimbala, NATO Strategy and Nuclear Escalation.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989, p. 161/163.  Hereafter cited as Cimbala.   
  
39 
 
command & control facilities could so disrupt the overall political control over nuclear 
release that a deliberate escalation would be impossible.83  The NATO concept of 
Forward Defense focused on a strong defense along the inter-German border that would 
blunt a Warsaw Pact attack.  The NATO concept fit well into the U.S. active defense 
doctrine but did not sit well with professional officers who felt that defense, while the 
stronger form of warfare was not decisive and could not achieve conditions of victory for 
NATO.  The Forward Defense concept was accepted by the political leaders in NATO.  
The European Security Study, a committee convened by NATO defense ministers in 
1982, endorsed the doctrine of Forward Defense.  The study concluded that the NATO 
alliance could not trade space for time given the geographic distribution of the NATO 
population, especially in the Central Region.84  Just as there was controversy within the 
U.S. Army over the concept of active defense there was similar controversy within 
European armies over Forward Defense. 
 The controversy over Forward Defense was the impression that it was Maginot 
line like and static.  Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany’s army, the 
Bundeswehr, preferred to think of operational level counter-offensives with corps and 
armies.85  The challenge contained within AirLand Battle doctrine was in conducting 
offensive and counter-offensive operations that crossed the inter-German border and 
strike deep into Warsaw Pact territory might provoke Soviet nuclear reaction.   
Follow-on Forces Attack stirred its own controversies again mainly focused on 
the nuclear threshold and NATO alliance stability.   Charles Daniel made a case that 
Follow on Forces Attack, FOFA, the NATO version of deep attack would not raise the 
nuclear threshold but rather increased the likelihood of nuclear exchange in Europe as 
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command & control targets, delivery systems and storage sites would be high on the 
target list for NATO non-nuclear attack.  The fundamental essence of Charles’ argument 
was NATO must ensure nuclear weapons remained under policy maker/political control 
while conducting a political military engagement with the Warsaw Pact to build 
confidence to resolve crises.  NATO should also continue to reduce nuclear stock piles.  
Removing nuclear warheads from mines, division level artillery and antiaircraft missiles 
would stream line planning and enhance civil control.86  Daniel recommended using 
NATO funds to harden command & control facilities, aircraft shelters, build redundant 
communications systems and increase stock piles of spare parts and ammunition.  
These moves along with confidence building measures with the Warsaw Pact would be 
a better investment in conventional deterrence.87  Daniel was not in favor of early release 
of nuclear weapons or FOFA.  He advocated more in depth conventional defensive 
means as a measure of deterrence.  Daniel was rather pessimistic about the chances of 
FOFA.  The European Security Commission had a different view. 
 The European Security Commission study saw deficiencies in the NATO doctrine 
of Forward Defense, despite endorsing it.  ESECS found that FOFA differed from 
AirLand Battle, ALB, in that the Soviet interpretation was that ALB equaled pre-emption 
which potentially heralded the early use of nuclear weapons.  U.S. forces seizing the 
initiative by crossing the inter-German border into East Germany when the Soviets 
crossed into West Germany would also potentially disrupt the NATO alliance as some 
nations viewed the alliance as a strictly defensive in nature.88  Forward Defense had to 
be strengthened as a NATO concept to both blunt an initial Warsaw Pact attack and 
degrade the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move second echelon forces.  The ability to 
mount a strong forward defense and conduct effective deep attacks rested on NATO, 
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specifically U.S. modernization initiatives. 
Stephen Cimbala, a critic of Flexible Response and Forward Defense wrote that 
U.S. modernization measures enacted in the 1980s (the “Big Five” weapons systems) 
would significantly threaten the Soviet land lines of communication running from the 
western Soviet Union through Poland and East Germany.  The combination of linking 
Apache attack helicopters with Air Force strike aircraft followed by ground units 
equipped with M1 tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles crossing into East 
Germany, all coordinated by a doctrine that focused the purpose of deep strike 
operations troubled Cimbala and, he supposed, the Soviets.  Cimbala postulated that 
the Soviet lines of communication would be so disrupted by deep attack/FOFA that 
these operations would preclude the smooth movement of Warsaw Pact resupply and 
reinforcements.  Land battles would allow time for maritime forces to assure NATO sea 
lines of communication remained open and assure the arrival of US reinforcements in 
France.89  He also wrote that there was some deterrent value in the declarative Army 
doctrine, FM 100-5, 1982.  Cimbala wrote that Army doctrine was, “remarkably realistic 
and straightforward.”  He described Army doctrine as, “Exemplary,” and that 
the,”…recent set of Army tactical doctrinal refinements known as AirLand Battle,” was 
based on securing and retaining the initiative by striking blows at the coherence of 
enemy formations and operations vice bringing fires only on the tip of the spear of a 
Warsaw Pact penetration of a forward defense.90  The ability to exercise command and 
control of the close fight, at the tip of the enemy spear, and the deep fight that attacked 
the coherence of follow on enemy formations was the essence of the concept of the 
operational level of war and the operational art.   
The leadership of the Army set in motion the intellectual movement toward 
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inclusion of the operational level of war into its doctrine in response to this full range of 
concepts of defense in Europe, as well as concepts on how to fight in light of the results 
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  Pressures from NATO countries to adopt a doctrine of 
defending in the central region of Europe, forward defense, while dovetailing well with 
the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, did not satisfy the experience of the Army officer 
corps that led it to demand counter-offensive operations and offensive operations 
against the Warsaw Pact and other potential adversaries as the best means of 
conventional response and to raise the nuclear threshold.  In chapter three this feeling 
within the officer corps will be further discussed.  This effort would prevent the use of 
nuclear weapons during the course of actual combat, if this event took place in Europe, 
while retaining the deterrent value of the weapons.   
Demonstrated competence with the Army “Big Five” family of weapons systems 
coming into the European theater was enhanced by the unveiling of the 1982 version of 
Field Manual 100-5.  The defensive was the stronger form of war, but the combination of 
these new weapons systems, employed by an officer and non-commissioned officer 
corps trained and educated in the execution of defensive and offensive operations would 
reinforce nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence, and this fact would indeed 
“raise” the nuclear threshold. 
The Army needed to focus on fighting the Soviet Union and developing a strong 
conventional Army.  The focus on Vietnam had robbed the Army of spirit.  As Robert 
Scales wrote, “Forty percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly 
hashish; a significant minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin.”91  Faced with this 
reality and the growing Soviet threat the focus on the potential battlefield of Europe it 
was necessary to revitalize the Army.  The first step in doctrine toward this revitalization 
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was the release of the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations of Army Forces 
in the Field.  This manual firmly focused the Army on Europe and the complexities of 
fighting a numerically superior Warsaw Pact force.  The manual promulgated the notion 
of “active defense,” that is identifying the enemy main effort on the battlefield and 
maneuvering forces to defeat it.  The statement of the doctrine was widely understood 
throughout the Army.  The doctrine also caused unease as the results of war game after 
war game showed, as Huba Wass de Czege wrote, commanders could, “beat the 
leading Soviet echelons using the ‘active defense’ but that the initial battles would render 
our units ineffective…”92  The first battles in war games allowed second echelon forces 
freedom of action, despite air interdiction.  These war games, as well as a considerable 
number of articles published in Military review and Parameters led to the rewriting of FM 
100-5.  The weight of articles also required a theoretical underpinning for any effort to re-
write the key operational doctrine of the Army.  A new translation of Clausewitz’ classic, 
ON WAR, made the German philosopher’s theory of war widely available to the U.S. 
Army officer corps.93 
Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation of Carl von Clausewitz book, 
ON WAR was published in 1976.  A widely read translation of Clausewitz with 
explanatory essays, this work put Clausewitz in the hands of the American officer corps.  
This work from the 19th century on a theory of war as an extension of policy informed the 
debate on Army reform and guided the ideas of those working on refining the curricula at 
the Army Staff and War College.  The opening essays in this translation, by Peter Paret, 
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Sir Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie and especially Brodie’s closing essay, A Guide 
to the reading of ON WAR, were equally useful in making Clausewitz understandable for 
a broader audience within the American Army officer corps. 
Peter Paret wrote The Genesis of ON WAR, the opening essay of this translation 
of Clausewitz’ work in which he explained the theoretical underpinning of the work.  The 
audience was both civilians and military officers involved in the development of strategy.  
Paret wrote in his essay, “The theory of any activity, even if it aimed at effective 
performance rather than comprehensive understanding, must discover the essential, 
timeless elements of this activity, and distinguish them from its temporary features.”  He 
went on to focus this theory, and how Clausewitz used it, on the nature of war itself 
writing, “Violence and political impact were two of the permanent characteristics of war.  
Another was the free play of human intelligence, will, and emotions.  These were the 
forces that dominated the chaos of warfare…”94  Paret also focused the reader of ON 
WAR on the dual nature of war as explained by Clausewitz.  The dual nature of war is 
expressed in two potential pairs of conflicts.  These are; war waged to destroy the 
enemy and force him to accept any terms or war waged to acquire territory in order to 
either retain it or use it as a bargaining offer in peace negotiations.95 
Sir Michael Howard’s opening essay in ON WAR was titled “The Influence of 
Clausewitz,” it is a history of Clausewitz’ influence on the study of war.  Howard also 
cautioned the student on reading too much into ON WAR.  He wrote that Clausewitz was 
a soldier writing for soldiers and not for “world statesmen conducting international politics 
in an age of nuclear plenty.”96  Howard did conclude that although the times in which 
Clausewitz wrote were long past it was still appropriate to study ON WAR as it offered 
insights into problems Clausewitz could not have foreseen, the world of “nuclear plenty.” 
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Bernard Brodie contributed two essays in this translation of ON WAR, an opening 
essay on the continuing relevance of ON WAR and the concluding essay a guide to the 
reading of ON WAR.  Brodie begins his essay citing a retired British officer of exalted 
rank and not lacking in intelligence who told Brodie he had once tried to read Clausewitz 
but got nothing out of it.  Brodie explained how to avoid this misunderstanding of 
Clausewitz.  The reader must be willing to invest time for reflection on “Clausewitz’s 
ideas, though densely packed in…are generally simple and…clearly expressed in 
jargon-free language.”  Brodie assures the reader that “he will not be hindered by 
abstruse language or difficult-to-fathom ideas.”97  Brodie’s guide to reading ON WAR 
provides a path toward the dual goal of reflecting and understanding enroute to 
achieving wisdom.  The utility of ON WAR, as pointed out by all of these historians, is it 
provided a theoretical framework for the study of war and the development of strategy. 
Colonel Harry Summers wrote a critical review of Vietnam in 1978.  Summers 
used a Clausewitzian analysis of Vietnam to explain why when the U.S. Army 
accomplished all of its tactical tasks in Vietnam and still failed.  The answer to this 
question was according to Summers due in part to the fact that, “we (the Army) saw 
Vietnam as unique rather than in strategic context.”  Summers believed that this 
strategic misconception “grew out of our neglect of military strategy in the post-World 
War II nuclear era.”98  Summers work reintroduced the American Army officer corps to 
the concept that war is an extension of policy.  This work had a profound impact on the 
officer corps.  Summers argued that the Army must not just do what it knows, namely 
tactics and logistics, leaving policy to the President and the people around him.  
Summers major point was that the American Army and its’ officer corps must study 
strategy, and participate in the development of national strategy.  He wrote, “The 
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quintessential “strategic lesson learned” from the Vietnam war is that we must once 
again become masters of the profession of arms.”99  Summers used Clausewitzian 
theory to frame his analysis and the quotation that guided the discussion, indeed all 
relevant retrospectives of Vietnam and its lessons learned is in Book One of Clausewitz’ 
ON WAR, “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 
statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they 
are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to 
its true nature.  This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”100  
Continuous tactical battlefield victories are not in and of themselves the guarantor of 
overall victory.  War is an extension of policy by other means, and war is more than the 
application of military might.  War must be the reasoned application of all the elements of 
national power to attain a policy goal.  Summers was a combat proven Soldier from 
Korea and Vietnam, he was not viewed as an outside intellectual who had never walked 
in Army boots.   
Rigidity of thought and interpretation of policy and strategy was Summers’ focus 
but can also be inferred from Waltz, Schelling and Weigley as a dangerous component 
within military circles.  Edwin Yoder, writing in Diplomatic History in 1996, cites Robert 
McNamara speaking of the complaints against civilian interference in running the war in 
Vietnam and civilian or policy restrictions.  Yoder also wrote a critique of the senior 
uniformed military that goes to the heart of Summers’ argument,” It is perhaps a defect 
of their rigorous dedication to the doctrine of civilian supremacy that some generals and 
admirals take no sympathetic interest in the larger political and strategy issues that  
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haunt their civilian superiors…”101  Rigidity of thought has its roots in the doctrines used 
by the military, another subject of debate on how to reform the Army in Vietnam’s 
aftermath.  
Barry Posen’s book, Sources of Military Doctrine, was published in 1984 and was 
widely read inside and outside the Army appearing on the required reading lists in CGSC 
and SAMS, as well as security studies programs at Harvard and MIT.  This book was 
used by the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 to force change on the Army from the outside.102  Posen drew heavily from 
the interwar period, between WWI and WWII for examples of lasting change on methods 
of war, mostly German, and fleeting change, mostly British and French.  He used two 
theories to review case studies of battles in 1940, organizational theory and balance of 
power theory.   Coming during a period of reflection on where the Army fit into the 
national security structure Posen’s book offered harsh judgments of the nature of 
militaries and how they innovate.   
Based on his review of history in the interwar period Posen wrote that with the 
growing specialization of military profession and a corresponding lack of understanding 
of the military within policy makers coupled with the tendency of the military to seek as 
much independence as possible from civilian interference true political-military  
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integration was extremely difficult.103  Posen also noted, “As a rule, soldiers are not going 
to go out of their way to reconcile the means they employ with the ends of state policy.” 
Posen argued that without civilian intervention, in accord with his analysis of 
organization theory, “Each service will prepare for its own war.  Forces will not cooperate 
effectively.”104   
Military innovation is only possible, Posen wrote, under two circumstances, 
“military organizations innovate when they have failed—suffered a defeat—and…they 
innovate when civilians intervene from without.”105  The review of military doctrine from 
the perspective of balance of power theory reinforced Posen’s assessments.  In short 
balance of power theory applies in bi-polar and multi-polar international situations.  
Balance of power theory requires that statesmen engage in “balancing” actions that 
sustain the effectiveness of deterrence.  Military organizations will not balance unless 
made to do so, as military organizations prefer offensive doctrines as these doctrines 
reduce uncertainty presumably by retaining initiative in battle and forcing one’s opponent 
to react to the offensive power’s actions.  Posen wrote, “Military doctrines are important 
because they affect the stability of the international political system and the security of 
states.”106  Posen wrote, “Stagnant doctrines may lead to disintegration.  They may also 
lead to defeat on the battlefield.”107  Given the perceived state of the balance of power in 
this time and Posen’s skillful use of the history of the interwar years up to 1940, his book 
influenced the debate of what should be done in the Army. 
Stephen Rosen wrote, Winning the Next War, in 1991.  While it entered into the 
debate on Army reform just outside the period of the mid 1970s to mid 1980s it was 
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nonetheless influential as the debate on refining the influence of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act that was still underway.  Rosen, in a counter to Posen, proposed that innovation in 
developing doctrine comes best from within an organization like the Army and in concert 
with civilian leaders.  Rosen looked at innovation in peacetime, wartime, and 
technological innovation and the influence of all three areas on a military’s ability to 
achieve victory.  At the start of the book Rosen wrote, “This book focuses on successful 
innovations, not on failure to innovate, because in bureaucracies the absence of 
innovation is the rule, the natural state.”108 
In a reference to Vietnam Rosen wrote, “Defeat by itself does not tell a military 
organization what future wars will look like, only that its preparations for the war just 
ended were inadequate.”109  Army reform would entail what Rosen called an “ideological 
struggle” as the face of future wars would define what the branches within the Army 
would look like in the future, which would also determine the monies these branches 
would receive.110  This is a smaller scale of the interservice rivalries, Army, Navy, and Air 
Force that such future visions involve.  Rosen wrote that innovation, “redefines the 
values that legitimate the activities of the…military organization…”  The ideological 
struggle Rosen wrote of  would, “revolve around a new theory of victory, an explanation 
of what the next war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be war.”111  The 
need for “a new theory” required an effort to educate officers in order to develop such a 
theory of victory and how to implement it throughout the Army.   
Rosen also reflected the thoughts of Yale, et al in a description of the Army 
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failing to react to a directive to develop a capability to conduct counter-insurgency 
operations.  Ordered to develop this capability by President Kennedy the Army chose 
not to put is full weight behind the effort because in part the Army “believed in the 
superiority of conventionally trained infantry and that conventional wars would continue 
to dominate the army’s strategic requirements.”112  Rosen concluded that solely civilian 
interference was not the best path to ensure innovation in the military.  The best path 
forward to ensure a vision of the future that informed both the development of forces and 
the use of force to attain policy objectives was a mutual civilian and military solution.  
Rosen recommended the development of a strategy that focused on, “the management 
of uncertainty,” and one that would, “look beyond war with the Soviet Union.”113   Rosen’s 
work contributed to attempts to modify portions of the Goldwater-Nichols reform that 
mandated specific change in diminishing service roles in strategy development. 
The world in which the question of Army reform was debated was framed by the 
withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent defeat of South Vietnam by the North, the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the War Powers Act of 1973, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986.  These events and questions of strategy and force development had to be 
answered in order to determine what must be done for the Army of the Republic. 
This line of thinking was reinforced in many ways by the RETO study, as well as 
by Summers, Weigley, and even Rosen and Posen.  Wass de Czege was realistic 
though as he wrote, “We are a pragmatic army.  Education, even in our profession (or 
especially in our profession), is not highly valued.”114  Wass de Czege, supported by key 
general officers in the Army senior leadership, prevailed in establishing the School of 
Advanced Military Studies.  This Army decision combined with the development of new 
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doctrine that was influenced by Weigley, Posen, Rosen and others indicated which 
school of thought won in the debate over what should be done.      
 The purpose of this chapter was to review what historians and theorists thought 
the important questions were concerning U.S. Army doctrinal reform in the aftermath of 
the Vietnam War, from roughly the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s.  The answer to the 
question should Vietnam lessons learned from the basis of Army doctrine was a 
resounding NO.  Preparing for small wars was left behind as the Army turned its focus to 
Europe and the challenge of dealing with the massive army of the Soviet Union.  The 
theory was that if the Army could contend with the Red Army it could then deal just as 
well with small wars.  The future would demonstrate the weakness of the theory.   
 The answer to the question of how best to reform the Army, by civil direction 
alone or in concert with senior Army leadership was civil direction.  The Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986, developed in the early 1980s, directed sweeping change for the 
entire defense establishment.  The leadership of the Army developed a new approach to 
education, and decided to focus on the Soviet Union and a potential battle in the central 
region of Europe, informed by the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  The need for 
serious thought on the use of conventional force to raise the nuclear threshold 
contributed to the Army’s thinking on follow-on forces attack or deep battle.  Posen was 
correct here as civil leadership was not interested in single service doctrine, hearings 
were held on Goldwater-Nichols compliance and the development of Army weapons  
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systems, but not on the development of the doctrine for the use of the weapons.115  The 
leadership of the Army appeared to decide to concentrate on the realms of tactics and 
operational art and left the realm of strategy to civilians.  In his book, Summers pointed 
out this as an error in the pre-Vietnam era and argued for the Army officer corps to pay 
attention to strategy.  The school of thought that dominated the direction of reform in the 
U.S. Army focused the Army on those areas in which the Army could dominate the 
discussion and claim subject matter expertise, namely tactics, operational art, and 
weapons system design.  This decision continues to influence that Army as officers 
educated under these conditions are now in positions of command and influence in the 
Army and Department of Defense. 
 Historians, international relations specialists, and active and retired officers 
joined in the intense debate over what should be done.  The history and theory of the 
time informed the debate.  The results remain to be analyzed in the course of time and in 
light of the course of the Army of the Republic since this tumultuous period.  Doctrine 
became a real engine of change in the Army, promulgated by practitioners from SAMS. 
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Chapter Three 
The Operational Level of War and U.S. Army Doctrine 
 
The post-Vietnam years in the U.S. Army were, among other things, a time of 
reflection.  In addition to answering the question posed by some within the force and 
many outside, “Why an Army,” those charged with the responsibility of anticipating future 
conflicts were also asking, “How should the U.S. Army prepare to fight?”116  In pursuit of  
an answer to this question, Army doctrine writers looked chiefly at how to fight the 
armies of the Warsaw Pact in the central region of Europe and also considered such 
related issues as the use of tactical nuclear weapons, decisions affecting major weapons 
systems, and analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  Taken together, these concerns 
were of pivotal influence in the move toward the introduction of the operational level of 
war as a central component of U.S. Army doctrine.  The miasma arising from the ashes 
of America’s strategic defeat in Vietnam created an atmosphere conducive to the 
reconsideration of the role of the Army in strategy and operational art.  As discussed 
previously, this ten year period was tumultuous with major decisions taken regarding 
Army major weapons systems acquisition, rebuilding of the Army education system, and 
refocusing of the Army on fighting conventional wars.  This chapter will focus on a review 
of the trends in the Army in the late 70s and early 80s. These trends included a 
consideration of limited war, theater nuclear war, the move to “raise the nuclear 
threshold,” and conventional forces as a part of overall deterrence.  The “capstone 
events” of this era was the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 Operations.  
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Significantly, several of the key people involved in founding what was to become the 
School of Advanced Military Studies also participated in writing this seminal doctrinal 
manual. 
One key to this transformation of thinking was a book written by Colonel Harry 
Summers, Jr., a Vietnam War veteran then serving on the faculty of the Army War 
College.  In 1982 Colonel Summers, Jr. published a short book that looked at the 
question of what went wrong in Vietnam.  Though the events in Vietnam were somewhat 
distant from a focus on operational art and a school to teach this subject, Summers’ 
work was important to the overall tenor of the times.  His critical analysis of the war in 
Vietnam argued that the Army did not view the war as a part of an overall strategy.  He 
further asserted that the strategy of flexible response, proposed by Secretary of Defense 
McNamara for war fighting in Europe, was developed by civilians without any substantial 
military participation.  The Army, specifically uniformed officers, did not participate in the 
development of this strategy because senior Army leaders felt that the Army’s proper 
role was in preparing the Army for war.  The Army, in Summers’ view, confused the 
requirements between the administrative demands of training and sustaining the Army 
with the requirement to employ the Army in attaining national security objectives.  The 
Army failed to consider the requirements and demands of strategy.  Applying a neo-
Clausewitzian formulation, Summers stated bluntly, “we failed to properly employ our 
armed forces…to secure our national objectives…” 117  Summers did not claim that the 
civilian systems analysts and political scientists whom McNamara had relied were wrong 
in their articulation of flexible response or the national security policy, but that military 
officers were obligated to be involved in the development of these strategies.  Linking 
the analysts’ means to the political scientists’ ends required an informed officer corps 
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and knowledge of the ways of war at the strategic level.  The protection of world-wide 
American interests is most often the cause for the commitment of American armed 
forces.  Active participation by military officers, acting as full participants in the 
development of policy and from that strategy, would lead to the development of policy 
objectives that were more than platitudes.118  Military advice and participation in the 
development of policy and strategy would provide the bridge to solidly reasoned and 
clearly articulated policy statements.  Although there is some distance between the 
arrival of Summers book and the Army doctrine of AirLand Battle Summers efforts 
started the process of thinking on the linkage of policy and strategy to tactics, which is 
the operational level of war and operational art.   
An indication of the depth of the thinking on war going on in the Army and at Fort 
Leavenworth at the time was the issue of the relationship between the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of war.  In order to develop strategists the Army required 
officers who understood the tactical level of war while retaining a grasp on the art and 
science of war as it was executed at the operational and strategic levels.  In 1981 
General Crosbie “Butch” Saint was assigned as the deputy commandant of the 
Command and General Staff College.  Saint inherited the challenge of finding and 
educating these officers upon his assignment to the Command and General Staff 
College from 1981 to 1983.  Saint was an energetic officer.  It was likely that he was 
assigned to Leavenworth to energize the school.  In his retirement oral history interview 
General Saint described the “help” he received in the area of developing strategic 
planners.   
Saint recalled that, “When I was the deputy commandant at Leavenworth, 
General Richardson used to beat me up all the time about strategic planners and we 
don't have any.”  In Saint’s mind a strategic planner needed to understand the regions of 
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the world and how a region influenced the development of strategy.  Saint also said that 
a strategic planner had to understand the full range of the capabilities of the joint force, 
which was what the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy bought to warfighting.  
Strategic planners also needed to understand the national decision-making process in 
order to develop a strategic plan that makes best use of joint force capabilities as well as 
attaining military conditions that led to attaining the national objectives of strategy and 
policy. 119  The development of strategy and operational level plans as well as the 
education of officers who could develop strategy and strategic plans was a part of the 
refinement of the Army’s view of warfare in the post-Vietnam years.  Summers 
articulated the Army’s failure to understand the process.  Saint, Richardson, and other 
senior generals were taking decisions to put into place an educational system that would 
ensure that the Army had officers with a solid grounding in the tactical realities of 
warfighting and upon that foundation then to develop a cadre of officers who could step 
up from tactics to the operational and strategic levels of war.  This deliberate decision, 
one in a series of decisions during this period, stressed selecting the officers suited for 
this career path, educating them, and then following up on the education by placing 
them into positions where they would come to understand the totality of the strategic 
system.  Summers, Richardson, and others started the Army on this path.   
In 1982 Summers’ book was adopted into the teaching curricula at both the Army 
War College and Command and General Staff College.  While some disputed the 
specific arguments about Vietnam he set forth, the treatise did establish the conditions 
for a more enlightened discussion of the development of strategy and the military’s role 
in the process.  This strategic discussion also prompted a deeper discourse about linking 
strategy to tactics and regarding the formal introduction of the operational level of war 
into the lexicon of the Army.   
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In an essay published in Military Review introducing the 1986 version of FM 100-
5 GEN Richardson clearly linked the execution of operational art to the army, army 
group and NATO command level, identifying the Army corps as a transitional 
headquarters capable of command at the tactical and operational level.  In this essay 
Richardson also encourage the officer corps of the U.S. Army to study the operational 
art irrespective of the level of command in which they served.  He said that there were 
officers, and by inference he included general officers in his statements, who mistakenly 
“equated the notions of forward thinking, anticipation and maneuver solely with 
operational-level endeavors while relegating fire and movement to only tactical 
undertakings.”120  Forward thinking, anticipation and maneuver were central ideas in the 
new doctrine and all officers, in Richardson’s mind, had to attain a deep level of 
understanding of the doctrine to effectively execute operations in accord with doctrinal 
principles.  The Command and General Staff College and SAMS would assist in the 
education of officers on these principles. 
The term “operational art” was not used by any of the initial sponsors of SAMS.  
Generals Richardson, Saint and Merritt held different ideas about the type of general 
staff officers that school would produce and how the school would hone the skills of the 
officers selected to attend.  They were in full agreement, however, with regard to their 
desire to have officers in the Army who were schooled in the handling of large 
formations, divisions, corps and armies.  In the 1970s as the U.S. Army was struggling to 
recast itself the senior leaders of the Army looked across the area called the inter-
German border and saw Warsaw Pact and Soviet armies and army groups.  To fight 
those large formations successfully, the U.S. Army needed to know how to plan and 
execute maneuvers at that level.   
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Dr. Roger Spiller, then a member of the CGSC faculty recalled the Department of 
Command, a department of the college that was disestablished in the late 1970s.  The 
Department of Command listed courses, “evidently of pre-WW2 vintage, directly 
addressed what was called "Large Unit Operations."  These courses, as Spiller recalled 
dealt with the command, as opposed to the staff control of corps and higher level 
formations.  Spiller also recalled that during his tenure at CGSC the Army corps was the 
highest level of formation the Department of Tactics covered “and then only 
infrequently.”  Spiller believed, as Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder did, that the 
College was suffering from a lack of understanding the nature and conduct of war and 
thus turned to, as Wass de Czege described, “cookie cutter” solutions to tactical 
problems.  These solutions were easier to grade for an inexperienced faculty and, as 
Spiller asserted, marked the tendency to “to look at war through the lens of the staff 
(mainly planners) and to ignore the role of the commander and his art.  The underlying 
assumption seemed to be that if you had bright planners, the commanders didn't matter 
so much.  It was an attitude Jomini would've instantly approved.”121   
 The conclusion these generals, Richardson, Saint, and Merritt, drew was the 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was not educating officers in the art and 
science of the maneuver of large units over distance.  The College was faced with a zero 
sum game in terms of what to add to the curriculum.  As the interests of the Army moved 
towards force development, weapons systems development and acquisition, etc, time 
focused on the tactics of large units was squeezed from the curriculum.  The Army had 
not maneuvered corps and armies in battle since Korea so other education requirements 
were taking priority.  As senior generals looked across the inter-German border they saw 
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Soviet Army operational level formations and knew there was a need to face those 
formations with similar NATO formations.  The inclusion of the operational level of war 
and the notion of operational art was a significant moment in the development of Army 
doctrine.  
 The Red Army of the Soviet Union, specifically Marshall M.N. Tukhachevskii, 
conceived and refined the idea of Deep Operation theory and the overarching concept of 
the operational level of war.  Reacting to the waste on the eastern front of World War I 
as well as the poor performance of the Red Army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-
1940, Tukhachevskii placed the Red Army on the path to develop, refine, practice and 
ultimately perfect a system of the operational level of war that linked strategic objectives 
to the tactical actions of armored corps and armies.  The path of Red Army refinement 
led to the formulation of the concept of the Operational Maneuver Group, OMG, 
developed by Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov.  Operational art, in the Soviet view, is the level 
of military art below strategy.  It deals with combat by armies and fronts, which are 
theater-level forces.  Operational success is based on the correct application of tactics, 
much as strategic success is based on the sum of operational results.  Perceived Soviet 
tactical rigidity was the basis for operational agility as the operational level commander 
knew with a degree of certainty where his forces would be and what they would be doing 
at specific points on the battle field.  Soviet Army doctrine and theory was based on a 
scientific approach to warfare.122   
This culmination of Soviet/Russian thought produced changes in NATO’s 
defensive doctrine.  The Soviet Red Army leadership, according to Isby, Naveh, and 
others believed that mass and momentum would preclude a nuclear exchange in 
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Europe.  Later studies of Tukhachevskii’s works and other Red Army theoreticians and 
practitioners of operational level warfare influenced U.S. Army as well as NATO thought 
on warfare at this level.123  One of the first theorists to articulate this level of warfare in 
western thought was Edward Luttwak.  
In 1980 Edward Luttwak wrote an essay for International Security titled “The 
Operational Level of War.”  This timely essay focused the thinking of the officers 
involved in the writing and refinement of the proposed Field Manual 100-5, Operations.  
Luttwak introduced the term operational level of war as the level of command and 
intellectual effort that linked the objectives of strategy to tactical tasks assigned to corps 
and divisions.  Luttwak defined strategy as the balance of political goals and constraints 
with available resources to determine outcomes.  The art of tactics dealt with specific 
tasks assigned to units at this level of war.  Luttwak then proposed that the operational 
level be built on concepts such as blitzkrieg or defense in depth to “attain the goals set 
by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics.”124  The Luttwak essay 
stimulated the thinking of the officers writing new doctrine concerning the linkage of 
campaigns and the operational art.  
The 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5 focused thinking Army-wide on winning 
the first battle of the next war.  While this manual shook the cobwebs from the thinking of 
military officers about war the perception that the manual fostered was that the Army 
focused exclusively on battles.  The manual caused a great deal of debate within the 
Army and eventually caused the development of the notion that tactical battles did not 
win wars alone; rather, as Luttwak, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder among others 
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stated a series of successful campaigns wins wars.  Lieutenant General (retired) L. Don 
Holder, then a lieutenant colonel, a member of the FM 100-5 (1982) writing team later 
recalled: “The Luttwak article was influential and timely.  We in the Army were discussing 
the subject at the time and Ed Luttwak's paper added a lot to that discussion.”125  
 The “how to win battles” debate within of the U.S. Army at this time also included 
arguments about how to prosecute war with tactical nuclear weapons.  This debate 
thinking was essential to deterrence in Europe. 
 Nuclear weapons were an integral part of the defense of Western Europe against 
the Warsaw Pact.  The number of Soviet Army and Warsaw Pact divisions vastly 
outnumbered the divisions fielded by NATO.  A critical reality was that the forces in 
NATO had to defend the alliance’s territory long enough for reinforcements from the 
United States to arrive.  This defense of Western Europe had to balance early alert and 
mobilization, forward conventional defense and the integration of nuclear weapons.  The 
challenge of integrating the planning for conventional, non-nuclear defensive measures 
and nuclear weapons involved many complex issues chief of which was the issue of 
political control.  Nuclear weapons, their release and the ultimate authorization for use 
were political decisions.  The path to operational level doctrine included coming to grips 
with nuclear planning. 
 In 1962 during a conference in Athens, Secretary of Defense McNamara 
proposed to Alliance defense ministers that NATO improve its ability to respond to a 
crisis without resort to nuclear weapons.  Five years later, in 1967 NATO adopted a 
“flexible response” strategy.126   
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 The Flexible Response strategy sounded good as a public statement, but the 
detail underpinning the actual execution of the strategy required a great deal of work 
within NATO, Europe and the U.S.  Charles Daniel wrote that “the need to raise the 
nuclear threshold is a decisive reason for the development by NATO of a more robust, 
imaginative, and effective conventional capability.”127  The purpose of Flexible Response 
was to make clear that the alliance is willing to use nuclear weapons but would work to 
avoid situations that provoked aggression and the dilemma of either 
appeasement/surrender or use of nuclear weapons. 
Writing in 1989, Stephen Cimbala cited deficiencies in the Flexible Response 
strategy.  First of all, there was a different understanding of the term among U.S. and 
European armies and political leaders.  In the U.S. the strategy meant that the theater 
conventional forces were a viewed as a “denial weapon,” which meant the mission of 
ground forces in theater was to buy time against a Soviet invasion and thus were to 
preserve response options even after the initiation of hostilities.  In Europe, conventional 
forces were seen as a trip wire that triggered nuclear release which was the ultimate 
deterrent of the Soviet forces.  Second, Cimbala pointed out that Flexible Response 
surrendered the initiative to the Warsaw Pact as the Soviets could select the time and 
place for an attack into Western Europe.  Finally, Flexible Response did not compensate 
for conventional force deficiencies by substituting nuclear weapons for them. 
  NATO planners also had rising concerns over the Warsaw Pact/Soviet 
Operational Maneuver Group, OMG.  The real challenge of the Soviet Union/Warsaw 
Pact Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) was, according to C.N. Donnelly, it presented 
NATO with a problem, “at precisely that level with which it is at present least well 
organized to cope – the operational level.”128  The OMG was a concept coming into 
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practice that could disrupt NATO defenses and preclude nuclear strikes.129  This concern 
led to the development of the NATO concept of Forward Defense. 
In 1987 Charles Daniel reviewed a series of studies on nuclear planning and 
concluded that a Soviet/Warsaw Pact first strike on U.S. theater nuclear forces and 
command & control facilities could so disrupt the overall political control over nuclear 
release that a deliberate escalation would be impossible.130  The NATO concept of 
Forward Defense focused on what the name implied, namely a strong defense along the 
inter-German border that would blunt a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack.  The NATO concept 
fit well into the U.S. active defense doctrine but did not sit well with professional officers 
who felt that defense, while the stronger form of warfare was not decisive and could not 
achieve conditions of victory for NATO.  The Forward Defense concept was accepted by 
the political leaders in NATO.  The European Security Study, a committee convened by 
NATO defense ministers in 1982, endorsed the doctrine of Forward Defense.  The study 
concluded that the NATO alliance could not trade space for time given the geographic 
distribution of the NATO population, especially in the Central Region.131  Just as there 
was controversy within the U.S. Army over the concept of active defense there was 
similar controversy within European armies over Forward Defense. 
The essence of this controversy lay in the concept of defense and the role 
offensive operations played in the defense.  The 1976 version of FM 100-5 was 
perceived to be exclusively focused on the defense and restoring the inter-German 
border, a notion to which some nations in NATO also held.  The basis of Forward 
Defense for some NATO officers, factions in the German Army mainly, was defense 
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only. 
 The controversy over Forward Defense was the impression that it was Maginot 
line-like and static.  In  actual fact, Forward Defense  incorporated mobile defense and 
local tactical counter-attacks with deep attack, Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA), which is 
air power focused on interdiction of Warsaw Pact second echelon forces and counter-air.  
Many officers in the Federal Republic of Germany’s army, the Bundeswehr, preferred to 
think of operational level counter-offensives with corps and armies.132  The perceived 
challenge regarding AirLand Battle doctrine was that conducting offensive and counter-
offensive operations that crossed the inter-German border and struck deep into Warsaw 
Pact territory might provoke a Soviet nuclear reaction.   
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war also provoked thought in NATO professional military 
circles.  A concept developed from this thought was the so-called Follow-on Forces 
Attack, or FOFA. 
Follow-on Forces Attack stirred its own controversies again mainly focused on 
the nuclear threshold and NATO alliance stability.   Charles Daniel made a case that 
Follow on Forces Attack, FOFA, the NATO version of deep attack would not raise the 
nuclear threshold but rather increased the likelihood of nuclear exchange in Europe as 
command and control targets, delivery systems and storage sites would be high on the 
target list for NATO non-nuclear attack.  Daniel argued that NATO must ensure nuclear 
weapons remained under policy maker/political control AND that NATO engage with the 
Warsaw Pact to build confidence to resolve crises.  The other part of the argument was 
NATO should also continue to reduce nuclear stock piles.  Removing nuclear warheads 
from mines, division level artillery and antiaircraft missiles would stream line planning 
and enhance civil control.133  Daniel recommended using NATO funds to harden 
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command & control facilities, aircraft shelters, build redundant communications systems 
and increase stock piles of spare parts and ammunition.  These moves along with 
confidence building measures with the Warsaw Pact would be a better investment in 
conventional deterrence.134  Daniel was not in favor of early release of nuclear weapons 
or FOFA.  He advocated more in depth conventional defensive means as a measure of 
deterrence.  Daniel was rather pessimistic about the chances of FOFA.  The European 
Security Commission had a different view. 
 A European Security Commission study completed in 1983 saw deficiencies in 
the NATO doctrine of Forward Defense, despite endorsing it.  ESECS found that FOFA 
differed from AirLand Battle, ALB, in that the Soviet interpretation was that ALB equaled 
pre-emption which potentially heralded the early use of nuclear weapons.  U.S. forces 
seizing the initiative by crossing the inter-German border into East Germany when the 
Soviets crossed into West Germany would also potentially disrupt the NATO alliance as 
some nations viewed the alliance as strictly defensive in nature.  The ESECS concluded, 
though, that these deficiencies could be partially off set by FOFA but defeating the 
second echelon would not win battles if the Warsaw Pact first echelon broke the NATO 
defense.135  Forward Defense had to be strengthened as a NATO [concept] to blunt an 
initial Warsaw Pact attack and to degrade the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move second 
echelon forces.  The ability to mount a strong forward defense and conduct effective 
deep attacks rested on NATO, specifically U.S., modernization initiatives. 
Stephen Cimbala, although a critic of Flexible Response and Forward Defense 
conceded that by the 1990s, if modernization measures (the U.S. “Big Five,” Abrams 
tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle, Apache armed helicopter, Blackhawk troop 
carrying helicopter, and Patriot air defense missile system) were enacted, the Soviet 
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land lines of communication running from the western Soviet Union through Poland and 
East Germany would be so disrupted by deep attack/FOFA conducted by air and land 
forces that these operations would preclude the smooth movement of Warsaw Pact 
resupply and reinforcements.  Land battles would allow time for maritime forces to 
assure NATO sea lines of communication remained open and assure the arrival of US 
reinforcements in France.136  He also wrote that there was some deterrent value in the 
declarative Army doctrine, FM 100-5, 1982.  Cimbala wrote that Army doctrine was, 
“remarkably realistic and straightforward.”  He described Army doctrine as, “Exemplary,” 
and that the,”…recent set of Army tactical doctrinal refinements known as AirLand 
Battle,” was based on securing and retaining the initiative by striking blows at the 
coherence of enemy formations and operations vice bringing fires only on the tip of the 
spear of a Warsaw Pact penetration of a forward defense.137  The ability to exercise 
command and control of the close fight, at the tip of the enemy spear, and the deep fight 
that attacked the coherence of follow on enemy formations was the essence of the 
concept of the operational level of war and the operational art. 
 During this period of study and intellectual reflection on war a number of 
works of fiction were published that explored what effect a modern war in Europe would 
have on Soldiers to the civilians of central Europe and generals to policy makers.  
Prominent among these works was General Sir John Hackett, Jr.’s The Third World War, 
published in 1982.  Hackett commanded the British Army of the Rhine and the NATO's 
Northern Army Group from 1965-1966.  He drew on his World War II combat experience 
as well as his NATO command experience to tell a story of fierce combat and the 
maneuver of large formations of armored units.  Hackett argued two points in his book; 
the necessity for Western Europe to have a strong and coordinated conventional 
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military, and given a strong conventional defense it could be plausible that nuclear 
weapons would not be used in the next world war.  His story did include a limited nuclear 
exchange.  Hackett and other writers argued for strong conventional defenses.138 
Senior commanders in the U.S. Army set in motion the intellectual movement 
toward inclusion of the operational level of war into its doctrine in response to this full 
range of concepts of defense in Europe, as well as concepts on how to fight in light of 
the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  Pressures from NATO countries to adopt a 
doctrine of defending in the central region of Europe, forward defense, while dovetailing 
well with the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, did not satisfy the desires of the U.S. 
Army officer corps.  This heat generated by the debate led many in the U.S. Army officer 
corps to demand counter-offensive operations and offensive operations against the 
Warsaw Pact and other potential adversaries be included in Army doctrine as the best 
means of conventional response and to raise the nuclear threshold.   
The Army needed to focus on fighting the Soviet Union and developing a strong 
conventional Army.  But in reality the U.S. Army of the 1970s was broken.  The focus on 
Vietnam had robbed the Army of spirit.  As Robert Scales wrote of this period, “Forty 
percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly hashish; a significant 
minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin.”139  Furthermore the core of the non-
commissioned officers, the sergeants a functioning Army depended upon, was hurt by 
the Vietnam experience.  The officer corps of the Army, and other services, was also 
dispirited by the strategic defeat suffered in Vietnam.  Faced with this reality and the 
growing Soviet threat, the focus on the potential battlefield of Europe it was necessary to 
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revitalize the Army.140 
  The first step in developing doctrine to guide this revitalization was the release 
of the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field.  This 
manual firmly focused the Army on Europe and the complexities of fighting a numerically 
superior Warsaw Pact force.  The manual promulgated the notion of “active defense,” 
that is, identifying the enemy main effort on the battlefield and maneuvering forces to 
defeat it.  The statement of the doctrine was widely understood throughout the Army.  
The doctrine also caused unease as the results of war game after war game showed, as 
Huba Wass de Czege wrote in 1982, commanders could “beat the leading Soviet 
echelons using the ‘active defense’ but that the initial battles would render our units 
ineffective…”141  The first battles in war games allowed second echelon forces freedom 
of action, despite air interdiction.  These war games led to the rewriting of FM 100-5.  
Commanders in the Army became convinced that they could not defeat the Warsaw 
Pact with units trained in the active defense doctrine.  The limits of active defense 
doctrine were also recognized by civilian theoreticians. 
As discussed previously in chapter two, Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen wrote 
about the development of military doctrine and its lack of coordination with the 
development of national policy.  Posen offered harsh judgments about the nature of 
militaries and how they innovate.  Posen reviewed the history of the interwar period 
between the conclusion of World War I and the start of World War II.  Based on this 
study, he concluded that  the growing specialization of the military profession and a 
corresponding lack of understanding of the military on the part of policy makers, coupled 
with the tendency of the military to seek as much independence as possible from civilian 
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interference,  ensured that true political-military integration proved extremely difficult.142  
Posen also noted, “As a rule, soldiers are not going to go out of their way to reconcile 
the means they employ with the ends of state policy.”143  Posen argued that without 
civilian intervention, in accord with his analysis of organization theory, “Each service will 
prepare for its own war.  Forces will not cooperate effectively.”144  The discourse on the 
Army and Air Force views of AirLand Battle, as well as Forward Defense and Follow-On 
Forces Attack reinforced Posen’s views.  Stephen Rosen took a somewhat contrasting 
position, and reached different conclusions.  Referring to Vietnam, Rosen wrote, “Defeat 
by itself does not tell a military organization what future wars will look like, only that its 
preparations for the war just ended were inadequate.”145  Rosen opined that any far 
reaching effort to achieve reform would also entail an “ideological struggle” as the face of 
future wars would define what the branches within the Army would look like in the 
future.146  This is a smaller scale of the inter-service rivalries, Army, Navy, and Air Force 
that such future visions involve.  Rosen wrote that innovation “redefines the values that 
legitimate the activities of the…military organization…”  The ideological struggle, Rosen 
wrote,  would “revolve around a new theory of victory, an explanation of what the next 
war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be war.”147  John J. Mearsheimer, a 
West Point graduate and academic analyst based at the University of Chicago, was also 
a close observer and critic of doctrine and conventional power.   
Mearsheimer wrote about the proposed application of “active defense” and lateral 
maneuver to fight a Soviet invasion in an essay in 1982 and a book published a year 
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later.  The bold strategy based on a mobile defense of the central region of Europe, he 
argued, would require an agile force that is willing to allow penetration of its forward lines 
and the counter-strokes of forces with a mobility advantage over the opposing force.148  
The application of either applying active defense or AirLand Battle under the NATO 
doctrine of Forward Defense required maneuver for a purpose; a tactical purpose and an 
operational purpose that would be linked to a larger strategic and policy objective.  
Conventional deterrence would be best served by presenting a potential attacker with no 
chance of a rapid, decisive victory but the prospect of an attrition strategy with 
“associated exorbitant costs and…the difficulty of accurately predicting ultimate success 
in a protracted war.”149   Eschewing maneuver for maneuver’s sake, Mearsheimer wrote 
that his examination of a maneuver oriented defense was a, “fundamentally flawed idea.”  
Plans and training at the time resulted in, “At best…a vague prescription so lacking in 
substance that its impact on future policy will be negligible.  At worst, it is a formula for 
disaster.”150  Richard Lock-Pullan, in his book US Intervention Policy and Army 
Innovation, interpreted Mearsheimer’s essay as a NATO wide application of an 
inadequate mobile defense against a large Warsaw Pact/Soviet force.   
The U.S. Army focus on refining Active Defense into AirLand Battle was a 
necessary refinement in the effort to put into place both a solidly based tactical and 
operational level mindset, based on well reasoned doctrine.151  The move toward 
ensuring a viable doctrine of maneuver in balance with firepower was the point of 
developing the 1982 version of FM 100-5.  Conventional deterrence would indeed raise 
                                                 
148
    John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, 
p. 50.  Hereafter cited as Conventional Deterrence. 
149
    Conventional Deterrence, pp. 206/207. 
150
    John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense and the NATO Central Front," 
International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/1982), pp. 104 122. Reprinted in Steven E. Miller, ed., 
Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 231-
249. 
151
    Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq, 
New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 80-85. 
  
71 
 
the nuclear threshold because it would present the potential attacker, the Warsaw Pact, 
with the prospect of a protracted war.  Application of the doctrine of AirLand Battle would 
also present a dilemma for the Warsaw Pact as tactically agile American units armed 
with “Big Five” weapons systems would put teeth into attacking deep into the rear area 
of the Warsaw Pact and disrupt forward movement.  The Army needed a viable doctrine 
to act as its engine of change.  
The basic thrust of the Army effort behind the writing of the 1982 version of FM 
100-5 was to put in place the capstone of all Army doctrine.  The effort at getting FM 
100-5  right started in motion the changes within the Army in terms of how the Army 
would fight and understand the art of war fighting at the tactical and operational levels of 
war.  The effect of the new doctrine was experienced almost immediately throughout the 
Army.  The concept of AirLand Battle answered the questions of unease that the 1976 
version had caused in that first attempt to wrench the Army from the doldrums of the 
post-Vietnam years.  This process of change shook the entire Army as the effects of new 
doctrine, the “Big Five,” and the Army training centers began to affect the field and 
institutional Army. 
General Richardson, Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine 
Command at the time said, “Well, the feelings, I guess, are pretty strong in insuring that 
the Army had a viable doctrine, that it was well expressed in our publications, and that 
the field knew what to do with it.”  The Army, under Richardson’s guidance, published 
the basic capstone field manual in 1982.  Once “on the street,” the Army began to 
respond to the doctrine and to adopt it as its own.  It appeared that this was the right 
doctrine at the right time.  The senior leadership of the Army was very pleased to see the 
depth of the acceptance of the doctrine and how quickly elements of the U.S. Army 
moved to incorporate the guidance in the doctrine into field exercises during 1983-1984.  
In 1985 General Richardson and others realized the guidance in the doctrine 
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needed some fine tuning, especially in regards to the development of the concepts that 
underpinned the operational level of war.  Richardson and other senior Army generals 
wanted to ensure that there was “sufficient jointness” in the manual as the impact of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was being felt in the services.  There 
was also had occurred some feedback from field commanders, especially in Europe, to 
reinforce the precise balance between offensive and the defensive operations.  
Richardson requested that his fellow general officers and their staffs review the field 
manual and other writings coming out at the time to ensure that “people who had some 
real concerns or questions about clarification…” were heard.152  Richardson recalled to 
Fort Leavenworth the original threesome who wrote the 1982 version of the field manual; 
Huba Wass de Czege, Rick Sinnreich, and Don Holder, and these officers went through 
several iterations of a revision.  The effort included both new doctrinal concepts and a 
repackaging of ideas introduced in the 1982 version of the manual.  However, the 
refinement process retained the dynamic of the first effort under Richardson’s control. 
The writing team developed a draft and sent the document to General 
Richardson.  Richardson commented on the draft and returned it for update in early 
1986.  The writing team, by this time so in tune with Richardson, then would include 
some of his scrawled recommendations and discard others.  Once a final draft was 
ready for a wider review, Richardson sent the manual out for comments from the field 
and wider institutional Army.  The circulation of the draft prompted more responses 
throughout the Army and the writing team received some good comments to be 
incorporated in the manual.  This penultimate draft was sent to the U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff, Gen. John J. Wickham, for his approval.  The draft was also sent to General 
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Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for his approval.  This was a key 
step in the process as Rogers was serving not only as an Army general but the 
commander of NATO forces.  U.S. Army doctrine had to be applicable to Europe as the 
key area on the planet where NATO forces faced Warsaw Pact forces.  Doctrine as well 
as equipment had to be interoperable.  Richardson obtained the approval of both Rogers 
and the Army Chief and sent the new manual to the presses in March of 1986.   To 
ensure wide acceptance and understanding of the new doctrine, Richardson wrote an 
essay for Military Review in its March 1986 issue.153 
Richardson’s purpose was to urge the Army, “to study the doctrine, understand it, 
practice it, and then for the school systems to take the doctrine and apply it to all the 
subordinate manuals that were a follow-on from that Capstone manual.” 154  The 
advocacy by the Commanding General carried considerable weight with the institutional 
Army  Richardson saw the publication of the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 as the 
doctrinal base for AirLand Battle and for all other doctrinal manuals in the Army, from 
tactics to helicopter operations, intelligence collection to supply distribution.  As 
TRADOC’s commander, Richardson viewed FM 100-5 as a good publication, and all 
those involved with the rewrite thought it really gave a much strengthened AirLand Battle 
doctrinal base for the Army.  He took steps to ensure that the Army would embrace and 
refine the concepts of the operational level manual at all levels.  Subordinate Army 
schools took up the effort at ensuring the concepts of AirLand Battle were incorporated 
into the totality of Army doctrine. 
Writing, publishing and then promulgating the new doctrine, with its emphasis on 
the operational level of war as the bridge between tactical units and strategic objectives 
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was the first step in getting the concepts to take hold in the minds of the Army officer 
corps.  As shown earlier, U.S. allies in NATO were studying the doctrine; indeed, they 
were asked to comment on it during the development process.  How the U.S. Army 
answered its self posed question, how to fight, had huge ramifications for NATO.  The 
Red Army and Warsaw Pact were also studying this doctrine and observing the manner 
in which the U.S. Army incorporated its doctrine into exercises and plans.  Doctrine 
became the engine of change in the U.S. Army.   
Very closely related to FM 100-5 was the effort to ensure that all U.S. Army 
doctrinal manuals were current and were supportive of FM 100-5.  The essence of 
Richardson’s vision for the promulgation of FM 100-5 was that all U.S. Army schools, 
including the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, would be 
responsible for developing “How to Fight Manuals.”  The Command and General Staff 
College in accord with its focus on educating general staff officers for Army divisions and 
corps, received the task to write the manual on corps and divisions operations as well as 
the manual for operations for echelons above corps.  The other Army schools--ranging 
from Fort Knox, the Army Center and School, to Fort Eustis, the Quartermaster School--
developed and wrote supporting brigade and below manuals.155  The schools also 
executed a corresponding effort by reviewing and updating the Army Training and 
Evaluation Plans (ARTEP). 
The Army adopted a focused approach to training units in 1973 and 1974.  The 
basis of the approach was a rational approach to the complexity of training for war.  
Army units had only so much time, money, and resources for training.  Unit commanders 
needed guidance on training focus and Army wide standards for training.  The Army 
Training and Evaluation Program, ARTEP, provided this focus.  The publication of FM 
100-5 required an across the board reassessment of the ARTEP and how to evaluate 
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the effectiveness of training as well as discerning effective execution of concepts in 
training.  The framework provided by ARTEP and its associated Mission Training Plan 
afforded commanders guidance and freedom of action to develop unit specific training 
plans which were in accord with doctrine as well as effectively using the allocated 
resources.  The revised ARTEP and associated documents enabled Army units to 
develop a management scheme for the conduct of training based on a commander’s 
appreciation of the state of readiness of his unit and in accord with the specific doctrine 
for his unit, combat brigade to maintenance group.  This detailed program, in accord with 
doctrine, provided the tasks, conditions, and standards in the various areas of tactical 
application of AirLand Battle doctrine for a particular unit.  The necessary bridge to 
acceptance and wide spread use within the Army was incorporation of the doctrine in the 
curricula of key Army school.  The Command and General Staff College was the key 
educational component school in this effort.  As noted earlier, at the time of publication 
of the doctrine then Major General Crosbie “Butch” Saint was the deputy commandant of 
the Command and General Staff College.  He was charged with updating the curriculum 
at the Staff College and supporting the development of the School of Advanced Military 
Studies.  Thus, Saint was the deputy commandant during a very interesting time.   
General Saint came to Fort Leavenworth in June, 1981.  Saint came from a 
reinvigorated European based U.S. Army that took war fighting very seriously.  Saint 
previously commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the V U.S. Corps 
commanded by then Lieutenant General Donn Starry.  He arrived with a mandate to 
revive the Staff College.  He asked a question along the lines of the Army asking itself 
how to fight by asking what is the purpose of the institution?  Saint provided the answer, 
“Train war fighters.”  This was Saint’s motivation and what he challenged the College to 
do, train war fighters.  
Saint’s perception of curriculum management was the cynical observation that 
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“Every Tom, Dick, and Harry who wanted to get something into the Army, called up 
Leavenworth and said, "Put it in the curriculum."  The example Saint cited in his oral 
history interview upon his retirement from the Army was a case study on the acquisition 
of helicopter blades he was told to incorporate into the Staff College curriculum as a 
means to illustrate the Army acquisition process.  Saint admitted that the use of the Staff 
College curriculum to illustrate everything but how to fight wars, ”tipped me over the 
edge.”  Saint’s assessment was that the Staff College was not in fact training war 
fighters but training individuals in certain staff procedures. 156  This assessment led Saint 
to conclude that more was needed to ensure that the Army knew how to fight at the 
division and corps level.  This assessment also led him to conclude that the Army 
needed a school such as that being envisioned as the School of Advanced Military 
Studies because the curriculum of the regular course at the Staff College was not 
providing educated division and corps level war fighters.   The division and corps level of 
command was conducted at the tactical level in accord with Army doctrine of the time.   
The Army that came out of Vietnam was a very directive Army.  The expression 
of this tendency was highlighted in the perception of brigade commanders, based on 
reading the 1976 version of FM 100-5, that they were required to position each company 
in their brigades.  Orders based on this doctrine were lengthy, specific, and very 
directive.  This atmosphere was conducive to the acceptance of German concepts such 
as “Auftragstaktik.”  This concept, translated in English as mission orders was 
promulgated in the 1982 version of FM 100-5.  With the advent of the National Training 
Center, NTC, in 1980 and the results of the first fights against the Opposing Force, 
OPFOR, showed that the tendency to over control forces led to swift defeat.  The first 
battles at NTC demonstrated that U.S. forces knew Army doctrine but did not “know” 
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how to really execute the concepts of the doctrine through tactical techniques.  A notable 
effort to promulgate tactical techniques within the structure of a corps battle was written 
by Brigadier General John M. Kirk. 
Kirk had a sign in his assistant division commander’s office that said, “Attack a 
Pissant Today.”  Kirk demanded that every officer and soldier in the division, as well as 
any unit to which he was assigned, be serious about training for war.  He demanded that 
from company to division level commanders share a common tactical language as well 
as a common philosophical and tactical base.  For Kirk the framework of the 1982 FM 
100-5 revealed a chasm between theoreticians and tacticians.  The theory articulated in 
FM 100-5 lacked a link to tactics that were suited for the armored warfare the writing 
teams envisioned occurring in the Central Region of Europe.  War, for Kirk, and by 
extension the officers under his command, was a tough, thinking person’s game that had 
to be reduced to “Pavlovian simplistics.”  These simple things were; fighting to win, with 
the combined arms available in the units at the time, against a realistic threat that 
outnumbered the friendly unit, and to modernize technically, tactically and intellectually 
every day.  Kirk insisted on adherence to tough, demanding standards for individual and 
unit training, as well as officer professional development seminar.  Kirk focused these 
efforts through interpreting doctrine.157    
Kirk wrote a pamphlet about these concerns while he was the assistant division 
commander of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in 1981 called Panzergrenadiers.  
The pamphlet, which he started while serving in Germany as a brigade commander and 
Chief of Staff in the 1st Armored Division from 1977-1980, contained an overview of the 
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strategic and operational structure of a war in Europe, and then linked the tactical 
techniques to this strategy.  He reinforced Saint’s position that the staff college was not 
teaching warfighting.  He wrote, “the Army has done a fine job of teaching 
battalion/company commanders to draw grand goose eggs, arrows on acetate.  Symbols 
bore little relation to ground, enemy, next war.”158   In 158 pages of text with ten 
additional pages in two enclosures, Kirk outlined a series of techniques for both 
offensive and defensive battles within the tactical battle space of a corps and division.  
Kirk began with an overview of the strategy for war in Europe. 
This overview of a strategy for war in Europe reflected the influence of the 
ongoing strategic debates on tactical implementation.  The interpretation on the ground 
in U.S. Army units in Germany was that the national strategy called for a defense of 
Western Europe.  The conundrum, according to Kirk, was that the strategy also implied 
the goal: beat the Russians.  Defeating a Russian/Soviet invasion of Western Europe 
required victory and to attain victory, the U.S. Army had to attack and take the tactical, 
operational and strategic initiative away from the Russians.  From Kirk’s perspective few 
writers, military or civilian, put the challenge of defense into an “attack/win continuum.”  
He wrote, “Simplistically put, strategic defense must be tactical attack so that we 
strategically win.”  Kirk’s pamphlet reflected a tension between the execution of tactics 
and the strategy of the time.159 
Kirk deconstructed the active defense model.  The widely held perception of 
active defense was a one echelon cordon or area defense.  On the tactical level, this 
form of the defense of Western Europe did not present the Warsaw Pact with any 
difficulties;, indeed, with a one echelon deep cordon the Soviet preference for 
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penetration and exploitation to operational depths, with the objective of disrupting 
political structures, was the best choice for an offense.  Kirk realized that the new 
operational doctrine required a new form of thinking about the tactics of the U.S. Army.  
To Kirk, a good strategic defense was fundamentally offensive in orientation at the 
tactical level.  The execution of offensive tactics would defeat the Russians by taking 
away the initiative, imposing NATO/U.S. forces will on the Russians, and most 
importantly destroying the Russians’ psychological dependence on attaining their daily 
objective and maintaining a precise operational tempo.  This last was more important 
that defeating the Russian force structure and weapons systems.160  This line of thinking 
was also reflected in Saint’s European experience.  
From 1976 to 1978, Saint served in the VII U.S. Corps, which was commanded 
by then Lieutenant General Donn Starry.  Starry led the U.S. lessons learned teams in 
talks with the Israeli Defense Force in the aftermath of the 1973 war.  Starry, who would 
in turn command Training and Doctrine Command, was also wrestling with the 
conundrum of strategic defense and tactical offense.  Saint commanded Starry’s corps 
cavalry regiment, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which formed the nucleus of the 
corps covering force.  If war came to Europe Saint would meet the Russians first and 
force them to deploy their forces.   In his historical interview Saint said, “Under General 
Starry, we did a lot of warfighting and built the GDP [General Defense Plan] from the 
bottom up.  I'd say we didn't invent the term but we invented what a covering force really 
did for a very large corps.”161    Saint’s cavalry regiment would take the first step in 
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defeating the Russians, as Kirk wrote, by disrupting the tempo of battle on which the 
Russians relied.  Saint said that he was, “in a tactical renaissance on how you fight a 
large force.”162    This tactical renaissance in the U.S. Army in Europe and subsequently 
in Army units in the United States continued as the new doctrine was introduced 
throughout the Army and the Army came to grips with how to fight.  While the Army in 
Europe, at least initially, faced the challenge of tactical offense with a strategic defense 
framework U.S. based Army units were the reinforcements to the Army in Europe and 
NATO.  The challenge for these units was how to integrate tactical formations into the 
fight when their purpose was to go on the counter-offensive with large units; corps and 
possibly armies.  This level of discourse within the framework of the 1982 version of FM 
100-5 forced the Army to consider the tactical formation of the corps and its place within 
the operational framework.  
 General Saint commanded the III U.S. Corps from 1985-1988.  At this time, and 
based on his experiences at Leavenworth and in command of an armored division in 
Europe he was charged with turning the III U.S. Corps into a truly strategically and 
operationally mobile armored corps.  Saint had to develop concepts and train an entire 
corps so it would have the knowledge and capability to deploy after it got to where it was 
going, either with its own equipment or with Pre-positioned Overseas Materiel 
Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS).  He envisioned a corps that could then road march 
over 100 miles; and fight from the march.  This vision fit into how the Army saw it would 
fight within the strategic defense-tactical offense conundrum of NATO strategy that Kirk 
wrote about in his pamphlet.  An entire of corps of 90 to 100,000 Soldiers was a true 
offensive weapon.  The corps fit into standing operational plans in Europe and Korea, 
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but the mission of the corps would be the same; get to the fight and then fight as an 
entire corps.  This vision required changes in everything Saint’s corps did, from 
individual tactical level training to corps tactical level training and how the corps fit into 
the operational level plan. 
 The III Corps, and the remainder of the Army, was coming to grips with the 
totality of the requirements of fighting in accord with the concepts in FM 100-5, 1982. 
Army units will fight in all types of operations to preserve 
and to exploit the initiative.  They will attack the enemy in depth 
with fire and maneuver and synchronize all efforts to attain the 
objective.  They will maintain the agility necessary to shift forces 
and fires to the points of enemy weaknesses.  Our operations 
must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorientating the 
enemy.  The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking 
effective counteractions.  Operational planning must be precise 
enough to preserve combined arms cooperation throughout the 
battle…163 
  
 The canvas of the battlefield upon which operational art was applied grew in 
scale and scope.  Army units were rediscovering the art required to move and sustain 
large formations across long distances.  Logistical units had to figure out how to sustain 
tank and mechanized infantry units while securing themselves on a fluid battlefield.  
Intelligence sections thought through how to gather information on a moving enemy 
force while moving at the same time.  Signals units grappled with the challenge of 
command and control on the move.  Units all over the U.S. tried to expand the distances 
used during field training and especially command post exercises by entering into 
agreements with local towns and farmers to use their fields thereby stretching the 
distances between headquarters and forcing commanders to deal with the real problem 
of transmitting their intent to subordinates.  Saint, for example, started a program of 
training in the fields out in West Texas.  He linked headquarters with his simulation 
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center and played out electronic war games.164  Overall, the effect of this training and the 
corresponding education was to put the entire corps into the mind set, as Saint put it, “to 
shoot the enemy in the back.”  Saint intended that the large scale level counter-
offensives launched by III U.S. Corps would, in a paraphrasing of George Patton, 
provide the enemy the opportunity to die for his country so III Corps Soldiers would not 
die for theirs.  The focus was the maneuver of large units to a place of significant 
advantage over the enemy.165  To accomplish large scale maneuver, the Army needed 
well educated commanders and general staff officers.   
 The lethality of the modern battlefield was demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War.  Generals like Starry, Richardson and Saint recognized that there was a 
requirement to link the tactical actions of the company level, the point of the spear of 
combat, to the requirements of strategy.  Saint captured this feeling and the purpose of 
operational art when he said the following. 
The concept that everybody above the company can lose 
the battle, but only the company can win the battle.  That 
is, everybody above the company has only one purpose in 
life -- to get companies in the right place with the right 
material and the right training to do the battle.  You can 
have the best organization in the world, but if it's not where 
the enemy is or you are in a bad place, you can lose.  But 
when you're in the right place and you close in combat, the 
company is the only one -- where it all comes down to the 
bottom line -- that can win the battle. 166   
 
 Kirk also pointed the way for the linkage of company through division tactical 
actions, linked with a common tactical language and philosophy that addressed the 
conundrum of fighting in Europe of strategic defense that required a tactical offense to 
ensure a strategic victory.  Kirk wrote that there was a chasm between theoreticians and 
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tacticians.  Kirk put a fine edge on the need to study the complexity of warfare by writing, 
“You must give the same level of effort to studying war that we have Sexism, 
Environment…etc.”167  Wass de Czege, recalling his days of company command in 
Vietnam and how it was apparent that the field grade level of command did not know 
how to string company level tactical victories into a larger success, wanted to ensure 
that the bar of tactical and operational excellence was raised throughout the Army.  Saint 
while he was at the Command and General Staff College wanted to ensure that the 
graduates of the college were ready to fight in wars as general staff officers within 
divisions and corps.  These complementary visions highlighted the necessity for 
educating officers in the finer arts of the tactical, operational and even strategic levels of 
war.    
These men and other senior leaders sensed the need within the Army to have 
selected officers schooled in this higher order of warfare.  The complexity of war, always 
a truism, was even more complex as the struggle to raise the nuclear threshold met with 
the need to balance strategic defense with tactical and operational offense.  During this 
time there was even a growing recognition that Army leaders had to understand the 
workings of policy makers and policy making councils.  Saint, even in his quest to focus 
the Command and General Staff College on war fighting, understood that there was a 
need for the bridge from the tactical to the strategic.  In his final history interview before 
retirement, Saint said that Army planners needed to know interagency capabilities and 
players at that level, “because you don't do anything in a strategic plan without the other 
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players.”  Whether or not the military was a major player in a policy or a minor player, 
without the education and experience of working within the strategic and operational 
level, who to talk to in the policy making councils, how to put changes into effect, an 
executable strategic plan would not be possible.  The challenge was how to find such 
officers, educate them, and put them back into the Army for the necessary experiences 
so that in 10 to 15 years when the Army needed strategic and operational level 
commanders and planners they would be there.  As Saint said, 
So, how do you get people to do that and who does it?  
Well, SAMS was part of that.  It's to give people the basic 
underpinnings so they can become strategic planners in addition 
to operational planners.  Then there is a requirement that you 
have to put them someplace where they have to operate jointly 
and in the interagency environment…If you want to have strategic 
planners, you have to go through those steps and at some point of 
time they are going to have career choices to make.  That's how 
you get them, whether we have enough of them or not it has to be 
a conscious process on whose going to be one of these guys. 168 
 
The creative tension caused by the introduction of a radically different doctrine, FM 100-
5, 1982, the struggle of raising the nuclear threshold, and the defense-offense 
conundrum in Europe set conditions for the recognition that the Army needed officers 
who could lead large formations and plan for comprehensive campaigns.   
 The Army War College might have been a place to look for the leaders of large 
formations and the staff officers who would plan and execute large unit maneuvers.  The 
curriculum of the War College at this time though was focused on the strategy and policy 
levels of war.  Beginning in 1976 the War College reorganized its curriculum into six 
phases, orientation, National and International Security Affair, Domestic Affairs 
Symposium, Individual Selective Concentration, Group Project Analysis of 
Contemporary Military and National Security Problems, and Symposium on 
Contemporary National Security Problems.  Save perhaps in the Individual Selective 
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concentration period during the academic year the War College and depending on the 
preference of individual officer/students, the War College did not offer courses in 
commanding and controlling large units in battle. 169 
The period of reflection that was a part of the post-Vietnam years in the U.S. 
Army put in motion a great renaissance of thinking about war; from operational level of 
war doctrine to tactics, from weapons systems development and acquisition to the role of 
nuclear weapons on the battle field.  The Army had to ask itself how to fight.  The pursuit 
of finding answers to this range of questions led Army doctrine writers to look at how to 
fight the armies of the Warsaw Pact in the central region of Europe.  The practical 
political, strategic and tactical considerations of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, 
integration of major new weapons systems into Army formations, and the demonstration 
of the lethality of the modern battle field shown during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war 
influenced the move toward the introduction of the operational level of war to U.S. Army 
doctrine.  This chapter focused on a review of the trends in the Army in the late 70s and 
early 80s.  The linkage of limited war, theater nuclear war, the move to “raise the nuclear 
threshold,” and conventional forces as a part of overall deterrence highlighted the 
introduction of the operational art into U.S. Army doctrine and lexicon.  The ashes of the 
defeat in Vietnam created an atmosphere conducive to the reconsideration of the role of 
the Army in strategy and operational art.  Linked to this renaissance in military thinking 
was the need for a school to educate the practitioners of this art of war.  “What is the 
purpose of the institution?  Train war fighters…that’s where the SAMS [School for 
Advanced Military Studies] course came from,” as General Saint stated. 170 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Tension of Expectations 
 
 
 The U.S. Army was at a cross roads in the early 1980s.  The swirling 
waves of debate unleashed by the assessments of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 
lethality of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, the movement toward the 
introduction of the operational maneuver group as a viable concept within Soviet 
Red Army and Warsaw Pact armies, and ultimately the introduction of a new 
doctrine for the U.S. Army in 1982 forced senior leaders to wrestle with how best 
to promulgate doctrinal concepts throughout the Army.  The new approach 
required general staff officers and commanders who embraced the concepts and 
who could take action to implement these concepts as soon as possible.  On the 
front lines, so to speak, was the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
which had to come to grips with the new doctrine and then quickly to determine 
how to teach it to the field grade officers selected to attend the college.  It was an 
interesting time in the Army, as Colonel F.W. Timmerman, editor in chief of 
Military Review wrote, “Several years ago, the words “operational art” would 
scarcely received any attention much less be considered a major area of study 
by US Army professionals.”171  In confronting the question of how to teach this 
doctrinal concept, there emerged tension of expectations between the field and 
institutional Army.   
 The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) had a difficult time in 
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settling on a methodology for teaching tactics.  The already-present “wrestling 
match” over how to present the active defense articulated by the 1976 version of 
FM 100-5 shifted into open combat when the 1982 version of the manual was 
released.  The concept of the AirLand battle proved even more difficult to teach 
for the Command and General Staff College, CGSC, Department of Tactics.  The 
active defense outlined in the 1976 version of FM 100-5, while widely disdained 
was in fact easier to understand.  The tactics of a divisional defense, for 
example, required a detailed knowledge of how the Soviets would echelon their 
forces.  The U.S. Army would then move units laterally on the battlefield to blunt 
a Soviet penetration.  AirLand Battle doctrine was more offensive in outlook.  The 
teaching and execution of this doctrine required tactics instructors to articulate a 
form of offensive operations that demanded on the ground experience in these 
forms of maneuver.  The number of instructors in the College Department of 
Tactics that had recent troop experience, from either U.S. or Germany based 
units was not enough to ensure a uniform approach to teaching the basics of the 
doctrine.  The Tactics Department of CGSC faced the conundrum of teaching 
doctrine it did not write and did not have instructors familiar with its execution.172   
 This difficulty came into sharper focus when the Army Chief of Staff, 
General Edward C. Meyer, directed Major General Guy “Sandy” Meloy to 
conduct an assessment of the Command and General Staff College as a training 
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and educational institution.  Meyer further directed Meloy to use a 1933 letter 
from then Colonel George Marshall to Major General Stuart Heintzelman as the 
basis of his assessment.  Marshall outlined 17 criticisms of the Command and 
General Staff College in 1933.  Marshall’s criticisms were based on his years at 
the Infantry School and work with a National Guard division.  Marshall wrote that 
the methods of teaching at the Staff College had to be modified in order to avoid 
“the chaotic state of affairs in the first few months of a campaign with a major 
power.”173  Marshall criticized the College for setting up marking and grading 
techniques that were so meticulous that they caused instructors to develop 
problems from a view point of exact grading as opposed to tactical problems that 
reflected the rigor of the battlefield.  The ripple effect of grading over reality drove 
the 1933 Department of Tactics to focus on the lowest tactical level with the 
result that graduates of the Staff College were unable to properly estimate a 
situation other than tactical.  Marshall observed that topics such as mobilization, 
deployment and sustainment, subjects that were hard to grade, were neglected 
in favor of simpler, tactical level instruction.  Finally, the focus on the tactical 
coupled with the lack of troop duty at actual corps and army level, in 1933, did 
not produce officers with the ability to understand the maneuver of large 
formations.174  Almost 50 years later the Chief of Staff Army wanted Meloy to 
determine if Marshall’s criticism were still valid.  The result of this assessment 
was the so-called “Meloy Report” of 1 February 1982.  
                                                 
173
    G.S. Meloy, Major General, US Army, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, United States Army, 
Subject Evaluation of CGSC Curriculum, Tab A, dated 1 FEB 1982.  Held in the Special Collections 
Section, Combined Arms Research Library, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS.  Hereafter cited as Meloy Report. 
174
    Meloy Report, Tab B. 
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 Major General Guy Meloy visited Fort Leavenworth and the Command 
and General Staff College from 17-21 January 1982.  He was accompanied by 
four “troop-seasoned officers” to evaluate the College curriculum.  Meloy 
reported that Marshall’s criticisms were still valid.  He reported that the college 
was “teaching form more than substance,” and  the diversity of the course 
material being presented allowed, “little opportunity for much more than 
superficial treatment of any given subject (to include command, staff and 
tactics)…”175   The report caused a great deal of discussion between General 
Glenn Otis, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, General 
William Richardson, then Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, and 
General Max Thurman, then Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.  This discourse 
ranged from how to fill the Staff College faculty with more experienced officers to 
arranged greater stability for the Deputy Commandant (who, typically, held the 
position for 12-18 months); but the focus of this assessment was summed up in 
two comments; one by Meloy and the other taken from an unnamed 
officer/student’s comment sheet.  Regarding the Staff College curriculum, Meloy 
wrote that “there is insufficient in-depth coverage of those subjects that contribute 
directly to killing Russians.”  The officer/student wrote, “There tends to be a 
dogmatic approach to tactics.”176  The “dogmatic” or cookie cutter approach to 
tactics was a prime motivation on the part of Colonel Huba Wass de Czege to 
recommend the development of SAMS.  The Meloy report was submitted to the 
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    Meloy Report, ```p. 1. 
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    Meloy report, page 2 and 6 respectively.  As far as I could determine based on a review of 
documents in the Combined Arms Research Library and the electronic files available through the Center 
for Military History there is no record of considering how to “fix” the problems cited by the Meloy report, 
other than the effort pursued by Wass de Czege to establish SAMS. 
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Chief of Staff Army.  As discussed in chapter one Wass de Czege’s report on 
Staff College education went to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 
DCSOPS.  These senior leaders were primed for a proposal to “fix” the perceived 
problem of cookie cutter tactics, promulgating a new doctrine and doctrinal 
approach to fighting wars. 
 The Combat Studies Institute, CSI, was established in 1979.  CSI’s 
purpose was to energize the study of military history as it related to the 
development of tactical and operational practices.  The role CSI played was 
supposed to assist the Center for Army Tactics in developing a deeper 
understanding of tactics in the CGSC student population.  Roger Spiller recalled, 
“a fair amount of what we were teaching always seemed to get down to tactics, 
but also with what was already being referred to as the operational level of war.  I 
doubt very much whether any of what we taught eased CTAC's burdens or 
mitigated its lacklustre reputation.”177  The resort to “cookie cutter” solutions to 
tactical problems was difficult to overcome.  Ultimately the effort required a senior 
Army leader as a champion. 
 General Donn Starry commanded the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command from 1977 to 1981.  Starry was a champion of the Army reform 
movement from the time he worked for GEN Depuy on the Army Staff.  Starry 
knew that path to real change in an organization like the Army was through a 
change in its educational system.  Thus a real change in doctrine and how the 
Army would fight in the future had to be led by a change in the approach to 
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     Quotation taken from an electronic mail note from Professor Roger Spiller dated 10 OCT 
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teaching.  Starry wanted to make the Command and General Staff College 
course of instruction two years long, as it had been for a time in the 1920s and 
1930s.  Eight of the Army corps commanders in World War II were graduates of 
the two year course, as well as many senior division, corps and army principal 
staff officers.178  Starry ran headlong into resistance from officeholders at the 
Army personnel system (then known by its acronym MILPERCEN or Military 
Personnel Center) who asserted that the Army could not afford to keep all its 
very brightest majors in school for two years.  Balked by their opposition, Starry 
undertook—as a fallback position-- to persuade the Chief of Staff to allow him to 
establish a pilot program of CGSC graduates pursuing advanced military studies.  
Starry intended that his second year of study would focus on, “command and 
staff at higher echelons--Corps, Army, Army Group, Theater…”  Starry had 
planted the seed.  Although this effort took until 1983 to come to fruition, Starry 
had faith that the experiment would pay dividends for the Army.  Having worked 
with Wass de Czege during the development of FM 100-5, 1982, Starry 
supported the then LTG Richardson’s decision to have Wass de Czege installed 
as the first director.179  
As a result of intervention by many people acting for various reasons, the 
School of Advanced Military Studies was founded in 1983.  The founder and first 
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     Robert H. Berlin, U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography, 
Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 
1989.    
179
      Letter from GEN (ret) Donn A. Starry to Dr. Richard M. Swain dated 7 June 1995.  In this 
letter to Swain, then writing a work titled “Filling the Void,” Starry described his personal path from 
command of a battalion through command of TRADOC to Readiness Command and his involvement in the 
implementation of FM 100-5, 1976 and his decision to re-write the doctrine in 1982.  The letter is held in 
the Special Collections section, third floor of the Combined Arms Research Library.  The quotation cited in 
this paragraph and the paragraph itself is drawn from pages29/30 of the letter.  Hereafter cited as Starry 
Letter.  
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director of the school, Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, envisioned the school 
providing specially selected and educated majors, following a year of intense 
study, to Army divisions and corps.  These majors would accomplish two 
purposes.  They would raise the general level of understanding of the increasing 
complexity of warfare.  They would also improve the quality of planning and 
executing operations across the Army.  To educate these specially selected 
majors, Wass de Czege proposed that the Army staff the school with highly 
qualified active duty lieutenant colonels or colonels.  Wass de Czege realized 
that he and the other initial faculty members could not remain at the school 
permanently, but he assumed that they would be allowed to get the school up 
and running before receiving orders for a new assignment.180  Wass de Czege 
stipulated the three prerequisites needed for a quality faculty; at least a master’s 
degree from a “good” school, previous teaching experience, and a demonstrated 
ability to command.181  As a non-negotiable demand, Wass de Czege insisted 
that the Army provide faculty members who met these criteria.  The minimum 
tour of duty at the school for these specially selected officers had to be three 
years.  The first year would be in an understudy role to learn about the curriculum 
and to team-teach a seminar of twelve to fourteen majors with a more seasoned 
                                                 
180
     The U.S. Military Academy at West Point instituted a program whereby selected officers 
would remain as permanent faculty members in the 1950s.  Wass de Czege did not want permanent military 
faculty at SAMS but he did want assurances that the military seminar leaders would be high caliber 
officers.  
181
       U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.  Senior Officer Oral History 
Program, LTC Harold R. Winton, USA, retired.  Conducted by LTC Richard Mustion, April 5, 2001 at 
Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 36.  Hereafter cited as Winton Interview.  The original faculty members, Winton, 
Wass de Czege, and Douglas Johnson all had advanced degrees from Stanford [Winton, Ph.D. in history], 
Harvard [Wass de Czege, M.A. in public administration], and Michigan [Johnson, M.A. in history] 
respectively.  All three men served in combat in Vietnam and taught at West Point.  Wass de Czege and 
Winton commanded infantry battalions and Johnson had extensive service in field artillery units and 
general staffs.  A “good” school meant a school of similar caliber as these three officers attended.   
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instructor.  The officers would lead seminars during the final two years of the tour 
of duty, and act as mentors for newly arrived faculty members.  Even though he 
had support from senior general officers, he could not persuade the Army 
personnel management division to sustain a three-year tour for very high quality 
officers whose only task was teaching majors.  The Army, in the view of the 
personnel managers, could make better use of such high quality officers in 
Washington on the Army and Joint staffs.    
 Because he expected resistance from the personnel department of the 
Army Wass de Czege had a Plan B.  He proposed establishing an additional 
program within the School of Advanced Military Studies.  This program would be 
a two-year long war college course called the Advanced Operational Studies 
Fellowship.182  The program started in 1985.  During the first year, officers 
assigned to the Fellowship would study the same curriculum as the Advanced 
Military Studies Program, the majors’ course.  This focused study would serve as 
instructor preparation because in the second year of the program the fellows 
served as the principal instructors of the majors.  The fellows’ curriculum also 
exposed them to the policy making process and how the major commands in the 
Defense Department executed strategy therefore the fellows also traveled to the 
global combatant commands of the Department of Defense as a part of the  
 
                                                 
182
    Officers selected for war-college-level schooling, especially those from the Army’s combat 
arms (those focused on fighting and coordinating battles), are former battalion commanders.  A battalion is 
an organization of between 650 to 1,000 Soldiers.  Successful command of a battalion is a recognized level 
of accomplishment that marks an officer for higher level command.  Completion of the war college level of 
schooling is another prerequisite for higher level command and promotion.  The program is now called the 
Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship; the change in the name took place in 1995. 
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education program.183  Plan B introduced an element of turbulence into the school 
as the principal instructors for the majors would constantly turn over.  Assignment 
to the Fellowship was dependent on those that volunteered for the program.  
Teaching the fellows (and providing a measure of institutional stability) led to the 
appointment of several civilians to the faculty.  Wass de Czege received broad 
authority General Richardson to hire the people he needed to start the school.  
Speaking of this time Wass de Czege said, “I was given to authority to hire 
whomever I wanted. I made the decision, but Hal and Doug and I were a close 
knit trio and I always consulted them. We may have had an informal group sit 
down with them. But I found them and I hired them based on the specific topics 
of their work and their potential for growth within the school.”184 
 The first two civilians hired to teach in the newly organized School of 
Advanced Military Studies were Robert Epstein and James Schneider.185  Epstein 
held a Ph.D. in European history and had never served in the military.  
Schneider, who was not a Ph.D. at the time he was hired, had served in the Army 
in Vietnam as a young man.  Epstein recalled the formation of the Fellowship as 
a challenge.  The challenge to define what was needed in the fellows’ curriculum 
                                                 
183
     The global combatant commands are military commands designed by the Defense 
Department to focus on specific regions of the world.  At the time the Fellowship began the commands 
were European Command, Central Command, Southern Command, Atlantic Command, and Pacific 
Command.  In 2007 the number of commands now includes Northern Command and Africa Command.  
Atlantic Command no longer exists; it became Joint Forces Command in 2000.  A global combatant 
command is a headquarters and commander-a four-star general or admiral-that focuses on a specified group 
of countries.  The headquarters is charged with developing military plans for operations in the region and 
an engagement strategy designed to further the interests of the U.S.   
184
     Electronic mail note from BG (ret) Wass de Czege to the author, 15OCT09. 
185
     Robert Epstein earned his Ph.D. in history at Temple University where he studied under 
Russell Weigley.  Epstein was hired on a one-year contract with the Combat Studies Institute, the history 
department of the Army Staff College, in 1982.  In 1984 he joined SAMS.  James Schneider also joined the 
faculty of SAMS in 1984.  Schneider took his Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas in 1993.  
Schneider turned down a full doctoral studies grant from Rice University to remain at Leavenworth and 
teach in SAMS.   
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took time to overcome.  Epstein recalled that at first the fellows took trips.  Later 
in subsequent refinements of the program, the fellows were required to take 
Epstein’s Military Classics Colloquium.  In the late 1980s military theory and 
strategy courses were added to the curriculum and were taught by either Epstein 
or Schneider.186  Schneider had moved to Leavenworth in 1980 and initially 
worked in an analysis center.  His educational background was a mix of history, 
science, mathematics, and military and scientific theory.  Schneider was hired as 
the military theorist in SAMS in 1984.  He, too, would instruct the fellows.  After 
Wass de Czege, Winton and Johnson left the school Schneider and Epstein 
wrote the SAMS curriculum and led the instruction of that curriculum for the 
fellowship.  
 Schneider’s recollection of the startup phase in 1984 was that “the 
seminar leaders had to gain something professionally for spending two years as 
instructors …” Schneider asserted that the fellowship was always an integral part 
of the original concept for SAMS.  From Schneider’s perspective, the Fellowship 
was a key element in successfully teaching the majors, as the Fellowship 
“provided educated (by the course authors) and experienced former battalion 
commanders” as the principal teachers of the majors in SAMS.187  The first 
faculty members of SAMS realized that the fellows were a key element in the 
success of the school and arguably contributed as much to its success as did the 
performance of the majors.  
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     This quotation is taken from a personal e-mail from Epstein to the author on 5 October 2006.  
The original e-mail is in my possession and in a personal file.  Hereafter cited as Epstein note, 5OCT06. 
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     This quotation is taken from a personal e-mail from Schneider to the author on 25 October 
2006.  The original e-mail is in my possession and in a personal file.  Hereafter cited as Schneider note, 
25OCT06. 
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  Wass de Czege’s initial focus was on providing the Army specially 
educated majors, led and taught by highly qualified lieutenant colonels and 
colonels.  The introduction of a designated a war college equivalent school 
caused two second-order problems.  The first was how to craft a curriculum that 
met the standards of a war college level program while preparing these officers 
to teach the majors.  The second was how to resolve the issue of appropriate 
assignments for the lieutenant colonels and colonels following their completion of 
the two-year Fellowship.  Were they assigned into selected positions as SAMS 
graduates just like the majors?  Majors were specially assigned to Army divisions 
and corps headquarters.  Although this appears to be an obvious solution, the 
fellows had no such special assignment status.  The Fellows not selected for 
colonel level command typically went to regional combatant commands.  There 
was no deliberate assignment policy for the Fellows.  This remained so until the 
late 1990s.  Plan B also introduced other elements of uncertainty, most 
importantly the changing level and type of experience of the Fellows.   
 The decision to establish SAMS and its purpose, at least initially, was “to 
raise the bar of tactical understanding throughout the Army.”188  Wass de Czege, 
Sinnreich and Holder defined tactical understanding as the ability to “see” how a 
battle would unfold in terms of forces, terrain, weather and time.  The internal 
tensions with which the early Directors of SAMS contended ranged from just 
what type of officer the school would produce to how fast the school would 
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      Taken from an interview with BG Huba Wass de Czege conducted by the author on 14 
January 2009 at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  The transcript is available 
through the Special Collections Section, Combined Arms Research Library.  Hereafter cited as Wass de 
Czege interview, 14JAN09. 
  
97 
 
expand and even whether the school would be an independent entity or a school 
underneath the College.  Then Major General Saint, the deputy commandant, 
believed as late as January 1983 that there would be no establishment of a new 
school but rather an extended course of study for selected officers.  This 
extended course of study would be run by the directors of the departments of the 
College.  Saint’s idea did not come to pass.   
 As previously discussed General Richardson decided that SAMS should 
be a new school reporting directly to TRADOC.189  As previously shown, the U.S. 
Army in the late 1970s and early 1980s was contending with the introduction of 
new weapons systems, new training concepts and locations—the National 
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California--and a new doctrine, AirLand Battle, as 
well as dealing with questions on how to employ these new weapons systems in 
accord with this doctrine. The doctrine itself needed to be promulgated (indeed, 
some would say proselytized) throughout the Army. SAMS, as another new idea, 
came into its own during this time and was subject to all these tensions. 
 The first three directors of SAMS, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder 
were all, to one degree or another, dissatisfied with the manner in which tactics 
was taught at the Command and General Staff College. The basic objection was 
the translation of Army doctrine into a curriculum designed to meet the needs of 
the lowest common denominator in CGSC seminars and how doctrinal instruction 
was presented.  At the time the Army selection process for attendance at the 
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      Taken from an Annual Historical Report, SG: CAC/FLVN 84, MH-010/001, VF CGSC-
departments-SAMS, 1982-84 held in the Special Collections section of the Combined Arms Research 
Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, page 177.  No author is listed.  The section is titled, The Operational level 
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Command and General Staff College outwardly selected the top 50% of each 
year group of officers.  Practically, this meant that in addition to the top 50% of 
combat arms officers a Staff College class also had officers from the combat 
support and combat service support branches, as well as lawyers, doctors, 
veterinarians, physical therapists and other fields in the Army.  Attendance at the 
Staff College was a prerequisite for selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel 
thus every branch and field in the Army insisted that its fair share of offices 
attend Leavenworth.    
Another serious difficulty was that the instruction in doctrine at CGSC was 
being done by less than ideal instructors. This was not a comment on the quality 
of these officer instructors as people; rather, it was in the manner of their 
previous assignments. There were not many instructors, as shown by the Meloy 
report, who were conversant in the latest field applications of doctrine. Thus, the 
method of instruction defaulted to rote doctrine and checklists. The tactics of 
large units; divisions and corps, was essential in the execution of operations in 
accord with AirLand battle.  CGSC was supposed to educate the majority of the 
general staff officers in the Army at a sufficient level to assist division 
commanders in the execution of AirLand battle. This was not happening, 
although the College was trying.  
As noted by the Meloy report the challenge of teaching AirLand Battle 
tactics was acerbated by the fact of the assignment process to the Command 
and General Staff College.  Unlike the 1920s and 1930s assignment to Fort 
Leavenworth was not viewed as career enhancing.  Any combat arms officer 
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assigned to CGSC was presumed to be able to teach and to teach tactics.  This 
reinforced the tendency toward approved solutions, lesson plans, and an 
extendable pointer as the tools of the instructor.  
Wass de Czege and Sinnreich stressed the theory and history of tactics in 
the instruction presented at SAMS.  The advantage SAMS had over the CGSC 
Department of Tactics was that they, along with the SAMS Fellows, were former 
battalion commanders and thus were more familiar with the application and 
execution of recent tactics.  
 Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich served as the second director of SAMS 
from 1985 to 1987.  Sinnreich had also been involved in the writing of FM 100-5, 
both the 1982 and 1986 versions.  Sinnreich wrote an end of tour report in 1987 
after his tenure as Director.  In this report, he highlighted several of the internal 
and external tensions he believed that SAMS and especially AMSP as the school 
continued to mature, faced.  He wrote that he had told the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Carl Vuono, that “virtually all the dangers facing SAMS are 
associated with its success, not its failure.”190   The Army as a whole and the 
College in particular also came to view SAMS as a useful experiment. 
 Sinnreich recognized this in his end of tour report. He commended the 
College and the senior leaders of the Army for not interfering in the development 
and continuing refinement of the SAMS curriculum.  For example, Sinnreich 
                                                 
190
      School of Advanced Military Studies memorandum for Commandant. U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, dated 10 June 1987, Subject: End of Tour Report.  Written by COL Richard 
Hart Sinnreich, page 2.  Held in the Special Collections section, Combined Arms Research Library, 3rd 
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retained the prerogative of refining the curriculum internally and without external 
review and approval.  This end of tour report was an effort on his part to 
shortstop any future outside interference as the school continued to evolve. By 
and large Sinnreich was successful in this effort.  
 Sinnreich and following directors faced the question of when to expand the 
size of the Advanced Military Studies Program within SAMS.  Wass de Czege 
proposed that the school expand after the third year; from two to four seminars, 
based on the expected successes of the graduates.  In support of Sinnreich’s 
position against expansion was a general officer who told Sinnreich that there 
would always be “guys who never do anything much more than jump out of 
airplanes, go anywhere, expose themselves to death and are capable of inspiring 
and leading young soldiers.”191  This general officer declared that there is an 
important role for these officers in the Army, but the purpose of SAMS is to 
educate officers with a broader vision, and to produce officers who could lead 
corps and armies.  This placed another burden on the program, since increasing 
instruction on the operational level of war would supplant instruction on the 
tactics associated with the maneuver of corps and divisions.  
 Sinnreich approached the introduction of more operational art in the 
AMSP and Fellows’ program in unique ways.  Sinnreich envisioned extending 
AMSP into the second semester of the course of instruction in the Command and 
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      U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Collection, Group Combat development SG 1986, SSG 
SAMS-012/013, Interview with Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, Director of the School for Advanced 
Military Studies at CGSC, by Dr. Michael Pearlman, 8 April and 26 June 1986.  Held in the Combined 
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General Staff College.  This second semester focused on tactics, at that time.  
This extension of AMSP would ensure tactics was fully covered in the second 
semester of CGSC and the first semester of AMSP thus allowing additional 
campaign studies in AMSP.  The Fellowship of SAMS would also focus on the 
operational art over tactics as the Fellows were experienced former battalion 
commanders and would build on their familiarity with higher level tactics and use 
this perspective to gain a deeper appreciation of the operational level of war.  At 
this time in the life of the school the experience the Fellows had in command 
came from rigorous training exercises, war experience came later on.  Sinnreich 
also wanted to formalize the War College program in SAMS, AOSF, to include 
follow on internship assignments to directed field army and higher level staffs, 
much as the majors’ assignments were directed following AMSP.192 
 Under Sinnreich’s direction the curriculum retained its focus on military 
history and theory.  Sinnreich also continued the program of scheduling trips to 
various commands and especially an extended trip to Europe.  The trip to Europe 
combined seconding AMSP students to division staffs during an exercise, to 
expose the students to the challenges of division level execution and tactics with 
a series of staff rides to European battlefields, mostly battlefields over which 
American forces fought in World War II.  The students and faculty would walk the 
ground on which American forces had fought in order to experience the 
relationship of terrain to time and distance, as well as the effect of weather on the 
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      U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.  School of Advanced Military Studies, 
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pace of operations.  Though costly, the combination of staff experience and staff 
rides reinforced the lessons of the class room.  These experiences came back to 
the class room as students and faculty related the shared on the ground 
experiences to the warfighting concepts under discussion during class.  
 Sinnreich stated that the discourse on the development of FM 100-5, 1982 
prior to taking the helm at SAMS as director did not so much inform the 
development of the curriculum and the overall SAMS program as the class room 
discourse informed the development of the 1986 version of FM 100-5.  Sinnreich 
believed that the class room discussions were the most dynamic he had 
experienced in his military career.  The focus during Sinnreich’s tenure was not 
to produce practitioners of FM 100-5 but informed thinkers schooled in the theory 
and practice of war at higher levels of tactics and operational art.  The students 
were exposed the basic theories of war and drew their own conclusions on the 
practice of war, taking theory and the evidence of history and war-gaming as the 
basis for informed action rather than rote application of doctrine.193   
 Sinnreich stated that the fundamental difference between the approach of 
the Command and General Staff College and the teaching of tactics with the 
approach SAMS took in exploring the theory of tactics resulted from differing 
insights offered by the philosophers of war Jomini and Clausewitz.  Sinnreich’s 
appreciation of the CGSC approach was the College took a Jominian approach, 
in his words, “…you could reduce the complexity of war to principles that the 
average man could apply.  That school (CGSC) is dedicated to that proposition.”  
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On the other hand, Sinnreich and the other early directors of SAMS followed the 
Clausewitzian approach that, “rules were the death of sound soldiership.  This 
school (SAMS) is dedicated to that proposition.”194   
Sinnreich continued the iconoclastic spirit he inherited from Wass de 
Czege by deciding to change the name of the program from the department of 
Advanced Military Studies, the name of the initial experiment at a second year 
program to the School of Advanced Military Studies.  Sinnreich did this without 
seeking approval from the leadership of the College.  By this act he established 
SAMS as a school under the College rather than a department within the 
College.  It was a significant decision and one that ensured a large degree of 
freedom for future directors.  The next director of the school also followed this 
path while putting his own mark on the school. 
   Colonel Don Holder followed Sinnreich as the third director of SAMS.  
Holder, too, had participated in the writing of the 1982 version of FM 100-5, and 
later, while serving as one of the first SAMS Fellows, the 1986 version.  The fifth 
and sixth years of the development of SAMS was marked with the decision to put 
on hold the Wass de Czege vision to expand AMSP to 96 officers.  Holder also 
directed the development of a separate curriculum for the SAMS Fellows.  
Finally, Holder directed the continued dialogue in both programs about the 
nuances under girding AirLand Battle doctrine. 
 Holder viewed the state of SAMS when he arrived as basically sound.  
There were 48 majors in AMSP and eight lieutenant colonels in the Fellowship.  
He later acknowledged that this early in the development of SAMS attending the 
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school was still regarded as, “a slightly chancy thing to sign up for…”  Holder did 
feel, though, that the “iconoclast spirit” of the early days was still evident.  
Infrequent reports from field commanders and his experience as the operations 
officer for the 2nd Armored Division persuaded him that acceptance of graduates 
was generally good for majors.  At this time in the history of the school, there 
were fewer than 100 AMSP graduates, but they were—on the basis of anecdotal 
evidence [informal reports from commanders after Battle Command training 
Program exercises]--making a difference in the divisions and corps to which they 
were assigned.  With regard to assignment of Fellows, Holder admitted that the 
Fellows were not clearly differentiated from other War College graduates in the 
minds of most field commanders.195   
 The plan to expand to 96 AMSP students was on hold based on a 
decision taken between Holder and Sinnreich and in consultation with Wass de 
Czege.  The question of expansion was juxtaposed with arguments about 
keeping the high quality of majors selected for the program as well as retaining 
the favorable student to teacher ration; two instructors to 12 officer students.    
Holder, “decided very early…to keep enrollment at 48 majors.”  The program was 
growing in popularity and other services were becoming interested in having 
officers attend AMSP.  All four AMSP seminars had USAF officers at the time.  
The size of the seminar remained at 12 though.  The decision to include USAF 
officers came at the cost of reducing the number of U.S. Army officers, again to 
retain the high level of quality within the AMSP seminars.  The discussion about 
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expanding the program and including officers from other services was heated.  In 
addition to the issue of selecting “quality” U.S. Army officers, there arose the 
question as to how the officers from other services would be selected.  
Additionally, the size of the seminar also came up for debate. Sinnreich and then 
Holder thought that the optimal size of a seminar was 12.  Adding other service 
officers, they argued, must not increase the overall size of the seminar and the 
student to teacher ratio.  But that would mean decreasing the number of U.S. 
Army officers selected for SAMS. 
IN support of remaining at a total of 48 officers in AMSP Holder wrote a 
memo for the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College 
informally called the “No Free Lunch” memo.  In this memo, which was rewritten 
into a back channel message to the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine 
Command and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations of the Army Staff, Holder made 
the case that quality and the selection process were the key ingredients in 
ensuring that the Army received the best possible officer from AMSP.196  Holder 
used the message to inform these key general officers that inclusion of officers 
from other services came at a price; seats for U.S. Army officers in AMSP and a 
requirement for high quality officers from the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy.  
Holder also decided not to have foreign officers considered for inclusion in AMSP 
for fear of losing control of the admissions process.197  Control of admission to 
                                                 
196
      U.S. Army.  Personal For Message from Major General Gordon Sullivan, deputy 
commandant, USACGSC and Major General Glynn Mallory, Deputy Chief of Staff-Training, US Army 
Training and Doctrine Command.  The so-called “No Free Lunch” message, it states that the inclusion of 
USAF and USMC officers into an Army program, in the name of “jointness” would come at the cost of 
seats for US Army officers in a US Army school.  Held in the SAMS historical files, Room 271, 
Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
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AMSP was a major point of contention for Holder. 
Over his tenure, Holder did not change the admissions process for AMSP. 
Indeed he fought to ensure selection remained under the control of the Director, 
SAMS and not go to Washington and the Army Personnel Center.  Eventually, 
the compromise between SAMS and the Personnel Center was to send the final 
list of selected officers to the Personnel Center for a “quality” scrub that would 
ensure none of the selected officers were at risk for promotion.  The 
Leavenworth-based selection process called for first year students in CGSC to 
apply for admission, take an entry exam that assessed their grasp of basic 
tactical knowledge but also called on them to write opinions on doctrinal issues.  
Holder, the director and other key staff selected by Holder conducted interviews 
for everyone who showed promise and selected the class based on the 
recommendations of interviewers, CGSC performance, and test performance.  At 
the time SAMS had around 100 applicants for the 48 available seats.  The 
standards for selecting officers to AMSP were applied more stringently to combat 
arms officers. 
Admission was slightly tougher for combat arms officers because more 
combat arms officers applied for the program, and because Holder and his 
faculty felt they needed one Military Intelligence, MI, officer and one logistician 
per seminar.  Holder believed that the combined arms team approach to the 
application of tactics and operational art required a combination of the combat 
arms, military intelligence and logistics.  While there were many applications from 
combat arms officers the applications from those branches-MI and logistics- were 
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not as numerous.  Controlling admissions allowed faculty to choose some 
uniquely qualified students.  During Holder’s tenure as director, he admitted an 
Adjutant General Corps officer because he was also a Russian Foreign Area 
Officer, FAO and was an especially bright applicant.  The net result of the 
admissions process started by Wass de Czege and carried on by Sinnreich and 
Holder was a very select, bright group of officers who were eager for the SAMS 
experience.198   
Part of this experience was an exploration of the basis of the new Army 
doctrine, theory and military history.  Officers selected to attend AMSP had to 
take a course in military history as one of their CGSC electives.  Dr. Robert 
Epstein of the SAMS faculty taught this course in the final CGSC semester.  
Holder, who had taught military history at West Point, believed strongly that 
learning the history of warfare was essential in developing critical thinking in 
officers. 
Holder did adjust the curriculum of AMSP during his tenure as director.  
During his tenure AMSP was organized into over 20 sub-courses.  Holder felt 
that the courses were far too short, and, thus, he consolidated the sub-course 
into eight courses.  Holder also began with a substantial block of tactics 
instruction, based on the continuing assessment that the tactics instruction in 
CGSC was weak and focused on the lowest common experience in a CGSC 
seminar.  Holder’s assessment of tactical instruction in CGSC deserves some 
comment. 
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 Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all felt that the instruction of 
tactics in CGSC was lacking.  This assessment was substantiated by the Meloy 
report, especially in Meloy’s finding that there were not enough recently  “branch 
qualified” officers in the Department of Tactics to teach CGSC students on the 
execution of tactics in accord with doctrine.  In a March 1986 essay in Military 
Review General Richardson, Commanding General of Training and Doctrine 
Command, introduced the 1986 version of FM 100-5.  In this essay Richardson 
stated that mastery of AirLand Battle was a key ingredient in preparing for war.  
Richardson also announced several initiatives to instill the doctrine into the total 
officer corps.  One of these initiatives was the establishment of a Center for Army 
Tactics within the Department of Tactics of the Command and General Staff 
College.  The purpose of the center was, “To instill the tenets of the AirLand 
Battle in the officer corps.”  Richardson intended that the center be “on the 
cutting edge of tactical study, teaching, doctrinal writing and evaluating lessons 
from those recently assigned to combat units.”  Richardson also wrote that the 
center would ensure standardization of tactical instruction throughout TRADOC 
and set standards for excellence in tactical training for the entire Army.  
Given the importance of the Center, Richardson wrote, “Only the Army’s finest 
combined arms tacticians will be assigned” to it, ensuring that “students will learn 
the most current and sound doctrine and tactics from the Army’s best.”  While no 
the focus of my research I found little evidence to support Richardson’s 
assertion.  This change would be in SAMS benefit as well as the Army’s, but my 
research did not turn up evidence that supported Richardson’s statement. Holder 
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prudently kept a focus on tactics and tactical instruction in AMSP while awaiting 
evidence of a change in CGSC.199     
   Holder kept the terrain model exercises, designed to make students 
aware of weapons characteristics and the effects of ground.  He also added 
emphasis to tactical movements and maneuver through the use of actual 
movement planning.  Holder felt this needed to be added to the tactics instruction 
based on his year of service as the G3, operations officer, of the 2nd Armored 
Division as well as his professional judgment based on the study of war.200 
Prior to coming to SAMS Holder served as the operations officer of the 2nd 
Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas.  The 2nd Armored was under command of 
the III U.S. Corps, which was commanded by LTG Crosbie Saint.  Saint focused 
on the role of the corps as a mobile force that would conduct counter-attacks 
upon employment in Germany under a NATO scenario.  As the division 
operations officer Holder studied the movement of large formations.  He insisted 
that SAMS incorporate the study of the movement of large formations based on 
this experience in III Corps and due to an incident with the SAMS faculty.  Holder 
was searching for historical case studies of corps sized movement and called 
SAMS while he was the operations officer.  Holder said that the answer he 
received from the faculty was words to the effect that SAMS did not foresee the 
need for corps maneuver in the near future.  Holder arrived at SAMS determined 
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that SAMS would indeed study this form of maneuver.201 
The other basic block of the AMSP curriculum as revised by Holder was 
Dr. James Schneider’s demanding theory course.  The theory course followed 
tactics and set the foundation for the remainder of the AMSP year of study.  
Holder, Sinnreich and Wass de Czege all believed that linking the theory of war 
with military history would best prepare AMSP graduates for the rigor needed to 
analyze warfare in the late 20th century and empower them to adapt the concepts 
of AirLand Battle into executable form in war exercises and war.  Theory ranged 
from Clausewitz and Jomini to Sun Tzu and Mao, as well as Russian theorists 
such as Tuchachevskii, one of the practitioner/theorists of the operational level of 
war. 
Student evaluations of these courses revealed a broad range of 
responses to the effectiveness and utility of the SAMS focus on theory.  In the 
SAMS internally directed end of course survey done in 1985 one AMSP student 
remarked that there needed to be an even tighter link between the military 
classics colloquia and theory, writing, “Use it to show a continuity between 
theory, principles, and the military experience throughout the ages.”  The same 
survey included a statement requesting greater exposure to Jim Schneider, “Jim 
Schneider needs to be used more.”  The conclusion of the survey indicated a 
degree of comfort on the part of the SAMS faculty regarding the utility and 
acceptance of theory as the initial course within AMSP.202      
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The results of the internally directed end of course survey done in 1986 
revealed a more maturing course and a more discerning student population.  
Officer comments regarding theory indicated that the officers saw a real need for 
a theoretical base from which a SAMS graduate would operate when back in the 
field Army.  An officer wrote, “The real benefit of the course is the theoretical 
study…The study of theory is not conducive to individual study and almost 
requires interaction.”  Another officer wrote that the faculty should reemphasize 
theory throughout the academic year, writing, “Not enough time within the 
curriculum to [reinforce] concepts developed in Course 1 throughout year.”  
Every officer-student in AMSP participated in these surveys but not every officer 
comments on every course.  The overall tenor of the comments made on the 
theory block of instruction indicated that while it was a tough course there was a 
widespread feeling that it was a necessary course.203 
During Holder’s tenure, after theory students alternated topical seminars 
covering division, corps and army level doctrine.  Each echelon-oriented seminar 
concluded with an exercise at that particular echelon of command.  Lieutenant 
Colonel David McConnell was the SAMS exercise director for Holder.  As 
directed by Holder, McConnell set up a series of manual and computer-assisted 
exercises that required students to plan then conduct tactical and operational 
level actions.  In the largest of these exercises, corps and army level, SAMS had 
                                                                                                                                                 
undated found in the SAMS files, Room 212, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
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several planning groups prepare operations plans.  Holder made it a practice to 
receive staff briefings from the student planning groups and then selected the 
boldest of the proposed plans for implementation. 
The program of instruction begun by Wass de Czege continued under 
Holder, essentially the schedule of four seminars sessions per week—
Wednesday generally being a study day-- with exercises running five days a 
week.  The trips for AMSP students ran about a week in length.  The year he 
arrived at SAMS as the director, the Army cut European travel from the program 
as it was too costly.  AMSP students did continue to travel to the East coast for 
visits to U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, 
SOCOM, U.S. Atlantic Command, LANTCOM/SACLANT, and the Pentagon.  
Trips to the NTC to view tactical training also continued.  AMSP conducted a 
number of local terrain exercises as a part of the exercise program which was 
part of the tactics sub-course.  As the reputation of the school grew the number 
of speakers coming to the school increased in number and stature.  SAMS, as 
Holder recalled, “had wonderful speakers including Luttwak, Lind, and many 
senior retired people like Emerson, McCaffrey, Starry and Cushman.”204  The 
speakers challenged conventional wisdom and reinforced the lessons on critical 
thinking. 
Under Holder, SAMS shifted from requiring the students to write one 
masters’ thesis to writing two monographs.  The reasoning behind this shift was 
that two monographs would allow for focus on the tactical and operational 
domains.  The first monograph was due at the end of the first semester of SAMS 
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and would be focused on a tactical topic.  The second monograph, due at the 
end of the second semester, but before the oral final examinations, was focused 
on an operational level topic.  Both monographs went through an acceptance 
process from the monograph director through the director of SAMS to the 
College Director of Graduate Studies. Dr. Phil Brooks.  Dr. Brooks was deeply 
involved in assuring that SAMS met the College standards for earning a Master 
of Military Arts and Sciences, MMAS.205 
The major change that Holder made to the overall program of SAMS 
regarded the handling of the officers in the SAMS Fellowship, or Advanced 
Operational Arts Studies Fellowship.  Holder recalled that, “When I became 
Director, the Fellows attended AMSP seminars and were allowed to choose one 
day per week to skip seminar and do as they pleased.”  Holder changed that 
method of operation and directed that the fellows form a separate seminar of 
their own with a suitable (operational level) curriculum.  Holder thought that “one 
of my best contributions to SAMS was regularizing the Fellowship by making it a 
separate seminar.”206  Holder recalled that he “intended to separate the Fellows 
from the AMSP students and to focus them on theater warfare.”  Holder assigned 
the Fellows a seminar room of their own and selected one of the previous year’s 
Fellows to serve as their seminar leader.  Holder, Epstein, and Schneider were 
the principal teachers of the Fellows.207    
The major problem with the Fellowship had to do with the perception of it 
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among eligible Army lieutenant colonels and colonels.  While Wass de Czege 
had initially thought this group should be hand selected officers from good 
schools, many eligible officers were not willing to volunteer to come to 
Leavenworth, at least not in the early years of SAMS.  If AMSP was a dicey 
option for majors two years at Leavenworth away from the mainstream Army was 
seen as a major risk among the officers selected to attend the War College.  As 
Holder recalled, “Most of the Fellows came to the School unwillingly.”  A very few 
officers volunteered to come to SAMS, going so far as to contact the school to 
ensure that the director knew of their preference.  In a concession to the school, 
the Army Personnel Center accepted school input with by-name preferences as 
soon as the selection list for War College level schooling was announced.  
However, at that time—[early to mid] 1980s when the reputation of the school 
was not so well established---most officers coming to the Fellowship were sent 
by the Army without much preparation.  Holder observed many years later that it 
was a 90 day process to bring the Fellows “out of their collective sulk…” and 
make them active participants of the class and the school. 
While there was reluctance on the part of the early directors to allow 
international officers into AMSP, Holder was the first director to have an 
international officer on the faculty as a Fellow and seminar leader.  In 1988 
British Colonel Gage Williams was assigned to Fort Leavenworth to study SAMS 
and then to return to launch the British Army’s Higher Command and Staff 
School.  Williams was such a manifestly talented officer that Holder put him to 
work on a staff ride to Vicksburg for the Fellows.  The focus of the trip was to 
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study the operational and strategic aspects of Grant’s 1863 campaign.  Williams’ 
efforts paid off, and the Fellows commented so strongly on the benefits of the trip 
that this staff ride remained a part of the Fellows curriculum in the following year 
as well.  In a very clever bureaucratic move Holder included members of the 
Combat Studies Institute, CSI, on these staff rides.  The staff ride program was 
the bailiwick of CSI and by having CSI members facilitate the staff ride Holder 
avoided an interdepartmental fight.  He also gained an ally.   
The Fellows travel program also included overseas travel to regional 
combatant commands; Southern Command, SOUTHCOM, Pacific Command, 
PACOM, and European Command, EUCOM.  The focus of the travel was to 
reinforce lessons on theater level warfare and the interaction of policy, strategy 
and the operational level of war.  This year of study and travel reinforced the 
preparation of the Fellows to teach the majors in AMSP. 
Holder continued to refine Wass de Czege’s “Plan B” as all seminar 
leaders were second year Fellows.  In Holder’s first year as director, 1987, one of 
the seminar leaders was selected for brigade command and due to 
circumstances beyond school control this officer had to depart to take command 
immediately.  A second Fellow was activated from the alternate brigade 
command list as well.208  This unforeseen circumstance led to assigning one 
seminar to Colonel Williams, the visiting British officer.  As Holder recalled, 
Williams proved to be “a brilliant seminar leader.”209      
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The curricula of AMSP and AOSF did not exclusively center on the Army 
doctrine FM 100-5, 1982 or 1986.210  However Holder intended that SAMS 
graduates would return to the operational Army as “advocates for and experts in 
AirLand Battle…” especially in the school’s first years, which coincided with the 
release of this new doctrine.  Both programs of SAMS educated these selected 
officers beyond the basics of the doctrine so that they could explain and properly 
implement the doctrine in Army divisions and corps as well as higher echelon 
headquarters.  This was Holder’s aim as director of the School until 1989 when 
he departed for a brigade level command.  Holder’s goal was to establish 
doctrinal understanding for the graduates’ next assignment and, equally 
important to give graduates enough understanding of theory to allow them to 
change doctrine as their careers advanced.  SAMS graduates education would 
allow them to more deeply understand the doctrine, implement the doctrine 
throughout the Army, and when it came time to revise the doctrine be able 
explain the need for change and participate in the writing and development 
process. 
 Under the first three directors and continuing into the future, SAMS started 
a process of immediate student surveys as a class neared graduation.  The 
SAMS administration also set up arrangements for continuing contact effort 
between graduates and the school to ensure SAMS retained awareness of how 
graduates performed their duties and for feedback on what was helpful to 
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graduates.  A review of the comment sheets from graduating officers from the 
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Advanced Military Studies Program 
(AMSP) class of 1984/85 revealed telling comments on the effectiveness of the 
curriculum and its focus on division and corps level tactics as well as the 
operational level.  One officer wrote that based on his education in AMSP he 
finally learned that “war is much more than a tactical battle of attrition…”  Other 
comments on the effectiveness of the curriculum were straightforward from, “You 
have a good thing going – don’t screw with it!!!” to “SAMS needs to find viable 
alternatives to the ‘fire hydrant’ approach to education.”  There was also a 
comment calling for limiting student and especially faculty war stories, “Four 
hours in class is bad enough, if seminar leader allows it [telling war stories] to 
ramble he is wasting taxpayers’ money.” 211 
The fact that the first three directors of SAMS were also intimately 
involved in the development and refinement of the center piece of U.S. Army 
doctrine was not serendipitous.  Reflecting circumstances perhaps unique in the 
history of the U.S. Army, senior leaders of the Army, Starry, Richardson, Vuono 
and Sullivan, to name a few, were deeply involved in the refinement of doctrine 
as well as the selection of the director of the school that would ensure a broader 
understanding of the nuances and underpinnings of the doctrine would go out to 
the field Army.  Doctrine would link the Army’s new combat systems with a 
method of how to employ these systems.   
Professor Frederick Kagan has called the period from 1975 to 1986 the 
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“Rebirth of Military Doctrine."212  This period was marked with a focus on winning 
the first battle of the next war to thinking about theater level warfare, from the 
tactical movement of battalions to the point of penetration to how to disrupt the 
follow-on echelons of an attacking force.  Sinnreich said that FM 100-5, 1982 
allowed the Army to “think about victory and winning the war again…”213  The 
combination of new doctrine entering the Army school system and component 
units in the field as well as new weapons systems led many officers, especially 
those in Europe, to no longer view their General Defensive Plan positions as 
Kagan highlighted, as the place where “I was going to die,” but where the Army 
was going to defeat the Russians.214  The doctrine of the mid 1980s required a 
link between the tactics of corps and divisions and the strategic objectives of the 
theater commander. 
Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all expected that the graduates of 
SAMS would return to the Army and raise the level of understanding of Army 
doctrine to new levels through more competent execution of operations.  The 
new doctrine clearly pointed out that the political purpose of the war be 
established before strategic and tactical objectives could be developed.  A 
deeper understanding of the nuances of the development of strategy, gained by 
a study of military theory and history would provide the basis for this 
improvement in execution.  This reflected the unstated but clear influence of 
Clausewitz’s On War, that war is an extension of policy by other means.   
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The practitioners of the new doctrine SAMS was educating understood 
that reasonably clear political objectives and policy statements were the key to 
establishing attainable operational level objectives.  The bridge between strategy 
and tactics was the operational level of war.  Although later critics would question 
the understanding of the interaction required between military and policy makers 
to state a clear policy and strategy, at the time the enthusiasm for the course, 
one that came from the focus on what SAMS graduates called a real study of war 
was indeed carried out to the field Army.215  The graduates had to get to the field 
Army and for the first two classes from SAMS it took some extraordinary efforts. 
LTG (ret) David R. Palmer was the deputy commandant of the US Army 
Command and General Staff College from late summer of 1983 to June 1985.  
He recalled that he arrived at Fort Leavenworth to serve as the deputy 
commandant after the decision was taken to establish the School of Advanced 
Military Studies.  The first year, 1983-84 was the pilot program and LTG (ret) 
Palmer said that it was clear to him that a part of his job as deputy commandant 
was to ensure that the first year went well.  In particular he recalled how the 
assignments for the first and second classes were made, the Chief of Staff, Army 
personally approved the assignments. 
 LTG (ret) Palmer said that he understood there was, “a rule--maybe 
unwritten…” or form of guidance that the graduates would go to either Army 
divisions or corps to serve as planners.  This assignment was to ensure that the 
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graduates would put their knowledge of higher level tactics and the operational 
level of war to use.  LTG Palmer related that in the spring of 1984, February or 
March, the Chief of Staff, GEN John Wickham, came out to Leavenworth to 
speak to various courses then in session.  As an adjunct to this visit LTG (ret) 
Palmer recalled that he and the Chief of Staff sat in the deputy commandant’s 
office in Bell Hall and that the Chief went over the list of the graduates and 
personally approved each officer’s post-SAMS assignment.  This was to ensure 
that no one would take another decision without checking with the Chief 
personally.  LTG Palmer said, “The Army is a large organization, and like all large 
organizations it has trouble digesting new things.  SAMS was a new thing.  As 
there was no regulation or guidance on SAMS it was important for the Army to 
understand that the assignment of SAMS graduates was important to the Chief of 
Staff.”  
 LTG Palmer said that he did not recall exactly how the list of names and 
preferred assignments made it to his office but was sure that then COL Wass de 
Czege polled the students and did other coordination with the Army G1 before 
this list arrived in his office.  LTG Palmer said that he was “90% certain” that 
GEN Wickham took the same level of personal interest in the assignment of the 
second class of SAMS graduates.   
 The senior leaders of the Army were not only personally involved in the 
decisions to establish the school but were also personally invested in ensuring 
that the graduates of the school’s first classes were assigned in accord with the 
proposed third phase assignment close to general officers in division or corps 
  
121 
 
command.216 
 The first years of SAMS’ existence was marked by tension between 
contrasting expectations.  Internally, there was the tension of establishing the 
independence of the school and the retention of the iconoclastic spirit that led the 
first classes to believe that they were a part of “a cabal plotting major changes in 
the way the Army operated.”217  The period was marked by establishing the 
method of student selection for AMSP, the refinement of the Fellows’ curriculum 
and how the Fellows would be received by the Army, as well as when and how to 
integrate officers from other services into AMSP.  The highlight, though not 
viewed so at the time, was the change in the name of the program from 
department to School.  Sinnreich, wrote in his end of tour report that the cost of 
SAMS was less than the cost of one M1 tank, but the return on the investment 
was great and the Army benefited from the education and ability the graduates 
brought with them to the field Army.218   
 There were indications as well of internal tension between the greater 
Staff College faculty and administration and SAMS.  By and large these tensions 
were not unusual as all bureaucracies have a degree of tension.  For example, 
SAMS was reaching a peak of popularity as LTG Holder, the third director 
recalled.  The SAMS faculty and director arranged for different speakers to come 
into SAMS as they fit into the SAMS curriculum.  These speakers did not 
ordinarily speak at the larger Staff College.  At the time SAMS was housed in 
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Flint Hall, a small renovated former cavalry stables.  The combined seminar 
room, as it was called, could barely accommodate the guest speaker and the 
population of SAMS thus CGSC faculty were not invited to attend these lectures.  
The reason was a lack of space but the exclusion bred a feeling of antipathy.  
Given the special relationship SAMS enjoyed with senior Army leaders it was 
easy for the CGSC faculty to presume aloofness on the part of SAMS.  This 
imagined slight and other tension were a part of the growing pains of an 
institution within a larger institution.  The first test of the graduates and the source 
of the external tension was the expectation of greatly improved performance of 
divisions and corps when the graduates of SAMS arrived on those staffs.219 
 External tensions came in the form of where to place the graduates of the 
school on division and corps staffs, how to overcome the Army’s disposition 
against perceived and real “elites,” and, most importantly, how would this 
experiment in retaining officers for a second year of schooling when the Army felt 
it needed more doers than thinkers, would fare as these officers joined the staffs 
of divisions and corps.  The senior leader advocates of the concept of SAMS had 
very high expectations of the graduates.  The dictum of Moltke the Elder to “be 
more than you appear to be” was a guiding principle for the first graduates of 
SAMS, as well as Wass de Czege’s more practically focused advice to “max the 
PT test and get your hands dirty in the motor pool.  You will succeed if you do 
those things and heed the motto of the German general staff to ‘be more than 
you appear to be…,” before the graduates could talk about new doctrine and the 
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theory than formed the supporting structure of the doctrine.  The good news for 
the Army was, in Wass de Czege’s words, “The new manual was followed almost 
immediately by the disciples and translators of the manual…”220  SAMS played a 
pivotal role in seeing that transformation occur. 
The unofficial SAMS’ policy of earning one’s spurs on the staff or going 
through “prop blast” was practical in an Army that was measuring success at the 
tactical level through performance at the National Training Center.  Even though 
the small portions of the Army had been tested in combat in Grenada SAMS 
graduates had not yet demonstrated their worth, and the worth of a second year 
of advanced military education, in facing the real purpose of the Army--which was 
to win the nation’s wars.  This first test came in the summer and fall of 1989, 
during an operation called “Just Cause” in the tiny nation of Panama.   
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Chapter Five 
 
The First Test 
Panama and Operation Just Cause 
 
 
 The Army’s new doctrine, AirLand Battle and the graduates of the School 
of Advanced Military Studies were tested in battle in late 1989.  Using the tenets 
of AirLand Battle, agility, initiative, depth and synchronization, this chapter will 
examine the influence of the doctrine and how it was used by graduates of the 
school to adjust plans to tactical realities and link tactical actions to operational 
objectives. 
 In late October, 1989, the principal commanders of the potential U.S. 
invasion of Panama; Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, designated commander of 
the Joint Task Force, Major General Gary Luck, commander of the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and Brigadier General William Hartzog, 
Operations officer, J-3, of Southern Command flew to Washington to brief the 
mission Operations Order, OPORD, 1-90 to General Colin Powell, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant General 
Thomas Kelly, Joint Staff Operations officer, J3, gathered in the Pentagon.  
Loaded down with charts and graphs, and, even more important, superbly 
prepared after months of total focus in the planning effort, Hartzog knocked the 
ball out of the park.  General Kelly later called Hartzog’s presentation as one of 
the best operations briefings he had ever heard.  The work of LTG Stiner’s XVIII 
Airborne Corps planners had paid off.  General Powell left the presentation 
convinced that the plan allowed for agility, adaptability and, barring an 
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unforeseen accelerating event in the near future, also allowed ample time for 
rehearsals. General Powell especially liked the emphasis on using enough force 
to overwhelm the Panamanian Defense Force in the shortest time possible. On 3 
November, General Hartzog briefed the plan in “The Tank” to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. They agreed to it as written.221   
 Stiner, as the joint task force commander, established the conditions for 
his subordinate commanders to exercise initiative by a series of rehearsals and 
ground reconnaissance missions in Panama.  As well, his plan, written by SAMS 
graduates, took advantage of the distance between military bases in the United 
States and Panama to expand the area available for U.S. forces to maneuver 
beyond the ability of the Panamanians to observe.  Stiner, as will be seen, used 
U.S. bases to stage his forces for the invasion, a depth beyond the 
Panamanians’ ability to monitor.  
 Before 1990, the common experience of battalion commanders had been 
a training exercise at one of the Army’s combat training centers.  The combat 
training centers were designed to simulate high-intensity modern warfare.  This 
“close to war” experience was the most intensive tactical training the Army 
offered.  Battalion commanders faced a live opponent who knew the terrain of the 
battle area.  Both sides were equipped with laser devices that simulated the 
direct fire weapons, rifles, machine guns, tank cannons, etc., used by U.S. and 
Soviet equipped forces.  The battalion commander had to develop and execute a 
series of plans and orders and adjust them to the realities of fighting against an 
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intelligent and flexible opponent.  Specially selected teams of officers and non-
commissioned officers served as observers and controllers.  These soldiers 
controlled the battles to ensure a level of safety.  They also observed the 
planning and execution cycles within a battalion and ran the after action review 
conducted after each battle with the opposing force.  The system of after-action 
reviews, during which observers dissected every mistake, was brutal but 
contributed to an increased understanding of the realities of warfare.  Battalion 
commanders who won battles at the combat training centers could walk with a 
swagger.  This changed in 1989 when the Army went to war.  This war was also 
the first real conflict for the fourteen graduates of the School of Advanced Military 
Studies assigned to the forces involved in the operation, many of whom played 
important roles in the Panama intervention, Operation Just Cause in 1989.  
 The SAMS curricula prior to the start of focused planning for Operation 
Just Cause remained basically the same as outlined from the beginning of the 
school’s existence.  The extant doctrinal centerpiece was Field Manual 100-5, 
1986.  The development of this field manual was very much a result of the 
discourse within SAMS during the tenure of COL Rick Sinnreich, the second 
director.  As previously discussed, Sinnreich recalled that he and then LTC Don 
Holder were not so much influencing SAMS with the doctrine but taking 
advantage of the discussions about the theory and history of war that took place 
during the conduct of the AMSP seminar to refine concepts that then went into 
the field manual.  The scope of the discourse within the seminars reflected this 
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approach.222   
 The broad focus of each program within the school was: tactical to 
operational - AMSP, and operational to strategic - AOSF.  In the Advanced 
Military Studies Program (AMSP) within the School of Advanced Military Studies, 
tactics instruction was specifically focused on battles and engagements.  Holder 
recalled that the level of the tactics block of instruction on which AMSP focused 
dealt with “the combat operations of corps, divisions, brigades, and that’s about 
as low as we took it.”  Holder did use the operational level of war as a framework, 
and he found that helped the students and the faculty in distinguishing tactics 
from operational art.  Holder said, “We looked at tactics as that - battles and 
engagements below the level of major operations in campaigns which is the 
operational field.”223  The Fellows, with their own unique curriculum instituted by 
Holder, focused at the higher echelons of command, and, as well, prepared 
themselves to teach the majors in the AMSP seminars. 
 The focus of the Fellows program came into its own with Holder.  
Regarding the fellows, he said, “my general guidance to John Mills who was the 
first Director of the Fellows was to emphasize operational art, cut out the tactics 
course, and start with a theoretical and historical overview.  Essentially they got 
an advanced version of the operational level instruction that the majors 
received.”224   The fellows were also exposed to visiting lecturers, William S. Lind 
and Edward Luttwak among others, and were sent on field studies that Army War 
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College students, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania did not get as a part of that 
curriculum.    
 The majors in AMSP and its graduates numbered just over 100 in 1989.  
These majors and the limited number of SAMS fellows represented the core of 
the greater officer corps who possessed full knowledge of the doctrine, FM 100-
5, and the theoretical underpinnings of that doctrine.  
 By that time, SAMS was definitely emphasizing the teaching of doctrine.  
As Holder recalled, “In fact, the school had the charter, which we the early 
Directors all agreed upon, of teaching the theory, history and the thinking behind 
doctrine.”225  The students in the school discussed the tenets of AirLand Battle 
doctrine, agility, depth, initiative, and synchronization, and how these tenets were 
developed.  Each sub-course in AMSP concluded with an exercise that would 
reinforce various doctrinal tenets as the majors developed plans and orders for 
the exercise and then actually play out the war game, either on a terrain board 
with small lead models of tanks and other armored vehicles or in computer 
assisted simulations.  For example in the early 1980s not many officers had the 
opportunity to train at the National Training Center therefore SAMS used the 
Dunn-Kempf war game to give a sense of the size of a brigade combat team in 
terms of vehicles and space.  The use of this war game reinforced the simple fact 
that movement over distance takes time as well as emphasizing the need to take 
decisions based on developing conditions and less than perfect information.  The 
Battle Command Training Program, BCTP, supported a division level exercise for 
SAMS.  This computer assisted exercise allowed SAMS students to “see” the 
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scope of a division in combat through the use of large computer screens to 
display the subordinate units of a division operating over distance, European or 
Korean terrain, and in electronic combat supported by complex algorithms that 
generated results in terms of combat casualties, ammunition and fuel consumed, 
and all of the other damage done in combat.  
 The 1982 version of FM 100-5 described levels of war as strategic, 
operational, and tactical.226  The 1986 version of AirLand Battle embodied in FM 
100-5 refined the definitions of military strategy, operational art, and tactics.  A 
subtle difference in the two manuals was the change from “levels of war” in the 
1982 version to the “Structure of Modern Warfare,” in the 1986 version, which 
also officially introduced the term operational art as the bridge between strategy 
and tactics.  FM 100-5, 1986 defined military strategy, operational art, and tactics 
as follows: 
 Military strategy is the art and science of 
employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to 
secure policy objectives by the application or threat of 
force…Strategy derived from policy must be clearly 
understood to be the sole authoritative basis of all 
operations. 
 Operational art is the employment of military 
forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or 
theater of operations through the design, organization 
and conduct of campaigns and major operations. 
 Tactics is the art by which corps and smaller 
unit commanders translate potential combat power 
into victorious battles and engagements.227 
 
The 1986 version of the FM specified that operational art also included the 
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“fundamental decisions on when and where to fight,” “whether to accept or 
decline battle,” and continuing a theme that was extant throughout the manual 
concerning the criticality of identifying the enemy’s center of gravity, calling the 
essence of operational art the ability to identify and attack the enemy’s 
operational center of gravity.228  The 1986 manual articulated four basic tenets of 
AirLand Battle doctrine.  These doctrinal tenets were: Initiative, Agility, Depth, 
and Synchronization.229   
 Initiative involved setting or changing the conditions of battle by positive 
action on the part of the U.S. force, essentially actions to ensure freedom of 
action.  Tied to initiative was the tenet of agility.  Agility referred to the ability of 
U.S. forces to act faster than the enemy on the battlefield and required 
commanders to have a continuous “read” of the battlefield to anticipate and 
overcome friction, a concept carried over from Clausewitz.  The tenet of depth 
contained a larger view of the battlefield to the battle space, which is an 
extension of operations in space, time and resources.  The doctrinal definition 
elaborated on the description of depth in terms of space and time, “space to 
maneuver, time to plan, arrange and execute, and resources to win.”230  Finally, 
and perhaps the most difficult to execute, was the concept of synchronization. 
 Synchronization was a hotly debated tenet.  Indeed, the first thought was 
to use the word “Orchestration” as the tenet.231  The writers faced amazement 
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and laughter by those with whom they consulted while trying to define this word 
in terms Army officers would accept.  Thus, the word was discarded.  
Synchronization was selected, and this word was also difficult to explain to the 
wider Army.  The definition in the manual was, “arrangement of battlefield 
activities in time, space, and purpose to provide maximum relative combat power 
at the decisive point.”232  As a result of the extensive conversations about the 
choice of words and the nuances the authors were trying to get across, the 
Fellows and AMSP graduates left Fort Leavenworth with a sophisticated 
understanding of the nuances of the tenets.  Authors and SAMS graduates even 
came to grips with the difficult term synchronization through lengthy discussions 
of the theoretical underpinning of the doctrine.  Hours discussing the Jominian 
and Clausewitzian concepts in seminars were about to be tested as the 
graduates moved out to the Army and joined their units as planners.  This 
translation of doctrine into action was done during operations in Panama.    
 The principal U.S. Army units involved with the development of the plans 
and execution of Operation Just Cause were the XVIII Airborne Corps 
headquarters, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light).  
The corps headquarters formed the nucleus of the Joint Task Force South (JTF) 
headquarters working for General Max Thurman, the commander of U.S. 
Southern Command.  The planners for the Corps/JTF were LTC Tim McMahon 
(Director); LTC Charles Bergdorf; MAJ James Delony; MAJ David Huntoon; MAJ 
David M. Rodriquez; MAJ Lloyd Sherfey; and CPT(P) Edward J. Dillenschneider.  
The lead planner for the 82nd Airborne Division was MAJ William Caldwell and 
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the lead planner for the 7th Infantry Division was MAJ Steven Barbero.233  All of 
these officers were SAMS graduates. 
 Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian dictator, declared war on the United 
States on 15 December 1989.  On 16 December in Panama, U.S. Marine Corps 
1LT Robert Paz and three other officers were going out for dinner in Panama City 
when they were stopped at a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) roadblock in the 
vicinity of La Commandancia, the headquarters of the PDF.  The PDF soldiers at 
the check point attempted to pull the officers out of the car.  The American 
officers feared for their lives and tried to escape.  As the Americans sped away in 
their car, the PDF soldiers began shooting and Paz was killed.  A US Navy 
lieutenant and his wife were nearby and witnessed this shooting.  The couple 
was taken into custody and removed to another building somewhere in town.  He 
was brutally beaten and his wife was threatened sexually.  She was put into a 
leaning position against a wall where she was made to stand until she collapsed 
on the floor.  
 The next day, 17 December 1989, two military policemen at Torrijos-
Tocumen Airfield were detained by the PDF. They were beaten and their 
weapons were taken away from them. These incidents, combined with 
intelligence which indicated that the threat was increasing to American lives there 
caused President Bush to take the decision to execute the plan for an invasion.  
The four doctrinal tenets articulated in the 1986 version of FM 100-5 are a useful 
framework for reviewing Operation Just Cause.  These tenets; depth, initiative, 
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agility, and synchronization, are evident in the design of the campaign and in the 
execution.   
 The opposing sides in this operation had two distinct views of the depth of 
the battle space involved in Operation Just Cause.  The PDF could only focus on 
the tactical depth it could see, the US forces in Panama, and to a limited extent 
on what was available on U.S. news reports.  Joint Task Force South used the 
operational depth provided by United States-based forces to extend the 
operation in space, time and resources. 
 
 
 Operation Just Cause (figure 1)234 
 Operation Just Cause began during the evening of 19 December 1989.  A 
joint force of over 11,000 Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deployed from 
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bases across the U.S. (Forts Bragg, Benning, Polk, Hood, Lewis, and Ord) and 
within Panama to launch Operation Just Cause.  XVIII Airborne Corps formed the 
nucleus of JTF South, which conducted the operational-level forcible entry 
operation into Panama. The use of the operational depth available to U.S. forces 
also allowed JTF South the time to synchronize the execution of the campaign.  
 The JTF capitalized on the capabilities of assigned joint forces by 
simultaneously attacking throughout the battle space.  General Carl W. Stiner, 
commander of JTF South, described the concept, “[we] go in at night with 
overwhelming combat power on multiple, simultaneous objectives to force the 
PDF to surrender very quickly.”235 
 JTF South executed an integrated plan that directed forces against 
twenty-seven separate objectives throughout Panama at virtually the same time, 
a prime example of synchronization.  Objectives included the locks along the 
length of the Panama Canal, securing US family housing while striking three key 
PDF targets in the same area, and the Commandancia, headquarters of the 
PDF.  Stiner said the key was “hitting all objectives [quickly] . . . [to] overcome the 
enemy’s ability to effectively organize his forces.”236  The plan attacked all PDF 
battlefield operating systems, two key systems being command and control (C2) 
and maneuver.   
 At H–hour, forward-deployed US forces attacked La Comrnandancia, the 
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central PDF Command and Control facility. The attack destroyed the PDF C2 
with fire. The rapid destruction and disruption of C2 established a fluid situation in 
which the PDF could not operate effectively.  Disruption of the C2 system also 
crippled the PDF’s ability to maneuver.  These simultaneous attacks also denied 
the PDF the opportunity to maneuver without interference. 
 Battalion 2000, an elite PDF unit, was based at Fort Cimarron. The 
battalion had to cross a bridge over the Pacora River to reinforce the PDF in 
Panama City or counterattack the JTF airhead at Torrijos/ITocumen airfield. 
Army special operations forces (SOF), supported by AC–1 30 gunships, secured 
the Pacora river bridge prior to any PDF movement, blocking potential 
reinforcements. 
 The PDF also had two companies based at Rio Hato, within reinforcing 
distance of the PDF forces in Panama City.  Preceded by F–117 air strikes, Army 
Rangers attacked these two PDF companies at Rio Hato .  Because of these and 
other attacks on its units, the PDF could not maneuver its forces to mount 
effective counterattacks against the JTF. 
 Just Cause was a coup de main, an operation that achieved strategic, 
operational and tactical objectives in a single operation. The overwhelming 
success of the JTF attack against key PDF strong points required a combination 
of infiltration by SOF, attacks by conventional units already in Panama and 
forcible entry by both Rangers and the 82d Airborne Division. These operations 
were also coordinated with the actions of the forward deployed forces of US 
Southern Command-the 193d Separate Infantry Brigade and elements of the 7th 
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Infantry Division (Light) and 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), along with a 
small contingent of Marines. Mission orders, combined with decentralized 
execution contributed to the success of the operation.  Setting the conditions for 
initiative required coordination among commanders and planners at the JTF and 
division level. 
 The process of communicating the plan down to the major subordinate 
commanders depends upon the basis of confidence between the commanders in 
any military operation.  The senior commander may describe to subordinate 
commanders the overall joint operating area, their areas of operation within the 
larger joint area and how they are mutually supporting or not, what their 
objectives are, and give the subordinate commanders maximum independence 
at developing their supporting major operations plans.  If there is not enough time 
to do this, or the commanders are unfamiliar with each other the senior 
commander may be more directive and suggest to his subordinate commanders 
the methods he prefers them to use to assault selected key objectives.  LTG 
Stiner had sufficient time to take the first path and gave his subordinate 
commanders broad latitude to develop their plans and execute operations. 
 For the crucial initial assault, Stiner assigned objectives to his subordinate 
commanders, gave them areas of responsibility and then, “told them to develop a 
plan and brief me back on it. And they did that.”  For this operation Stiner’s 
selected method of empowering subordinate commanders worked very well, from 
his perspective.  Stiner said, “It worked great!”237   
 Stiner, his commanders and their planners spent time together on the 
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ground in Panama prior to the start of the operation.  From August to November 
of 1989, JTF South conducted three iterations of these planning excursions in 
Panama.  Traveling in military jets to avoid Panamanian customs but wearing 
civilian clothes Stiner took his commanders with him and they briefed each other 
on the respective plans.  During these visits they were able to develop the 
outlines of their plans as well as present them to the theater commander, 
General Max Thurman.  Stiner said his commanders were, “briefing me and they 
were briefing GEN Thurman. So we knew each other's plans.”  Stiner and his 
commanders brought their planners, all graduates of SAMS, with them on these 
trips.  This allowed the briefing sessions to be working sessions as well.  When 
the inevitable “glitches” would arise, the effect of Clausewitzian friction, the 
planners would develop solutions to these problems on site.  This luxury of 
advance reconnaissance and on the ground planning sessions with the captured 
audience of planners and commanders ensured widespread common 
understanding of the plan and how each subordinate command played a role in 
the accomplishment of the overall mission.238   
By stressing meticulous planning, Stiner set the conditions for the exercise 
of initiative in Operation Just Cause.  This effort paid off during the execution of 
the multiple attacks, as in all operations and in warfare in general, engagements 
are executed in the realm of chance.  The XVIII Abn Corps operations officer, 
then Colonel (promotable) Thomas Needham said, “A corps is a big outfit, JTF is 
a big outfit, and you never know who puts out what, and how it gets out or 
doesn't get out because you'd be relying on a lot of people or ... we're all human, 
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and I tell Major X something and he tells somebody else and it gets 
mistranslated…”239  This is the professional acceptance that in warfare even the 
simplest thing is difficult to accomplish.  Developing a series of plans with the 
tenets of AirLand Battle in mind empowered commanders to overcome friction 
and seize advantages when they arose. 
 The plan for Operation Just Cause, given the operational depth and 
multiplicity of units involved, was complex.  There were 27 initial objectives to be 
simultaneously assaulted and captured on D-Day, the opening day of the 
operation.  The principal operations officer for the operation, COL Thomas 
Needham, was responsible to the commander, LTG Stiner, to develop methods 
to overcome this complexity and the friction that was possible in the execution of 
the plan.  COL Needham reported that he was not concerned about this fact. 
 Recognition of complexity is one step toward resolving the challenges of 
simultaneously assaulting a number of objectives throughout the battle space.  
Practice of these tasks during training, even when the training is not directly 
related to the operation at hand is one method of exposing commanders and 
staffs to the challenges of synchronization and the expectation that their initiative 
will overcome obstacles due to friction as they arise.  In the case of the XVIII Abn 
Corps and its subordinate command, the 82nd Airborne Division, circumstances 
allowed for practice of a parachute assault on multiple objectives over an 
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extended battlespace.  COL Needham recalled that the Corps “had run an 
operation March of [19]89, and previous to that November of [19]87 that had 
multiple targets.”240  XVIII Abn Corps and its planners, as well as the 82nd Abn 
and 7th Infantry Divisions and their planners were familiar with the coordination 
required to execute a complex operation at great depth, how to synchronize 
actions within complexity, insofar as actions in war can be synchronized.  The 
SAMS curricula stressed the theoretical underpinning of doctrine so SAMS 
graduates knew about friction, the fog of war, and simple things being difficult to 
execute in war both in a classroom perspective and from the actual execution of 
operations in exercises.  The exercises that preceded Operation Just Cause 
gave everyone a feel for the scope of operations in depth, operations with 
multiple objectives and targets. 
   COL Needham, along with his planners and operations staff, realized that 
this was no exercise and there were a great deal of targets to seize on D-Day.  
Needham knew that he had four subordinate task forces; Atlantic, Bayonet, 
Semper Fidelis and 82nd, as well as a Joint Special Operations Task Force 
working in accord with the Joint Task Force South campaign plan.  Needham 
recalled, “I mean, we had the subordinate headquarters to execute. It wasn't like 
we at the JTF were taking down all these targets simultaneously. We had 
subordinate headquarters that had the responsibility of executing the missions.”241  
LTG Stiner got across to planners and the combat units his personal war-fighting 
philosophy of using overwhelming combat power, fighting at night to take 
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advantage of the technology available to his forces, and striking in a 
synchronized manner to completely disrupt his opponent’s ability to command 
and control his forces.  This tendency to swift and synchronized operations was 
also evident in the 82nd Abn Division. 
 The 82nd Abn Division planning staff and commanders developed an 
equally complex and challenging plan of operations.  On D-Day the division 
emplaned at Fort Bragg/Pope Air Force base in North Carolina, executed a 
combat parachute assault, and a link-up operation with Army Rangers, under fire 
and at night.  This first day of operations was followed by the execution of three 
separate helicopter assaults over a period of a few days.  This was in the plan, 
and the plan was developed mindful that events in combat rarely unfold exactly 
according to plan.  All SAMS graduates knew the dictum of Moltke the Elder, a 
Prussian General Staff officer, that no plan can look with certainty beyond initial 
contact with the enemy main body.  The development of the plans within the 82nd 
Abn Division certainly had this dictum in mind.   
 The 82nd Abn Division, under command of Major General James Johnson, 
used established procedures to develop its plan for the initial invasion and 
forcible entry.  Called the “backward planning process,” the first step in 
conceptualizing the assault was to view the ground tactical plan which then led to 
the development of the plan to establish the actual airhead formed by the initial 
parachute assault.242  Johnson summed up this approach as follows: “that's the 
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way we dropped our soldiers and that's the way we dropped our equipment, to 
put the equipment and the people so that troops could be assembled and quickly 
moved to pickup zones on the taxiway to the west of the main runway at 
Torrijos.”243  
 The synchronization of the 82nd Abn Division’s plan was apparent in the 
sequencing of parachute drops of equipment and assaults by paratroopers.  The 
division’s paratroopers landed to the east of the airport runways with the 
equipment dropping to the west.  Troops would conduct a ground movement to 
contact, and open up a main supply route [MSR] to the divisional objective areas.  
Division level tactical synchronization included attention to the detail of the 
positioning and cross-loading of equipment in the heavy equipment parachute 
drops so the paratroopers could quickly “de-rig” the heavy equipment then put it 
into operation so that the division could move the equipment off the runway.  This 
attention to detail also assisted in setting conditions for agility for divisional units.   
 Agility was evident when one examines the division’s ground tactical plan.  
To establish the conditions for the movement of the division’s paratroopers the 
divisional planners coordinated the initial airhead linkup with the Rangers that 
preceded the parachute assault of the 82nd Abn.  The coordinated link up 
facilitated a very dangerous maneuver, called a forward passage of lines while in 
                                                                                                                                                 
positions.  The essence of backward planning is beginning at the final objective and thinking through what 
it takes to get to this final objective, identifying the steps required along the way as well as required 
supplies, evacuation and care of wounded, etc. 
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contact.  The parachute assaults were conducted at night to take advantage of 
the technological advantage U.S. troops held over the PDF, widespread night 
vision devices.  The divisional plan called for a link up then the Rangers escorting 
82nd Abn paratroopers through the airhead the Rangers had established.  Once 
through the passage lane, the division would be on the main highway leading into 
Panama City and the Panama Viejo/Tinajitas area, San Miguelito.  Divisional 
planners did the necessary coordination and liaison with Rangers in advance of 
D-Day to help facilitate the rapid movement of the ground convoys.244  
 General Johnson, his key commanders, and staff planners also took 
advantage of the XVIII Abn Corps sponsored planning trips to Panama.  Central 
to the execution of the 82nd Abn Division’s plan in support of JTF SOUTH was a 
series of helicopter assaults following the parachute assault and establishment of 
the airhead.  In addition to the ground tactical plan the division staff and aviation 
brigade staff conducted air mission planning at Fort Bragg and then refined these 
plans on the ground in Panama during the planning trips. 
 The division planner, MAJ William Caldwell, took advantage of the 
opportunity to see the ground in advance of battle and was able to focus on flight 
routes for the helicopter assaults from the airhead to the objective, how many lifts 
would be required to take the number of paratroopers required for each objective 
and the number of aircraft required for each helicopter assault.   
 Further complicating the plan for these helicopter assaults was the fact 
that there would be a number of landing zones near each objective and that 
these helicopter assaults would be done at night.  The division planners and the 
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air mission commanders who were based in Panama went into great detail on 
this planning effort.  The air mission commander and the aviation battalion 
commander also made a trip to Fort Bragg during a divisional Battle Command 
training Program (BCTP) exercise held just prior to the execution of Operation 
Just Cause.  This deep familiarity with the concept of the operation enabled the 
Panama based aviation units to conduct rehearsals of the operation before D-
Day.245  Rehearsals in Panama and at Fort Bragg, among other places, 
established conditions for agility, which is the ability of friendly forces to act more 
swiftly than the enemy, and also to overcome the elements. 
 On the evening of 19 December 1989 the weather was deteriorating 
rapidly.  A cold front with sleet and rain closed in on Fort Bragg and Pope Air 
Force base.  The paratroopers were dressed for the cold and wet weather and 
loading aircraft headed into the 90-degree temperatures in Panama.  Agility, the 
tenet of AirLand Battle depended upon the physical fitness of the paratroops.  
Physically fit Soldiers can adjust to any kind of environment.  Regarding this 
event, MG Johnson said, “It takes a physically fit man or woman, I think, to be 
able to make that kind of adjustment. And even so, it's tough. It's going to take 
you two or three days once you're down there.”246   Once on board the aircraft, 
the paratroops removed their cold weather clothing.  The aircraft had heat on 
board allowing the troops to dry out.  The cold caused more problems for the 
loading and air flow.  
 The cold weather and sleet did not happen until after the heavy out-load, 
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the loading of equipment onto the assault aircraft. That part of the plan went very 
well, along with the movement of those aircraft to Charleston.  The freezing rain 
and sleet would cause problems for the air flow from Fort Bragg to Panama.  The 
aircraft had icing problems on their wings at about the time the paratroopers were 
loading the personnel aircraft.    The de-icing process would cause a problem 
with the flow of the assault aircraft carrying the troops to Panama. 
 The aircraft carrying the 82nd Abn Division’s paratroopers left Pope Air 
Force base in formations of threes.  MG Johnson was in the lead aircraft.  Once 
his plane was aloft, the USAF air mission commander who was also on his 
aircraft told him about the icing problem.  Johnson told the mission commander 
he wanted to get the maximum number of planes off the ground in order to keep 
the operation on track as closely as possible to the plan, which called for 
simultaneous assaults.  The initial lift of eight or ten aircraft took off with others, 
as Johnson recalled, “Came in increments of six or eight, five or six at a time, as 
they could get airborne and catch up.”247 
 War is conducted in the realm of chance, one of the factors that must be 
considered when developing a plan that depending on synchronization over time 
and distance.  The Air Force did everything it possibly could to de-ice the planes 
of the assault echelon. Pope Air Force base started with four de-icing trucks and 
ended up with six to ten trucks.  All were in use during the loading stage of 
preparing for the flight to Panama.    
 The operational planners, both Army and Air Force worked around the 
clock to deal with the effect that the freezing rain and subsequent icing problem 
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could have on the execution of the plan.  Air planners and operators were also 
drawing on other Air Force bases and the civil airport for de-icing trucks.  
Johnson said that he had “nothing but the highest respect for Military Airlift 
Command and those that were involved in the out-load of us from here, both the 
heavy equipment and the personnel aircraft.” 248   
 The intervention of chance, in the form of the icing problem faced by the 
task force challenged the agility of the force as well as the attempted 
synchronization of the initial assault.  In accord with the tradition of the airborne 
and 82nd Airborne Division operating procedure the first aircraft off the ground 
had the assault brigade and battalion commanders  Johnson, the USAF air 
mission commander and the assault brigade leadership could communicate while 
aloft through the aircraft radio systems.  Johnson could also speak with the JTF 
commander, Stiner.  The combination of tradition and operating policy ensured 
that the assault phase could begin when scheduled.  Johnson was able to talk to 
the commanders and make in flight adjustments to the plan.  The advantage of 
rehearsal, on ground reconnaissance and high quality training enabled the plan 
to continue.  Johnson knew he had the leadership in the air thus he had what 
was necessary to get on the ground and begin to build combat power, establish 
the airhead and accomplish the division’s mission.  Johnson, his commanders 
and his planning staff, crafted a simple plan that established conditions for agility 
and initiative that could be accomplished in the face of the intervention of chance.  
Johnson said he was, “very confident that we had what it took to get the job 
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done, even though it may be done incrementally instead of simultaneously.”249 
 The development of a simple plan that was rehearsed extensively and 
war-gamed thoroughly allowed execution with staggered parachute assaults 
instead of the planned air drop from a single air column of twenty C-141s.  
Continuous in-flight communication allowed the commanders to coordinate the 
assault and determine whether or not to execute on time or continue the assault.   
Once Johnson realized that the air flow was going to be a staggered into the 
operations area he spoke with the joint task force commander, Stiner, who was 
on the ground in Panama.  Johnson preferred to drop the entire force which 
would entail a delay in the assault.  He knew it was possible to conduct the 
assault incrementally; dropping paratroopers when the aircraft arrived.  Johnson 
told Stiner that he did not want to execute the assault incrementally if it was 
possible to wait until all aircraft were assembled for a simultaneous assault.   
 The guidance Johnson received from Stiner was short and to the point.  
Stiner told Johnson to go with what he had.  Stiner trusted in the ability of his 
forces to act faster than the PDF could react.  The advantage in agility would 
outweigh any risk associated with smaller forces executing operations, at least at 
first.  The 82nd’s assault was only one part of the overall assault in Panama.  
Johnson did not know that Stiner determined that the execution of the plan might 
have been compromised thus speed was required.  Johnson preferred to delay 
so he could put his whole force on the ground at the same time, but this was not 
an option.  The entire operation had already begun.250  
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 The success of Just Cause offers a vision of future battles.  The face of 
battle continues to change with new technologies, the interest and influence of 
the mass media, and the sheer destructive power found in today’s military 
organizations. Political realities, including public expectations for quick wins with 
minimum casualties, underscore the emphasis placed on depth and 
Synchronization. In this light, FM 100-5 further refines these concepts. 
 Depth, a tenet of Army operations, is defined in FM 100-5 as the 
“extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose.”  Operations, 
in terms of depth, require the commander and staff to anticipate enemy actions 
so the enemy can be attacked throughout the depth of the battle space. The 
battle space of a unit is greater than its area of operations. The area of 
operations is a geographic area assigned to a commander.  Battle space, a term 
essential to understanding depth, is defined as “a physical volume that expands 
or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy.” 
 Simultaneous attack, which takes place within the battle space, is a 
companion concept of depth. It is defined as “concurrent application of combat 
power throughout the depth of the battlefield."  Simultaneous attack of enemy 
formations or critical points throughout the battle space will cause the enemy to 
lose the coherence of his attack or defense. The goal of simultaneous attack 
throughout the depth of the battle space is the establishment of a fluid situation in 
which the enemy’s attack or defense breaks down under constant and 
unexpected attack from every side.251 
 Richard Lock-Pullan, writing in 2006, raised the point that the planning and 
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execution of Operation Just Cause focused solely on the tactical task of 
defeating the Panamanian Defense Forces and capturing Noriega without taking 
a longer view on what Panama would look like in the aftermath of the fighting.  
This argument is somewhat revisionist (possibly reflecting concerns about Iraq 
fifteen years later), because at the time there were plans in place for post-hostility 
operations that were executed by U.S. Army South and the 7th Infantry Division.  
An alternative case could be made that the best educated planners, the SAMS 
graduates, were focused on the perceived most difficult tasks, namely the 
execution of operations launched from multiple bases across distance to seize 
multiple objectives in a synchronized operation.  LTG William Caldwell, then a 
major and lead planner for the 82nd Abn Division, said of transition to post-
hostility operations, “We did not consider recovery, it was not our job.“252  When 
the major combat units were withdrawn, the remaining headquarters, U.S. Army 
SOUTH which developed the post-hostility plan, BLIND LOGIC was unable to 
adjust as rapidly to the ever changing conditions on the ground.  U.S. Army 
SOUTH did not have any SAMS graduates assigned.253   
 Lieutenant General Carmen Cavezza, then a major general commanding 
the 7th Infantry Division assumed command of JTF Panama when LTG Stiner 
and the XVIII Abn Corps left the country.  He recalled feeling that he was at a 
disadvantage in Panama because he did not speak Spanish and thus he was, 
“not communicating directly with Herrera, who was running the police, and with 
the other officials.”  Cavezza spoke through Major General Mark Cisneros, 
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commander of U.S. Army South, a native Spanish speaker.  Cisneros was also 
stationed in Panama and knew the major players in the region and in the country, 
and they knew him which was equally important.  Cavezza felt that the theater 
commander should have made Cisneros the JTF commander, but that was moot.  
While Cisneros was a commander in the region he did not have a large staff.  
This is what the 7th Division could add to the conduct of operations, as well as 
three infantry brigades.  This likely caused some problems that affected the 
transition of operations from combat to post-hostilities.  LTG Stiner brought the 
fully manned XVIII Abn Corps staff with him and took over the running of 
operations in country.  When LTG Stiner and the corps staff left country there 
were many difficulties U.S. Army SOUTH and the 7th Infantry Division had to 
face.  As Cavezza recalled, “Stiner came down with his staff, he brought a lot of 
people in and virtually took over the whole organization. Then when he left, they 
left with him, and boom, there are all kinds of voids.”254  This staff integration did 
work, though, and the 7th Division was able to complete the operation in Panama. 
 Cavezza and the 7th Infantry Division spent more time on the ground in 
Panama than the rest of the task force.  Cavezza and his staff, (MAJ Mike 
Barbero was his SAMS planner) wrestled with the difficulties of transitioning from 
combat operations to post-hostility operations.  In his interview at the end of the 
operation, Cavezza said that he believed that the next iteration of FM 100-5 
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should give more thought to the planning and conduct of post-combat operations.  
Cavezza said, “I don't think we can stop our manuals at combat operations, 
because even the tactical units are going to continue to be involved after that.”  
Cavezza believed that the Army needed to talk more about the challenges of low-
intensity conflict, (LIC), the term in doctrine at the time.  FM 100-5, 1986 briefly 
mentioned the challenges of low intensity conflict as one of the challenges the 
Army would face, saying that “Leaders at all levels must develop a broad view 
of…conflict…”255  Based on his experience in Panama Cavezza felt that the Army 
needed to think more about these challenges and that it should be a part of the 
doctrine.  Cavezza knew that, once the challenges of LIC became a part of 
doctrine, “the force structure will be developed to support that part. I think that's 
been a weakness, but I think we're getting a handle on it.”256   
 LTG, then MAJ, David Huntoon was one of the planners on the XVIII Abn 
Corps staff.  A mechanized infantryman, he was serving his first airborne 
assignment at a momentous time.  He was also in a unique position to see the 
power of the SAMS network of graduates respond to the pressures of planning 
for combat.  In a speech at the 25th anniversary celebration of SAMS he said that 
during both campaigns the SAMS networks across all services contributed 
significantly to the success of those campaigns.  Huntoon went on to say that the 
shared cultural bias, familiarity with language and doctrine of operational art, and 
most importantly of all the relationships that graduates built in their seminars, on 
exercises and trips proved to be a powerful addition to the planning and 
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execution of these campaigns.  He said that this point came most vividly to mind 
on the night after the Ranger Regiment and the 82d Abn Division jumped into 
Torrijos-Tocumen Airport in Panama City.  The circumstances were interesting 
for, as he said, he was flying in a Blackhawk helicopter from the XVIII Abn Corps 
tactical operations center or TOC to the 82d Abn Division’s tactical command 
post, TAC.  He was to meet with then Major Caldwell about establishing new 
operating boundaries between the subordinate commands.  SAMS graduates 
had worked on the Operation Just Cause campaign plan for many months paying 
great attention to detail, overseeing full scale rehearsals, and the requisite 
synchronization of and collaboration with all services and special operations 
forces.  Huntoon said: 
That planning was SAMS centric, and reflected the very 
essence of this program in its scope, vision, end state, and mostly 
importantly, in the exceptional quality of its graduates.  And as I 
looked out on that dark night at the millions of lights in Panama City 
with the fires still burning in the Comandancia and near the airport, I 
thought about this coup de main executed for the right reasons, 
with maximum force and minimal loss.257 
   
 The short campaign in Panama came to a successful conclusion.  The 
lessons learned teams descended on Fort Bragg and Fort Ord to try to codify 
what went well and where the Army needed to improve.  The new doctrine and 
the planners from the new school in the Army had done well.  The extra year of 
schooling had paid off in the form of plans that embodied the tenets of AirLand 
Battle.  Rehearsals and war-gaming played a significant role in establishing 
conditions for the exercise of initiative and agility.  The depth provided by the use 
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of bases within the continental United States, as well as bases within Panama, 
extended the operation in distance, time and resources.  This depth also allowed 
for the adaptation of the plan when friction and chance entered the execution 
phase of the plan in the form of the icing problem at Pope Air Force base.  All of 
these tenets allowed for a synchronized plan to be executed relatively smoothly.  
The XVIII Abn Corps/JTF SOUTH conducted a synchronized assault at night, 
over multiple objectives, and overwhelmed the enemy forces in the theater of 
operations.  While the “lesson learned” effort was going on in the United States, 
the Army in Europe was planning on a reduction in force.  Everything pointed to 
the fact that the Congress and the American people expected a “Peace Dividend” 
from the end of the Cold War.  The great Soviet armies were withdrawing to 
Russian soil.  The Germans were asking why so many Americans were needed 
in their country now that the Berlin Wall was down and the entire German nation 
was reestablished.  It was an interesting time in the Army. 
 The last of the storied REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany 
Exercises) was conducted in Germany January, 1990.  These maneuvers were 
now an anachronism as the thrust of planning was how to return forces to the 
United States, units as well as their families, pets, and household goods to posts 
in the United States.  A great number of U.S. Army units in Europe were 
preparing to fold their colors and return their tanks, armored vehicles, and trucks 
to the United States.  SAMS continued to educate selected Army officers in the 
theoretical concepts behind the approved doctrine.  
 One may assert that the School of Advanced Military Studies was not in 
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static mode at this time.  It did not indulge in self-congratulation.  The staff, 
faculty and students were engaged in reading after-action reports generated by 
Just Cause and thinking through the Implications of these reports for the curricula 
of SAMS.  In an end of course survey done by the AMSP class of 1988-89, 
containing some of the officers who planned Operation Just Cause, and 
containing faculty thoughts on the results in light of the operation in Panama, 
student officers and faculty concluded that “LIC [low intensity conflict] needed 
more emphasis,” and that the course needed “more joint participation.”  The 
survey, published in July, 1990, reflected similar concerns of previous classes 
over the perception of elitism and intellectual superiority others would harbor 
towards SAMS graduates, but tellingly also raised concerns about the meaning 
of the full spectrum of warfare.  The faculty noted that while the XVIII Abn Corps 
and 82nd Abn Division departed Panama rather quickly after the end of hostilities 
the 7th Infantry Division and U.S. Army South were left to execute plans for the 
recovery, to a limited extent, of Panama.258    
 With Just Cause the Army and SAMS faced a test of battle and the new 
Army doctrine.  This new group of highly educated planners appeared to have 
passed the examination of their qualifications with flying colors.  The Army turned 
back to preparing for war and the routine of the peacetime Army.  Training 
schedules were revised and field exercises and tank gunnery exercises were 
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scheduled.  On the other side of the world an American officer went to sleep in 
the Sheraton Hotel in Kuwait City.  While he slept his world and the focus of the 
Army changed.  He wrote, “I awoke to gunfire at about 4:15 on the morning of 2 
August 1990...That sounds like shooting…I wonder who could be shooting at this 
time of the morn-Shooting!  Oh shit!”259  The next test of SAMS and the Army was 
about to take place in the deserts stretching away from the Persian Gulf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
259
     Martin Stanton, Road to Baghdad Behind Enemy Lines: The Adventures of an American 
Soldier in the Gulf War, New York: Ballantine Books, 2003, p 47. 
  
155 
 
Chapter Six 
 
The Arrival of “The Jedi” 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
 
 
 While small in number the graduates of SAMS did play an effective role in 
the planning for the invasion of Panama.  They incorporated the latest Army 
doctrine into the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause.  The 14 SAMS 
graduates who participated in the Panama operation set a very high standard of 
performance for the other graduates around the Army.  In the summer of 1990 
there were some 203 total graduates of the program; from the Advanced Military 
Studies Program and the Fellowship.  The graduates ability to apply and adapt 
doctrine and turn doctrine into action would be tested in the coming months of 
1990 and 1991.   
 Any hope for a return to what passed for “normality” at the end of the Cold 
War and the conclusion of “Operation Just Cause” was shattered in late July, 
1990.  The Iraqi regular Army and Republican Guard invaded the Emirate of 
Kuwait in a lightning attack.  The president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, declared 
that Kuwait was now an eternal part of Iraq, its nineteenth province.  For SAMS 
faculty and students, there was little time to consider lessons learned from 
Operation Just Cause, as the stunning and unexpected immediacy of the 
invasion captured the focus of the Department of Defense and the Army.  What 
since has become known as the First Gulf War proved to be a much larger war 
and provided a stern test for both the U.S. Army in general and graduates of 
SAMS in particular.  During this war SAMS graduates would serve at all levels of 
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war and echelons of command from the strategic, U.S. Central Command, 
operational, Third U.S. Army/Army Forces Central Command, through the 
tactical, both Army corps (XVIII Abn and VII) and all Army divisions.260  What 
follows treats with this second combat test of graduates of the school--
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991--and how well they 
incorporated the doctrinal tenets of FM 100-5, 1986 into the plans and orders 
they drafted.  The test began in August 1990. 
 General Schwarzkopf’s headquarters received a small team of SAMS-
educated officers in mid-August 1990.  Schwarzkopf was not satisfied with the 
planning effort in his headquarters.  Schwarzkopf felt that he and his staff were 
“stumped” and could see no imaginative way to stretch the forces at hand into a 
winning offensive.  Consequently he asked the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Dennis 
Reimer for augmentation of his planning staff.  Reimer directed that a team of 
officers, educated at SAMS, be sent to Riyadh to assist Schwarzkopf.  The task 
they received from Schwarzkopf was highly classified and access to these men 
was tightly controlled, as well as the access these planners had to other sources 
of information.  Posing as a team from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas studying desert 
warfare, this team developed the basis for the final plans to eject the Iraqi Army 
from Kuwait.261 
 The emphasis on secrecy stemmed from the fact that the President, 
George H.W. Bush, and his National Security Council, were establishing the 
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international and national political conditions for an offensive.  War is an 
extension of policy by other means, but the conditions for that policy were not in 
place.  Planning for the offensive was kept top secret for these reasons. 
 The team consisted of Colonel Joe Purvis and Majors Greg Eckert, Bill 
Pennypacker, and Dan Roh.  Purvis and Eckert were Armor officers, 
Pennypacker an infantryman, and Roh was a logistician.   
 Colonel Joe Purvis was assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii 
following his graduation from the Fellowship at SAMS in 1989.  Earlier in his 
career, Purvis served in Vietnam as a helicopter pilot and then served as an 
Armor officer.  He had staff experience at the division level and had commanded 
a cavalry squadron.  Prior to assignment as a SAMS Fellow, he spent a year as 
the executive officer to the LTG Robert Riscassi, commanding general of the 
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth.  Thus, he possessed substantial 
experience dealing with senior officers and a background in armored warfare.  
He arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in late August, 1990.  When Purvis reported 
for duty at Schwarzkopf’s headquarters, he did not know any of the other SAMS 
graduates who would serve under his direction. 
 Major Greg Eckert, who graduated from SAMS in 1986, was assigned to 
the 4th Infantry Division at the time the call came to report to Riyadh.  Already 
selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel and for command of a tank battalion 
in the 4th Division, he was serving as the division G3 Training officer and was 
also informally acting as the division G3, operations officer.  Eckert recalled 
learning of his impending assignment to Central Command in late August, 1990.  
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Eckert was meeting with  MG Neal Jaco, his division commander to review the 
results of brigade training meetings and to receive the commander’s training 
guidance when the Jaco’s private phone rang.  A general officer from the Army 
Personnel Center was calling.  After a brief conversation, Jaco “looked at me and 
said, ‘Is there any reason you can't be in Riyadh in about a week in CENTCOM 
HQs.”   He did not tell me anything more (of course we were all aware of what 
had just happened in Kuwait). I told him, no, as far as I'm concerned [and] two 
weeks later there I was and met Joe Purvis then for the first time.”262  
 Following his graduation from SAMS in 1988 Major William Pennypacker 
was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley.  This was his phase III 
assignment, the apprentice year working on a division staff and learning how a 
division commander takes decisions.  Because of this pattern of assignments he 
had recent experience at the tactical level, from division through battalion.  
Pennypacker served as a division planner and then a battalion S3 and a brigade 
executive officer.  Pennypacker was excited about going to Saudi Arabia, but he 
said that, ultimately, “It cost me a CIB and a 1st Infantry Division combat patch.”263 
 Major Dan Roh was a logistician and at the time was assigned to the 8th 
Infantry Division in Germany.  After graduation from SAMS in 1988, Roh served 
as a division planner in the 8th Infantry Division and then served in a series of 
logistics assignments within the division.  When he was called for reassignment 
he was serving as the Division Support Command’s executive officer. 
                                                 
262
    Personal electronic mail, dated 20 March 2009 from Eckert to the author. 
263
    Personal e-mail, 20 March 09 from COL (ret) Bill Pennypacker to the author.  A CIB or 
Combat Infantryman’s Badge is awarded to Infantry Soldiers who served in direct combat with an enemy 
force.  It is the ultimate outward device that an Infantryman has been to war, thus it is highly prized.  This 
is not careerism on Pennypacker’s part merely an expression of his desire to serve in direct combat. 
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 The team also included a British officer, Brigadier Tim Sullivan.  Sullivan 
wore U.S. desert camouflage uniforms in an attempt to avoid coalition concerns 
about favored treatment of the British.  There was concern that the Arab 
members of the coalition, Syria in particular, would object to offensive operations.  
Schwarzkopf did not want to upset other western allies either.  The British 
recognized that the SAMS cell was going to plan the counter-offensive and 
wanted to be a part of the effort.  Schwarzkopf accepted this help to his plans 
team because Sullivan, attuned to coalition sensitivities on equal treatment, wore 
a U.S. uniform to blend in to Schwarzkopf’s headquarters.264  Sullivan was a true 
asset to the team, as Purvis recalled, and provided the team with information 
about British forces and capabilities because the team was not allowed to openly 
ask questions that would lead to the conclusion that offensive planning was 
ongoing.  Every officer in this group was very experienced at the division level of 
planning and operations and this experience coupled with the SAMS education 
and understanding of FM 100-5 was powerful. 
 The four man team, led by COL Purvis, was sequestered from the 
CENTCOM staff and put to work planning the campaign that would eject the 
Iraqis from Kuwait.  Schwarzkopf kept this team separate from the bulk of his 
headquarters staff owing to concerns over security and sensitivity to 
considerations of offensive operations being planned before the President took a 
decision to expand the operation.  Eckert was charged with learning about the 
                                                 
264
    Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War, New York: Little, Brown 
and CO., 1995, p. 166.  Hereafter cited as Gordon.  The British knew of SAMS through reports from UK 
COL Gage Williams who was sent to SAMS as an observer and ended up being named a seminar leader by 
COL Don Holder. 
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coalition ground forces and lead the group in thinking through the challenges of 
large unit maneuver in the desert.  Pennypacker coordinated with the CENTCOM 
intelligence section and focused on learning about the Iraqi force disposition, 
fighting capabilities, and the terrain.  Roh, the logistician, began the calculation of 
what it would take to sustain a corps in the attack, and later on two corps, as well 
as coalition forces.   
 Approximately ten CENTCOM personnel had knowledge of the Purvis 
Group's activities and plans.  The group’s purpose was kept highly classified as 
CENTCOM staff was focused on the arrival of forces and the defense of Saudi 
Arabia.  The political and military conditions for an offensive to eject the Iraqi 
Army from Kuwait were not in place.  The SAMS group would plan the offensive 
operations under Schwarzkopf’s direct control.  For Purvis, Eckert, Roh and 
Pennypacker, that meant that getting information was often difficult to say the 
least.  Schwarzkopf was ferocious about guarding the secrecy of the planning 
effort.   
 As Purvis and Eckert recalled it was not permissible to tell other staff 
officers exactly why a piece of information was required.  Given this reality, the 
network of SAMS graduates assigned throughout the theater proved most useful 
because all occupied key operational and planning positions throughout the 
levels of Army command.  The range of positions that SAMS graduates held 
ensured that the shared experience of the school established the basis for an 
information sharing network.  Graduates serving at division through corps and 
army level reached out to each other, sharing information and ensuring a wider 
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appreciation of the overall campaign plan and the interrelationship between corps 
and divisional plans.265     
 Moreover, due to the shared experience at SAMS these officers either 
knew each other or heard about each other.  They were willing to study questions 
and respond to their caller from CENTCOM without spending a great deal of time 
asking why he needed to know.266 (See the figure below)  The common view of 
plans at the time, generally assumed based on a common CGSC experience, 
was there were two different types of plans; those that worked and those that did 
not.  SAMS graduates, as demonstrated in Panama, were in the business of 
crafting plans that worked.  Army divisions relied on SAMS educated officers for 
plans during Battle Command Training Program exercises.  The whole Army 
knew about the SAMS planners and Operation Just cause.  A standard was 
established in translating doctrine into plans that would work, plans tested in 
evaluated exercises and in combat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
265
    This statement is based on conclusions drawn from interviews with SAMS graduates 
assigned to the U.S. Army divisions and corps in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  These officers are; LTC 
(ret) Mike Burke, LTC (ret) Pat Becker, COL (ret) Greg Eckert, MG (ret) James Marks, LTGs Mark 
Hertling, Dave Huntoon, Bill Caldwell, COL Lance Betros, and COL (ret) Gordon Wells.  
266
    Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1996, p. 77. Hereafter cited as Swain.  Also drawn from 
interviews with COLs (ret) Purvis and Eckert. 
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 CENTCOM (Purvis 
Group) 
 
 Third Army/ARCENT 
(G2/3/4 Plans - “Long Ball 
Hitters) 
 
VII Corps G2/3/4  Plans  XVIII Abn Corps G2/ 3/ 4 
Plans 
1st Cavalry Division 
(theater reserve) G2/3/4  
Plans 
 24th Infantry Division 
G2/3/4  Plans 
1st Infantry Division 
G2/3/4  Plans 
 82nd Abn Division G2/3/4  
Plans 
1st Armored Division 
G2/3/4 Plans 
 101st Abn Division (Air 
Assault) G2/3/4  Plans 
3rd Armored Division 
G2/3/4 Plans 
  
Distribution of SAMS graduates.  G-2 /-3 /-4, respectively intelligence, operations 
and logistics 
 
 
 Various officers and civilians serving on the Joint Staff, in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, and even in the White House later claimed credit for the 
so-called “Left Hook,” the central feature of the Central Command campaign 
plan.  Senior policy makers and military leaders; including Brent Scowcroft, 
National Security Advisor, to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Joint Chiefs 
head, Gen. Powell, and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, were intrigued by the notion 
of moving the U.S. Army’s heavy forces farther to the west, deeper into the Saudi 
desert, and attacking around the Iraqi defenses, but the concept needed the 
underpinnings of the science of war to make it feasible; how much fuel would be 
needed to move the thousands of vehicles deep into the desert and then attack 
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north and east into Iraq, how much ammunition was required, how long would 
this move take to execute, and how could this movement of large forces be 
hidden from the Iraqis.  All of these details had to worked out through war games 
and hard planning work.  Not until late August 1990, when Purvis’ group of SAMS 
graduates began working with Schwarzkopf’s regular planning staff and trading 
ideas with General Kelly’s planners on the Joint Staff, did “a true war plan began 
to emerge.”267   
 Officers on the staff at Central Command and Third U.S. Army had mixed 
feelings about the arrival of SAMS graduates to reinforce planning efforts already 
underway, and the bad feelings grew worse as SAMS graduates took on the key 
advisor roles and enjoyed close access, called “face time” with general officers.  
This caused some jealousy and gave rise to the use of the term “Jedi Knight” as 
a derisive moniker for the arrival of “special” officers educated at SAMS.  
Headquarters above the level of division and corps did not have SAMS 
graduates routinely assigned to the staff so it appeared that they just arrived on 
the scene to save the day.  This perception was reinforced by the Army staff in 
Washington, D.C. which directed the assignment of SAMS graduates to units 
deploying to Saudi Arabia.268 
 The leadership of the Army combed the divisions and corps that were not 
deploying and sent SAMS graduates to the theater until there were 82 “Jedi” 
                                                 
267
    U.S. News & World Report.  Triumph without Victory The Unreported History of the Persian 
Gulf War.  New York: Random House Books, 1992, p. 169.  Hereafter cited as Triumph without Victory. 
268
    The origin of the moniker, Jedi Knight, is lost in SAMS lore.  Some maintain the title was 
generated from within SAMS before the Gulf War.  Others maintain the term was used, derisively; to 
describe SAMS gradates during the Gulf War.  The first “official” use of the term took place after the Gulf 
War in the statement of Rep. Ike Skelton, and this is cited in chapter nine. 
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serving in the Iraq theater of operations.  This process was directed by the Army 
Chief of Staff, GEN Dennis Reimer.  Research did not uncover a specific reason 
why this was done however based on the track record to date of SAMS 
graduates, in divisional exercises and during Just Cause and a real feeling 
throughout the Army that this campaign had to be done correctly, it was not 
surprising.  The Army had to do well during this war and if SAMS graduates cold 
help they would go to the war.  The Army personnel center, assisted by the staff 
of SAMS, identified SAMS graduates throughout the Army and assigned them to 
CENTCOM and Third Army.  For example, then MAJ John Frketic was assigned 
to the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska following graduation from SAMS in 1990.   
 Frketic was placed on a temporary duty assignment to Central Command 
in January 1991.  He subsequently served on a coalition liaison team during 
combat operations.269  This temporary assignment process began in September 
1990 and continued till January 1991.  Many of the SAMS graduates were well 
received and went to work refining plans.  Purvis and his team was well received 
initially but not everything went well for the team.   
 On October 11, 1990 Purvis, USAF BG “Buster” Glosson and MG Robert 
Johnston went to Washington, DC to represent GEN Schwarzkopf and present 
the campaign plan, as it was at the time, to the National Security Council and 
the President.  Schwarzkopf directed Purvis to present the one corps plan of 
attack that is just the forces at hand in Saudi Arabia.  He ordered Purvis to not 
stray from this plan or offer his opinions at all.  The essence of the ground plan 
at the time was a direct strike into Kuwait and the teeth of the Iraqi defense.  
                                                 
269
      Interview with COL (ret) John Frketic by the author on 14MAY2009. 
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The National Security Advisor, retired USAF LTG Brent Scowcroft, expressed 
strong criticisms of the proposed ground plan.  Scowcroft felt that the ground 
offensive plan was not bold enough and worse, it was unimaginative.  Secretary 
of Defense Richard Cheney also expressed reservations on the ground portion 
of the plan.  All of the planners felt that more forces would be needed but no 
decision was taken at the time to send more troops to the desert.  Shortly after 
Purvis returned from Washington, DC, his team of planners prepared an update 
to GEN Schwarzkopf on the courses of action for the use of one and possibly 
two US Army corps.270 
 One member of the planning team, Greg Eckert, was newly promoted to 
lieutenant colonel.  Purvis decided that LTC Eckert would brief GEN Schwarzkopf 
on the two corps options.  The options were, at the time, very rough and 
amounted to no more than proposed course of action (COA) sketches.  Up to 
that time the plans team was very restricted with regard to their dealings with the 
larger CENTCOM staff.  This limited the detail the team could incorporate into the 
plan, thus they had to make a number of assumptions on forces, supplies, and 
sustainment.  The presentation was to not only Schwarzkopf but his lieutenant 
general component commanders and major general level staff officers.  To 
Eckert’s best recollection there were 33 stars in the room.  This was the very first 
formal presentation of the plan to the component commanders and senior staff.  
This briefing took place shortly after the 11 October presentation to the President 
                                                 
270
      Triumph without Victory, p. 166 and Purvis interview.  See also The Generals’ War, by 
Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Crusade, by Rick Atkinson, and It Doesn’t Take A Hero, by Norman 
Schwarzkopf for descriptions of this key meeting that set the basis for many subsequent decisions on the 
conduct of operations during the first Gulf War. 
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and his security advisors.   
 The CENTCOM war room was fairly small, and there was very little space 
in which a briefer could move, this meant that Eckert stood directly across a desk 
from Schwarzkopf.  Eckert began the briefing, but after about ten minutes the 
phone rang.  It was GEN Powell.  Schwarzkopf had everybody leave and after 
ten minutes of private conversation with Powell he called everybody back into the 
war room. Schwarzkopf looked at Eckert and said, "Continue," with a degree of 
frustration in his voice.  Eckert was also getting a sense of great tension within 
the room and noticed some of the flag officers were starting to look at the floor 
and ceiling.  Eckert started back into the presentation and after about ten minutes 
the phone rang again. GEN Powell once again was calling. Everybody left the 
room and once again was called back in about 15 minutes later.  
 Eckert was standing just across the table and very close to Schwarzkopf.  
Shortly after the second call from Powell, Eckert heard Schwarzkopf mutter, 
“They want an Inchon and there is no fucking Inchon here...they don't 
understand..." There were other grumbled comments Eckert could not make out.  
The flag rank shoe and ceiling gazing increased in the room as Schwarzkopf 
snarled, "Continue."  As Eckert started to speak, Schwarzkopf,  
 
pointed to the map and told me to put my hand where he was 
pointing. I extended my mechanical pointer to the map. The CINC 
shouted "I said your fucking hand!" Then he came over the table 
and grabbed my hand. For the next few minutes Schwarzkopf used 
my hand as his pointer. I don't recall what he was saying as I was 
apparently going into mental defilade. When he was done he told 
everyone the brief was over and to get out.271  
                                                 
271
    Drawn from an electronic mail note and telephone conversation with COL (retired) 
Greg Eckert to the author, 15 May 2009.   
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 Schwarzkopf, who was working under tremendous pressure, was never an 
easy man to work for.  Publicly, Schwarzkopf displayed an avuncular mien, but 
privately his rage would explode on hapless staff officers.  Dating from his 
second tour in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was known to have an explosive temper.  
In the course of the preparation for the start of operations Schwarzkopf 
threatened to relieve from duty or even court-martial all of his component (air, 
sea, and ground) commanders and both Army corps commanders.  The planners 
soon discovered that he possessed a volcanic temper.  Eckert was counseled 
not to take what had occurred in that session personally.  Based on this incident 
Purvis decided that only he would formally brief Schwarzkopf for the remainder of 
the campaign.  These “reconnaissance by fire” sessions with GEN Schwarzkopf 
continued throughout the period while the planners were sorting out the ground 
campaign.272    
 Purvis later recalled that the final determination for the date of the ground 
attack did not rest on battle damage assessment or the arrival of artillery as 
frequently repeated elsewhere but the arrival of a fuel transportation truck 
company.273  The question of the operational level of war in the desert came 
down to how many trucks were available to sustain the corps grand maneuver.  
The desert was a tactician’s dream and a logistician’s nightmare, a saying 
attributed to famed German Field Marshal Rommel.  
                                                 
272
    Drawn from the Purvis and Eckert interviews, see also Gordon and Trainor, Atkinson, and 
Triumph without Victory.  “Reconnaissance by fire” is a term that is used to describe how units making 
contact with an enemy force develop the situation.  In this instance it was used to describe how staff 
officers would learn how Schwarzkopf would react to a proposal.  Since no one really knew a staff officer 
would be verbally “fired upon” by Schwarzkopf. 
273
     Purvis interview 25MAR09. 
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 The Purvis group also had cover in the form of Brigadier General Steven 
Arnold.  Arnold, previously assigned as the Assistant Division Commander of the 
2nd Infantry Division, was assigned to Third Army as the operations officer.  
Arnold also had a second job, as he said, “I acted as a sounding board and 
provided general officer top cover to Joe and his group because the group was 
not really all that well accepted.  They were somewhat derisively called “Jedi 
Knights.”  Arnold and Purvis presented concept briefings to GEN Schwarzkopf.  
These presentations were designed to gain concept approval of the joint 
approach for ground operations.  Arnold recalled that the Air Force developed its 
own operations plan for the air war.  Purvis and Arnold presented the concept for 
all ground operations; Army, Marines, British and Arab coalition forces, including 
the Egyptians and Syrians.  Arnold recalled an amusing part to this action saying, 
“as a planner for GEN Schwarzkopf I would present a joint ground concept then 
as G3 (of Third Army) I would receive this guidance and develop a plan for Army 
ground force operations.”274 
 The Third Army/ARCENT mission.   
 ARCENT forces continue to establish a defense in 
sector and, on order, conducts offensive operations to 
destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) 
and defeat Iraqi (IZ) forces in Kuwait. 
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     Interview LTG (ret) Steven L. Arnold, 23APR09, by the author.  Hereafter cited as Arnold 
interview, 23APR09. 
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The Third Army/ARCENT Commander’s Intent. 
 Victory will be achieved through the destruction of the 
RGFC, preservation of the combined forces offensive 
capability, and restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait.  
ARCENT forces will penetrate and bypass static defensive 
forces to complete the physical and psychological isolation 
of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.  The 1st operational echelon 
reserves will be fixed and blocked to secure flanks and 
LOCs.  Follow-on operations will then be conducted to 
complete the destruction of the RGFC.  Thereafter, ARCENT 
will consolidate to prevent Iraq from re-seizing Kuwait and 
use a combination of TACAIR, artillery and PSYOP to defeat 
remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait and limit further losses to 
friendly forces.  This will establish the military conditions for 
the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti government and the 
establishment of law and order in Kuwait by Islamic and 
other friendly forces.275 
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       U.S. Army.  Headquarters, VII Corps, Abu Qaar, Saudi Arabia.   OPLAN 
1990-2 (OPERATION DESERT SABER), 13 January 1991, pp. 5/6.  Hereafter cited as 
Desert Saber. 
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Map 1276 
 On 30 January 1991 the Iraqis attacked into Saudi Arabia and captured 
the small town of Khafji, along the coast road toward the Saudi oilfields.  The 
"Battle of Khafji" was the first major ground contact between Iraqi and coalition 
forces.  Eckert and the other SAMS planners were refining the plans for the 
ground operations at the time.  He recalled that thinking at the time that this 
battle was evidence that the Iraqis had no intention of leaving Kuwait without a 
fight.  The major operations plan, in Eckert’s mind, was not influenced by the 
battle as, “It did not materially effect how I thought the actual campaign would 
unfold.”  The major advantage the U.S. and coalitions forces enjoyed over the 
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      Triumph without Victory, p. 289.  
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Iraqis, air supremacy, was clearly evident as a result of this battle.  This 
advantage though meant, to Eckert, that to really eject the Iraqis from Kuwait and 
win this war, “we would have to put boots on the ground to get them to leave 
Kuwait.”277  
 The Third U.S. Army and Army Forces Central Command headquarters 
also had a cell of SAMS educated plans officers.  Third U.S. Army did not act as 
the field Army for Central Command since Schwarzkopf retained the position of 
Commander, Land Forces as well as the Joint Force Commander.  Nonetheless, 
Third Army coordinated the development of plans for Army forces and crafted the 
two corps attack that Schwarzkopf called the left hook or “Hail Mary.”  These 
officers, whom Arnold called the “long ball hitters,” were: LTC Dave Mock, and 
MAJs Paul Hughes, Dan Gilbert, and Rick Halblieb.  These officers all came from 
Army divisions that were not deploying to the desert.  Mock was a cavalry officer, 
Hughes a signal officer, Hughes an infantryman and Halblieb an intelligence 
officer; these men formed the hub of the planning effort at Third 
Army/ARCENT.278  The addition of SAMS educated planners improved the quality 
of the planning effort.  They were sent to Third Army because of their SAMS 
education and their demonstrated competence. 
 LTG Yeosock, Arnold and the Third Army planners crafted a truly 
operational level plan that included operational movement, maneuvers, fires and 
sustainment, the art of operational level warfare.  The corps of the Third Army 
both moved hundreds of kilometers to get into position for the attack.  The corps 
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      Personal electronic mail, dated 20 March 2009 from Eckert to the author. 
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     Richard M. Swain, “Lucky War” Third Army in Desert Storm, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997, pp. 143-145.  Hereafter cited as Swain. 
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then attacked into the depth of the Iraqi defense, again a maneuver of hundreds 
of miles.  The SAMS planners understood the art and science of war that made 
this movement and maneuver possible.  The long ball hitters translated their 
education into action.  By taking on this task they allowed Yeosock to exercise 
command of Third Army. 
 Yeosock considered the strengths of the two corps in theater; XVIII Abn 
Corps and VII Corps.  In September 1990 GEN Schwarzkopf outlined his 
guidance for the refinement of his concepts into operational and tactical plans.  In 
this presentation Schwarzkopf named the Iraqi Republican Guard as the focus of 
main effort for VII Corps.  VII Corps was to destroy the Republican Guard.  XVIII 
Abn Corps would conduct a supporting attack on the left or western flank of the 
main attack executed by VII Corps. 
 The concept of operations drawn up by Arnold and his planners was a 
single envelopment.  How Third Army would complete the envelopment was 
based on the enemy situation at the time of making first contact with the Iraqi 
Republican Guard.  Schwarzkopf’s guidance to Yeosock, Third Army 
commanding general, Franks, commanding general of VII Corps, and Luck, 
commanding general of XVIII Abn Corps, and then refined in the planning effort 
by Arnold and Purvis was a force oriented objective as opposed to a terrain 
objective.  This meant that Schwarzkopf wanted the Army ground forces to attack 
and destroy Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units, not attack to hold ground.  
Arnold called this “the big thought,” and he felt that Franks really had this concept 
correct, namely to hit the Republican Guard with an armored fist of massed 
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divisions as opposed to poking it with small, uncoordinated attacks.   
 Arnold drew the figure below to illustrate the nature of the battlefield and 
the force oriented objective assigned to the VII Corps.  The Republican Guard 
had three general options; it could remain in place, move in response to the 
attack of Third Army, or it could counter-attack once the Iraqi command identified 
the point of the breach conducted by Third Army and VII Corps.   
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 Arnold Sketch279 
Arnold recalled that Franks believed that a slight operational pause prior to hitting 
the Republican Guard would be required.  No one in the U.S. Army had 
maneuvered an entire corps in a long while thus no one really understood that 
                                                 
279
      Sketch drawn by LTG (ret) Steven Arnold during an interview conducted by the author on 
23APR09. 
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unit columns get stretched out over time and distance.  Here the inclusion of the 
Dunn-Kempf terrain board exercises with lead models of tanks and other 
vehicles, as well as Holder’s insistence on the study of large unit maneuvers paid 
off for the SAMS graduates in all the divisions and corps.  In exercises at SAMS 
they saw, in miniature formations, a replication of the length of armored columns.  
This experience assisted in visualizing the battlefield.  The idea of a slight pause 
was not a suspension of combat but the time needed to close up columns of 
vehicles, refuel these vehicles, resupply the units with ammunition, and ensure 
that intelligence was passed and understood, then enter into the attack.280 
 XVIII Abn Corps planners and LTG Luck, the commanding general, 
crafted a mission statement and commander’s intent that embodied the tenets of 
AirLand Battle.   
 
Mission.  On order, XVIII Abn Corps attacks to penetrate IRAQI 
forward defenses and to interdict IRAQI LOCs along the 
EUPHRATES RIVER in order to prevent reinforcement of and 
escape from the KUWAITI Theater of Operations (KTO) by IRAQI 
forces; on order, continues the attack east to assist in the 
destruction of the RGFC. 
 
 
Commander’s Intent.  The purpose of XVIII Abn Corps operations is 
to interdict rapidly the IRAQI LOCs in the EUPHRATES RIVER 
valley, and to assist in the destruction of the RGFC.  Corps 
operations are characterized by a rapid operational tempo that 
employs complementary heavy and light Corps forces supported by 
massed fires.  We accept risk in the depth of Corps operations to 
surprise the enemy and gain positioning advantage and flexibility 
for our forces.  Success is interdicting IRAQI LOCs on the 
EUPHRATES RIVER, blocking of IRAQI reinforcements into or 
escaping from the KTO, and the destruction of the RGFC ICW joint 
and combined forces.281 
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     Drawn from the Arnold interview, 23APR09. 
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    Department of the Army.  Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, APO NY 09657.  
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 The XVIII Abn Corps operation consisted of three phases; Phase I 
(Logistic buildup); Phase II (Force prepositioning); Phase III (Offensive 
operations).  The Corps planned that the entire operation would be conducted 
concurrently with the theater major air operations conducted by the Joint Force 
Air Component Command, JFACC.  While the coalition air forces were attacking 
strategic and operational level targets the XVIII Abn Corps planners expected 
that the ground operation and subsequent consolidation would take eight weeks 
to complete.   
 The first phase was a logistics buildup that assumed a, “short duration, 
high tempo, high consumption ground offensive.”282  The logistics build-up was 
also designed to support Corps level operational and tactical deception 
operations, an element of the plan that set conditions for both the agility of corps’ 
forces and the synchronization of all ground force efforts with the larger theater 
(CENTCOM) deception plans.  Phase II covered the movement of the corps from 
assembly areas in eastern Saudi Arabia to the west and attack positions for the 
ground offensive into Iraq.  Phase II was the offensive into Iraq and the series of 
attacks conducted by the divisions assigned to the corps. 
 Phase III focused very closely on executing the supporting attack the 
corps conducted while playing on the strengths of the disparate divisions 
assigned to the corps.  The 82nd Airborne Division, which naturally pressed for 
airborne assaults (which Schwarzkopf prohibited), was assigned a supporting 
                                                                                                                                                 
OPLAN Desert Storm, 13 JAN 1991, originally classified SECRET, declassified by US 
CENTCOM, 1991, p.4.  Hereafter cited as XVIII Abn Corps OPLAN. 
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    XVIII Abn Corps OPLAN, p.4. 
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role and the mission of guarding supply lines and containing bypassed packets of 
Iraqi forces.283  The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault, AASLT) was given a wide 
zone of operations in order to take advantage of the inherent battlefield mobility 
of this division and its extensive numbers of helicopters.  The 101st AASLT would 
strike deep into Iraqi territory to dislocate Iraqi defenses, set up operating bases 
for its three battalions of Apache attack helicopters, and prevent Iraqi 
reinforcements and supplies from entering Kuwait.  The 24th Infantry Division 
(Mechanized) had five mechanized infantry battalions, four armor battalions, and 
a cavalry squadron.  This powerful force would open up ground lines of 
communication and supply for the 101st AASLT and destroy Iraqi divisions in 
zone.  As XVIII Abn Corps was on the outside of the “Hail Mary” maneuver to get 
on the flanks of the Iraqi Army, the 24th Mech would cover a great deal of 
distance in order to enter the battle.  The corps plan was developed by the corps 
planners but was decentralized for execution in accord with LTG Luck’s manner 
of command.  Luck allowed his division commanders a great deal of latitude in 
execution, he did not direct actions. 
 XVIII Abn Corps executed Operation Just Cause in December 1989.  VII 
Corps had not seen combat since the end of World War II.  Lieutenant General 
Fred Franks, the corps commander, recalled the dark years of the post-Vietnam 
Army when he addressed his commanders as they began preparations for 
deployment to Saudi Arabia.  He had seen the end of the Cold War and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  Now, VII Corps would depart Germany for war in the desert.  
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    Schwarzkopf felt that dropping paratroopers into the desert was a waste of effort and air 
assets.  There was also a feeling in the 82nd that Schwarzkopf simply did not like the division.  No 
definitive reason was ever found for not using the 82nd in the role as parachute assault troops. 
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The corps, which was the largest armored force the U.S. Army had ever 
assembled, was the main effort force for the offensive into Iraq which would eject 
the Iraqis from Kuwait and destroy the Republican Guard. 
 VII Corps planners and Franks crafted a mission statement and concept of 
the operation that embodied the tenets of AirLand Battle.284  
 Mission.  On order, VII (US) Corps attacks to penetrate Iraqi 
defenses and destroy the Republican Guard Forces in zone.  Be 
prepared to defend northern Kuwait to prevent Iraqi forces from re-
seizing Kuwait.  
 
Concept of the Operation.  We will conduct a swift and violent 
series of attacks to destroy the Republican Guard Forces 
Command and minimize our casualties.  Speed, tempo, and a 
continuous AirLand campaign are key.  We want Iraqi forces to 
move so we can attack them throughout the depth of their 
formations by fire, maneuver, and air.  The first phases of our 
operation will be to get maximum forces moving toward RGFC with 
minimum casualties in minimum time.  These phases will be 
deliberate and rehearsed; the later phases will be METT-T 
dependent and will be battles of movement and depth.  We will get 
maximum forces through Iraqi positions by conducting a deliberate 
breach and an envelopment around the western flank through gaps 
in the obstacle system concurrently, to force the enemy to fight a 
non-linear battle.  The deliberate breach will be done with precision 
and synchronization resulting from precise targeting and continuous 
rehearsals.  Point of main effort initially is to ensure success of the 
penetration and passage of the 1 (UK) AD through to defeat the 
tactical reserves to the east.  Point of main effort then shifts north to 
the enveloping force consisting of 2ACR, 1AD, and 3AD moving in 
zone toward RGFC.  Initial movement of combat support/combat 
service support elements for rapid build-up of combat power on the 
far side.  Once through the breach, we will defeat forces to the east 
rapidly with an economy of force, and pass the point of main effort 
to the west of that action to destroy the Republican Guard Forces 
Command in a fast moving battle with zones of action and agile 
forces attacking by fire, maneuver, and air.  Combat service 
support must keep up because there will be no pause.  We must 
strike hard and continuously, and finish rapidly.285 
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 The VII Corps plan envisioned a five phase ground offensive operation.  
The first phase covered the corps movement from the ports of debarkation to 
tactical assembly areas where the subordinate divisions and other units of the 
corps prepared for combat.  Phase II was the movement from tactical assembly 
areas to forward assembly areas or defensive positions in the corps zone.  
During this phase Franks used the movement of the units of the corps as a 
rehearsal of the long distance movement the corps would make into Iraq.  Over 
the protests of his commanders he directed that all units self deploy to the 
forward assembly areas.  This was the largest movement of U.S. armored units 
since World War II, until the actual attack.  Phase III was the breach of forward 
Iraqi defenses and the corresponding enveloping maneuver led by the 2nd 
Armored Cavalry Regiment.  Phase IV was the attack by the 1st U.S. Infantry 
Division and the 1st (UK) Armored Division to defeat Iraqi tactical reserves near 
the breach site and the continuing envelopment of the remainder of the corps 
forces.  Phase V was the corps setting conditions for an attack to destroy the 
Iraqi Republican Guard divisions wherever they were on the battlefield.  Finally, 
phase VI was the defense of northern Kuwait.286 
 The phasing of this complex corps operation fit into Franks’ vision of the 
battlefield and how the corps attack would unfold.  Franks knew, as did Luck, that 
he could not look beyond initial contact with the main body of the Iraqi forces with 
any certainty.  The initial phases of the operation were rehearsed in detail to 
ensure that actions across the corps were synchronized.  Once the Iraqi local 
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tactical reserves were defeated though Franks had a series of concept plans that 
the corps would execute depending upon what the Iraqi Republican Guard might 
do in response to the corps attack.  As Arnold, the Army operations officer at the 
time, said the corps had a force oriented objective, namely the Republican 
Guard.  Franks, a cavalry officer, wanted to follow the hoary advice of the World 
War II German tank expert, Heinz Guderian.  Guderian told his Panzer troops 
that in the attack they should boot not spatter the enemy.   
 Franks focused his planners on the task of hitting the Republican Guard 
not with a wild cavalry charge across the desert but with an “iron fist” of three 
armor heavy divisions, 1st Armored, 3rd Armored, and 1st Infantry, supported by 
the British 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.  This 
called for a plan synchronized and sustained at corps level and executed with 
agility and initiative by Franks’ divisions and cavalry regiment.  The main plan 
developed by Franks’ planners did not have branches plans as described by 
Army planning doctrine but rather had what Franks called a range of “audibles” or 
FRAGPLANS that Franks and VII Corps could execute as Franks and his staff 
read the battlefield and determined how the Republican Guard would respond to 
the corps attack.  A FRAGPLAN or fragmentary plan by doctrine is a brief outline 
of a potential situation for which some planning is done.  It is generally enough 
planning to provide a solid start point. 
 Major Pat Becker, a SAMS graduate and planner at VII Corps wrote many 
of the VII Corps “FRAGPLANS.”  Becker described these as, “a situation worth 
planning for but possibly not a logical extension of the current battle set - so it’s 
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different from a contingency plan.”287  These VII Corps FRAGPLANS formed the 
basis for the agility of the VII Corps as the commander and his planners tried to 
foresee potential enemy actions and a corresponding corps response to each.  
Developing the situation depended upon the corps covering force, the 2nd 
Cavalry, finding and fixing the Iraqi force for the main attack delivered by the 
armored divisions. 
 The origin of Franks’ “audibles” or FRAGPLANS were the result of map 
studies that began in September 1990, shortly before the VII Corps was alerted 
for deployment to Saudi Arabia.  Based on initial reports from Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait Franks determined that the only tactical option was a breach of the Iraqi 
defenses.  The planners wargamed this option and found that a breach would be 
a lengthy operation in terms of time and casualties.  The planners translated 
Franks football terminology into doctrinal language with no loss of effect.  The 
assigned divisions of the corps would be in column behind the breach force.  The 
corps planners and commanders were unsure of the sophistication of the Iraqi 
defense and its length and depth.  Franks did not like having one option.  He told 
his planners. “Let’s do this like pro football, continue to plan for the breach but if 
the Iraqis give us an opening we are going to call an audible.”  The audible would 
be to place forces beyond the western edge of the Iraqi defenses and go around 
them.  Franks would call this audible when he was convinced the Iraqis had gone 
as far west as they were able.  Franks said, “To put the entire corps through the 
breach was going to take too long.  I did not want to do that…”  He postured his 
corps to exploit the opportunity the Iraqis presented him in the design of their 
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defenses.288  (See map 2) 
 
  
 
Map 2289 
 Franks and his SAMS educated planners used the language of FM 100-5 
to convey exactly what the commander wished to happen in the zones of 
operation assigned to the subordinate divisions and the cavalry regiment of the 
corps.  The 1st Infantry Division breach would be executed with, “precision and 
synchronization.”  The later battles the corps commander expected to fight after 
the breach would depend upon how the enemy forces reacted to VII Corps 
actions and battles of “movement and depth.”290  Franks described the 
relationship with his planners as one that underscored the wisdom of establishing 
                                                 
288
     Franks Interview, 25NOV09. 
289
    Triumph without Victory, p. 327. 
290
    Desert Saber, p. 5.  METT-T is an acronym meaning; Mission, Enemy, Terrain (and 
weather), Troops, and Time available. 
  
183 
 
SAMS.   Franks said he was confident in their abilities to grasp the entire 
strategic concept and translate this into an operational concept for the corps.  Of 
the SAMS team he had at the corps and in his assigned divisions Franks said, 
“Their tremendous knowledge allowed us to speak in a form of short hand based 
on a common language, a doctrinal language.”291    
 
 
Map 3292 
 The operational plans and orders of VII and XVIII Abn Corps manifested 
the tenet of initiative in the construct of the orders and the personalities of the 
respective commanders, LTGs Luck and Franks.  Luck established wide zones 
for his subordinate divisions and allowed the division commanders maximum 
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latitude in the execution of his corps plan.  His mission statement, intent and 
concept of the operation established conditions that allowed the exercise of 
initiative.  Luck knew the strengths of his three U.S. divisions and the political 
limitations on the use of his French division.  Luck’s planners knew each other 
and used the doctrinal language to communicate precisely what Luck wanted.  
The power of Luck’s corps resided in the 24th Infantry Division’s tanks and 
infantry fighting vehicles and the Apache attack helicopters of the 101st AASLT.  
Luck’s plan of attack maximized the use of these forces.  Luck’s approach to 
command empowered his subordinate commanders.    
 Franks did much the same in VII Corps.  He personally explained the 
corps plan and associated “audibles” to his subordinate commanders.  He even 
encouraged wide debate about the corps plan listening to the proposed 
modifications of his commanders, especially Holder, and incorporating these 
proposals into the plan.  Holder acted as a sounding board for Franks. 
 Based on multiple interviews with Holder and from reading secondary 
sources Holder played a large role in the development of the VII Corps plan.  
Aside from being the former director of SAMS and thus having an influence on 
the graduates assigned throughout the corps Holder had Franks’ confidence.  
Holder suggested that the corps not only breach the Iraqi obstacle belt but move 
to the west and beyond the Iraqi fortifications.  The breach would shorten the 
distance for the corps artillery units and supply columns while unencumbering the 
corps’ two armored divisions and armored cavalry regiment.  Franks, Holder and 
the division commanders executed the commanders’ role envisioned in doctrine 
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and shared a vision for the fight ahead.  
 Franks communication efforts ensured a wide understanding of his 
commander’s intent.  The network of SAMS graduates in the corps facilitated 
wide acceptance of the corps plan.  Within the zones of operation in the corps 
zone the commanders of the divisions and brigades had the maneuver room to 
exercise initiative.  By developing corps audibles Franks also retained the ability 
to exercise initiative at the corps level in keeping with his expressed intent to 
hammer the Iraqi Republican Guard with an armored fist.  
 The clearest manifestation of agility during the execution of the VII Corps 
plan occurred on 27 February 1991 during a battle between the 1st Armored 
Division’s 2nd Brigade, called the “Iron Brigade,” and the 2nd Brigade of the 
Republican Guard Medina Luminous Division.  The battle took place on a low 
ridgeline just a few kilometers northwest of the Iraq-Kuwait border.  The Soldiers 
of the Iron Brigade called it the “Battle of Medina Ridge.”  In 40 minutes the 
Soldiers of the Iron Brigade destroyed the 69 tanks and 38 armored fighting 
vehicles of the Iraqi 2nd Brigade, with no US losses.  This was the largest tank 
battle of the war.  The Iron Brigade took advantage of its superior technology and 
training and acted faster than the Iraqi forces could, despite rolling into the Iraqi 
planned kill zone.  The thermal sights of the M1A1 tanks allowed the Soldiers of 
the Iron Brigade to identify Iraqi tanks at 4000 meters, well beyond the 
engagement range of the Iraqi T-72 but within the effective killing range of the 
M1A1.  A captured Iraqi sergeant told his captors that the American tanks were 
invisible and that the Iraqis were shooting at the muzzle flashes of the American 
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tank cannons.  Sergeant Jeffrey Reamer, a tank commander in the Iron Brigade’s 
1st Battalion, 35th Armored Regiment recalled that the battle itself lasted but a 
short time and near the end of the battle the targets were dwindling.  He heard a 
spot report, a short report sent over command radio networks to inform all of 
enemy activity, saying that a truck was trying to get away.  The voice of the 
brigade commander, Colonel Montgomery Meigs, came up on the radio and 
ordered that if the enemy was not surrendering continue killing them.  As Reamer 
recalled the battle he said, “you know, for a while there, you didn’t feel like you 
were in a war.  But…when you heard the brigade commander say to take 
someone’s life, it made you remember this was war.”293  This was tactical agility 
at its best and rested on the shoulders of very well trained American Soldiers.  
See map 4. 
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Map 4294 
 The 24th Mech demonstrated great tactical agility in the XVIII Abn Corps 
zone through the conduct of its attack.  The 24th, under the command of Major 
General Barry McCaffrey conducted multiple brigade level attacks across its 
zone of operation in order to keep Iraqi forces off balance and to seize 
opportunities to destroy these same Iraqi forces thus protecting the flank of the 
main effort, VII Corps.  The attack on Jalibah air base was one such attack.  The 
24th’ Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade attacked Iraqi forces defending this base 
from an entirely unexpected direction not only routing the defending force but 
also destroying a number of Iraqi Air Force aircraft on the ground. 
 The concept of depth manifested itself in the entire plan; from strategic 
and operational to tactical.  The US and its coalition partners made use of the 
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strategic depth offered by bases in the United States and Europe to extend the 
battlefield in space.  The operational movements conducted by the XVIII Abn and 
VII Corps extended the operational battlespace beyond the limits of Iraqi 
command and control.  Finally, the deep tactical assaults conducted by the 
helicopter borne brigades of the 101st Airborne Division extended the tactical 
battlespace in the favor of the tactical agility and mobility of US forces vis-à-vis 
the Iraqi forces.  Luck reviewed and approved the attack plan of the 101st Abn 
Division, saying that the division would be making air assault history with its deep 
air assault of 120 kilometers.295  Both corps made movements of operational 
depth in preparation for the attack.   
 These movements allowed the corps to rehearse the intricate movements 
required of them in the attack, especially VII Corps.  XVIII Abn Corps also made 
use of tactical airlift.  These movements were enabled by the air forces of Central 
Command’s complete dominance of the air.  What information the Iraqis were 
able to gain from these moves was disguised under a cloud of deception 
operations conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division.  The 1st Cavalry Division’s 
operations also extended the depth of the battlefield for the two corps by focusing 
Iraqi attention on one small area near the Wadi al Batin.  This area near the tri-
border area of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq was a natural avenue of approach 
into Kuwait.  The wadi began in Saudi Arabia and extended along the western 
border of Kuwait and Iraq moving from the southwest to the north-northeast.  The 
wadi was wide enough for a brigade maneuver within and  moving along side the 
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wadi offered a landmark upon which to guide an attack into Iraq and Kuwait.  
Operations executed by the 1st Cavalry Division so focused the Iraqis attention 
on this area that Iraqi forces essentially froze in place expecting the coalition 
main effort to attack on this axis.296   
 Franks also took the depth of his battlespace into consideration, in terms 
of friendly capability and the array of enemy forces.  The UK 1st Armored Division 
had to be given a mission within its abilities.  At the time there was some concern 
over the mechanical reliability of the British main battle tank, the Challenger.  
Franks decided that passing the UK 1st Armored Division through the 1st Infantry 
Division’s breach, “allowed me to fix Iraqi forces in depth behind the first line of 
defense and keep these forces away from the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions and 
the 2nd ACR.”297 
 There was some effort at the CENTCOM, the Purvis team, and Third Army 
level, Arnold’s SAMS graduate “long-ball hitters,” to synchronize the activities of 
the joint force, especially the land forces.  LTG Yeosock viewed synchronization 
at the army level as assigning tasks to the corps, allocating forces, setting 
objectives and boundaries, conducting deep fires and monitoring progress.  Also, 
due to Yeosock’s appreciation of the command climate within Central Command 
he felt that he contributed most to the campaign by remaining near Riyadh and 
Schwarzkopf thereby allowing his corps commanders to execute the fight.  
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Synchronization was evident in the plans of Third Army as the Army coordinated 
the movement of both corps into an attack that would destroy portions of the 
Republican Guard.298  As VII Corps prepared to destroy the Iraqi Republican 
Guard Franks’ primary concern was to hit the Republican Guard with a mailed fist 
made up of his two armored divisions, the 1st “Old Ironsides” and 3rd “Spearhead” 
Armored Divisions.  The battle was synchronized at the corps level through the 
use of objectives, phase lines, and command and control.  The same was true at 
the division level as the major generals commanding these divisions; MG Ron 
Griffith and MG Paul “Butch” Funk respectively, synchronized the attacks of their 
brigades in attacking the divisions of the Republican Guard.   
 The synchronization efforts on the part of the division commanders and 
their SAMS educated planners allowed the division commanders to coordinate 
the main fight against the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions in the corps zone 
making use of artillery and air support to augment divisional reconnaissance 
forces in finding and fixing the Iraqi divisions.  Once these divisions were fixed, 
that is the attention of the Iraqi forces were so focused on surviving the onslaught 
of artillery and air delivered fires that they could not effectively maneuver against 
the brigades of the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions these U.S. brigades could 
maneuver tank and infantry battalions to bring extremely lethal direct fire against 
the Iraqi forces.   
 The Iraqi Tawakalna Division was in the center of the Republican Guard 
defensive area facing the US VII Corps.  The division commander of this unit was 
focused to his division's front where he was being attacked by the 3rd Armored 
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Division.  As this attack was unfolding the Iraqi division’s right flank was attacked 
by the 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General Ron Griffith.  While 
the 1st Armored Division’s focus of main effort was on the Republican Guard’s 
Medina Division the Iraqi divisional defensive zones and U.S. divisions’ zones of 
operation overlapped, to the detriment of the Tawakalna.  One battalion of the 
Tawakalna's 29th Mechanized Brigade occupied defensive positions in the 1st 
Armored Division's zone of operations.  The division’s 3rd “Bulldog” Brigade, 
commanded by Colonel Dan Zanini, attacked this lone Iraqi battalion.   
 As historian Stephen Bourque subsequently described the action, “Colonel 
Zanini synchronized the fight to maximize his fire power and minimize battlefield 
confusion.”  Zanini’s synchronization of artillery, Apache attack helicopters and 
mechanized infantry fire suppressed the Iraqi defenders as his tank battalions 
maneuvered to within effective tank cannon range of the M1A1s.  Task Force 1-
37 Armor maneuvered toward the Iraqi defenses.  The brigade commander 
synchronized the fight at his level allowing the battalion commander to direct the 
close fight, tank on tank.299 
 Mark Hertling, a SAMS graduate and at the time of Operation Desert 
Storm the operations officer of the 1st Armored Division’s cavalry squadron, 
summed up the influence of his SAMS education and how it influenced him 
during the planning and execution of his tactical operations.  His main point was 
how he focused on an end state for the operations and how his squadron would 
fit into the overall division plan.  He said that, “At the end of the day, what should 
                                                 
299
    Stephen A. Bourque, “Correcting Myths about the Persian Gulf War: The Last Stand of the 
Tawalkalna,” in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, p.9.  Hereafter cited as Bourque.   
  
192 
 
our stance be, how should we be positioned, and what did we want to 
accomplish.”  The military history portions of the AMSP curriculum, from the wars 
of Napoleon to Vietnam, demonstrated to Hertling that “nothing is a first on any 
battlefield...you can always find examples of what you're doing -- or trying to do -- 
in the history, and you ought to look there first.”300  SAMS education influenced 
the planners across the Army. 
 The difficulty of viewing war from the operational level is that success can 
come to be seen as forward movement.  The operational level of war is the 
bridge for linking tactical success to strategic and policy objectives.  The tactical 
synchronization conducted by Franks, coupled with his intent to hit the Iraqis with 
concentrated forces as opposed to a wild cavalry charge was not well understood 
at the operational-strategic level, especially at Central Command headquarters in 
Riyadh.  Rick Swain, the historian of the Third Army believes that Schwarzkopf 
fell “victim to chateau generalship” since he remained so tied to his headquarters 
and did not go forward, even to the Third Army headquarters, to get a better 
sense of the state of the battle field.301  
 For example, Schwarzkopf quickly became enamored at how quickly 
McCaffrey and his 24th Infantry Division was moving vis-à-vis VII Corps.  The 24th 
Mech was also moving unopposed, over very difficult ground to be sure, but 
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unopposed nonetheless.  Commanding from Riyadh also shielded Schwarzkopf 
from the conditions extant on the battlefield at the time.  Arnold recalled that what 
Schwarzkopf did not realize was, “We had a huge thunderstorm in the desert 
right as we were conducting the breach.”  The water from the storm washed out 
the breach lanes cleared by the 1st Infantry Division for the 1st (UK) Armored 
Division and subsequently the re-supply convoys of the major units of VII Corps.  
This fact made extremely difficult to navigate through the minefields.  Not being 
there and relying on reports alone, Schwarzkopf dismissed the mines as a 
problem, but tired troops, rain, no easily recognizable lanes in mine fields, and 
long columns slowed the pace of the VII Corps advance.  VII Corps and even 
XVIII Abn Corps still had units in forward assembly areas and not through the 
breach lanes while others were far forward and engaged with Iraqi forces.302 
 In the VII Corps operations order Franks emphasized, “Combat service 
support must keep up because there will be no pause."303  However, terrain, 
weather, and the enemy coupled with tired troops upset this desire twice.  Arnold 
thought that Franks’ notion of a pause was realistic.  Franks and Yeosock knew 
that VII Corps attacking formations would get strung out and would need some 
sort of pause before entering the main battle with the Iraqi Republican Guard.  
This is an instance where doctrine needed improvement. 
 Arnold and Purvis put this notion very clearly.  Arnold stated that he felt 
that the Army needed to find a new doctrinal term because operational pause 
does not play well in Washington.  The Army had not maneuvered large 
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formations often enough for people in uniform and out of uniform to have a clear 
understanding of just how long the columns of divisions and a corps really are, it 
was hard to imagine even for SAMS graduates who saw columns of micro-armor 
on a terrain board.  There was no substitute for the actual experience in seeing 
large formations move and maneuver.  Due to this fact, an operational pause 
was not received well in Washington.  Politicians and policy makers had no frame 
of reference for the complexity of mounted warfare and the conditions in the 
Saudi and Iraqi desert at the time thus they did not really understand that 
columns were strung out and combat power needed to be re-set before engaging 
the main body of the Republican Guard.  The military advisors to the policy 
makers also did not have the experience of maneuvering large formations and 
thus had a difficult time explaining this kind of operation. 
 In the last analysis Arnold believed, “Freddy Franks knew what he was 
doing, hit the Republican Guard with a fist, not fingers.  The pressure to keep 
driving on was terrific.”  Arnold did acknowledge though that even GEN 
Schwarzkopf was under tremendous pressure to move rapidly and conclude the 
war swiftly.304  The Israelis were under missile attack, there were doubts about 
the strength of the Arab coalition members’ staying power, especially the 
Syrians, and even on the as yet unknown influence of 24 hours per day news 
coverage.  This was a new factor that the Army, as well as other services needed 
to come to grips with in the aftermath of the Gulf War. 
 Rick Swain, in his book Lucky War, believed that General Schwarzkopf 
dominated the entire theater of war on the Arabian Peninsula by force of 
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personality.  Swain wrote, “No act taken had meaning except in reference to his 
mercurial and unforgiving personality.”  The overall effect of Schwarzkopf’s 
mercurial personality and his tendency to “shoot the messenger” was one of 
reluctance to even approach the “CINC” with anything that could remotely be 
seen as bad news.305  Schwarzkopf had an equally tempestuous relationship with 
Purvis and his planners.  Initially enthusiastic to receive planners from SAMS 
later on the group fell in and out of Schwarzkopf’s favor, largely based on 
Schwarzkopf’s need to blame someone for the perceived disaster of the briefing 
to the President and his war advisors.  Michael Gordon, a reporter for the New 
York Times, wrote that after the war Schwarzkopf “considered the Jedi plan 
“garbage,” but he [Schwarzkopf] had not produced a better plan.”306 
 The planning for and conduct of Operation Desert Storm established 
SAMS in the minds of the leadership of the Army as the place to turn to for 
superb planners.  The level of planning at all echelons of command was thorough 
and incorporated the tenets of AirLand Battle.  The doctrinal underpinning of the 
planning and execution was sound as the U.S. Army defeated the fourth largest 
army in the world in 100 hours of combat.  The Army spent the years between 
Vietnam and August 1990 preparing for a war in the central region of Europe 
against a similarly equipped Warsaw Pact army and found itself fighting the last 
great armored war of the 20th century in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Iraq.  The world watched this war, and studied the outcome.  SAMS also studied 
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this war. 
 Following the successful conclusion of the Gulf War, SAMS faculty and 
students settled back in their class rooms to study the significance of the First 
Gulf War upon changing conduct of corps and army level operations.  Obviously, 
the execution of plans by operational commanders had not been perfect, and 
there were important lessons to be studied.  Even though Arnold and the Purvis 
group presented “joint” options to Schwarzkopf, these options were ground force 
options alone.  SAMS and other advanced studies schools that were established 
in the aftermath of the Gulf War investigated the conflict found it was necessary 
to grapple with the implications of a truly joint campaign, not merely a division of 
labor between the ground, sea, and air arms.   
 There were other issues, e.g. conventional battle dominance, asymmetric 
advantage, regarding which SAMS, its students and faculty would discuss both 
during and after the war.  If the U.S. was so dominant in the conventional realm 
of combat, how would the next threat manifest itself?  With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, how would the United States use its 
Army in this post Cold War era?  The lid had been kept on simmering regional 
and inter-ethnic struggles but now that the Red Army was gone and the super 
power struggles were over cracks in the façade of civility were appearing.   
 LTG Fred Franks was promoted to General when he left command of VII 
Corps and put into command of Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC.  
One of Franks’ first tasks was to design the effort to update FM 100-5, based on 
both his command experience in Desert Storm and his appreciation of the 
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changing world.  He asked the Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Gordon Sullivan, for 
SAMS graduates to be assigned to his headquarters.  Sullivan supported the 
request.307    
 Over the next several years SAMS graduates found themselves learning 
how to adapt a warfighting doctrine based on the premise of a conflict with the 
Red Army or surrogates thereof to the “wars” of the Peace Dividend era. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
The Wars of the Peace Dividend 
 
 
 In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union the American people and their political representatives expected, 
indeed sought, a “Peace Dividend.”   After all, the Cold War had ended and the 
looming threat of the Soviet Union had disappeared from the world scene.  The 
Army was directed to shed a substantial part of its manpower and components 
and thus went from 18 active Army divisions and five corps headquarters with 
associated corps level troop units (ranging from aviation to military police) to a 
force of ten divisions and four corps.  In accord with historical traditions the 
United States would reduce its Army and the armed forces overall following the 
successful conclusion of three wars, two hot, Panama and Desert Storm, and 
one cold, the 50+ years of containing the Soviet Union, in fact the reduction of 
the Army began before the start of Desert Storm.  The United States “tradition” of 
not maintaining a large standing army can be seen for example, from the Civil 
War to the end of the Cold War.  William T. Sherman wrote in his memoirs that at 
the close of the Civil War the Union Army had just over 1.5 million men under 
arms, and by act of Congress in 1866 this Army was reduced to 54,641.308  In his 
memoir, My American Journey, Colin Powell recalled testimony before the House 
Armed Services Committee in February 1990 concerning the size of the defense 
establishment. 
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     William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman, New York: Viking Press, 1990, p. 
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 Powell wrote, “But with the Soviet military shrinking, we faced a likely 
stampede by members of Congress arguing there was no threat, hence no need 
for a large military.  “Peace Dividend” had become a fashionable phrase.”  Powell 
described his argument that while the U.S. might no longer face “the 8th Guards 
Army across the Fulda Gap,” the nation still needed the capability to project 
power to unpredictable trouble spots around the world.309     
For anyone who looked beyond the Soviet Empire’s collapse, however, 
world conditions did not bode well for realizing a “Peace” dividend.  The record of 
the proceedings of the U.S. Senate show that from the end of the Gulf War in 
March, 1991 through February, 1999 there were 21 deployments of 500 or over 
U.S. troops with durations ranging from 30 days to several years.  The pace of 
operations did not abate for either the armed forces in general or the U.S. Army 
in particular.  Deployments ranged from responses to continued Iraqi acts of 
aggression, such as Vigilant Warrior in 1994, to Sea Angel, the US humanitarian 
response to a typhoon in Bangladesh to the hurricane recovery response to 
Hurricane Iniki’s devastation of the Hawaiian island of Kauai, to the military’s 
support for firefighting operations in the western US.310 
 The extant doctrine in the aftermath of Just Cause and Desert Storm 
remained FM 100-5, 1986.  However, conditions around the world were clearly 
changing and SAMS was preparing for a doctrinal update in response to new 
national security policies, force reductions, and innovative information 
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technologies.  It seemed that Moltke’s dictum would be re-written as no doctrine 
can look with certainty beyond changing policy and technological conditions. 
 Dr. Jake Kipp of the U.S. Army Soviet Army Studies Office, later renamed 
the Foreign Military Studies Office, gave a presentation at SAMS in February, 
1992 entitled, “Whither the Red Army.”  During this lecture Dr. Kipp suggested 
that the new world beyond the demise of the Red Army as enemy number one 
would be filled with new/old challenges as U.S. policy makers grappled with a 
rapidly changing world.  Kipp further suggested that Army units would be called 
on to separate warring factions, restore order in lawless regions, and operate in 
areas that would not be, in the Cold War sense, seen as vital national interests.  
These interests would change.311   
 In a memorandum dated 29 July 1991 the Army Chief of Staff, GEN 
Gordon Sullivan wrote to incoming Training and Doctrine Command commander, 
then LTG Fred Franks that he viewed doctrine as the engine of change for the 
U.S. Army.  In Sullivan’s view the world was changing and this change meant 
that the Army had to change its mode of operations in order to best serve the 
Nation.  Sullivan’s aim along with Franks was to capitalize on Army successes 
during the Panama operation and Desert Storm and refocus the Army through 
rewriting the operational doctrine of the Army to reflect post-Cold War 
circumstances.  That proved to be a gradual process as the operations that were 
conducted in the immediate post-Cold War era were done in accord with the 
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extant doctrine, put into practice by SAMS graduates.312   
 In light of the successful operations conducted in Panama and the Persian 
Gulf, Army divisions and corps, as well as headquarters above these tactical 
echelons, sought SAMS educated officers based on the superior performance of 
SAMS graduates during these operations.  Examples ranged from GEN Franks 
establishing an initiatives group at Training and Doctrine Command headquarters 
in Fort Monroe, VA and sending “by name” requests for SAMS graduates to work 
for him, to LTG Gary Luck insisting that the XVIII Abn Corps maintain its 
allocation of three to five SAMS graduates per year to be assigned to the corps 
plans section.  SAMS graduates played a key role in the planning of operations 
along the spectrum of conflict as the range of military operations were changing 
in the later years of the 20th century.  This chapter will examine three such 
operations planned by SAMS graduates.  These are; Joint Task Force - Los 
Angeles and the aftermath of the Rodney King riots in 1992, Joint Task Force 
Andrew and the recovery efforts following Hurricane Andrew, also in 1992, and 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia at the end of 1993 and early 1994.   
 These operations tested the Army as it entered the post-Cold War period, 
a time when its officer corps was introduced to the concept, Operations Other 
Than War, and how to use U.S. military forces in what traditionally had been 
viewed as non-military roles to achieve results that fulfilled the policy objectives 
of the U.S.  Faithful to its founding precepts, the Army and SAMS attempted to 
refine the concepts of operational art and how this level of war linked tactical 
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     Memorandum from GEN Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army to LTG Frederick M. 
Franks, Jr., dated 29JUL91, subject Reshaping Army Doctrine, cited in John Romjue’s TRADOC 
Historical Monograph, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 1997. 
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actions to strategic and policy objectives in these operations.  The operations 
tested SAMS graduates ability to think while facing conditions that were not 
foreseen during their year of study.  The SAMS curriculum did not begin to 
change, as will be seen in chapter eight, until 1992.  SAMS graduates from 
classes prior to 1992 adapted the tenets of AirLand Battle in each of these 
operations as they applied the familiar tenets of doctrine to the unfamiliar 
situations they faced as planners in Army divisions and corps. 
 The first example of the changing conditions affecting the use of force is 
Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA).  On the morning of 1 May 1992, Majors 
Gordon Wells and Lance Betros, newly graduated from SAMS and assigned to 
the 7th Infantry Division were preparing to do physical training.  The television in 
their office was tuned to CNN, and Marlon Fitzwater; the President’s press 
secretary came on the air to announce that in response to a request from the 
governor 7,000 federal troops would be committed to reinforce the National 
Guard then facing massive civil disturbance in Los Angeles.  Betros looked at 
Wells and said, “I think that is our warning order!”  Then they ran to the division 
operations officer’s office.313 
 
                                                 
313
     Conversation with COL (ret) Gordon Wells, 10 June 2009.  A warning order is the first order 
a unit receives in advance of action.  After Operation Desert Storm all major units kept a television tuned to 
CNN to ensure the leadership heard what was being announced in Washington, DC. 
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 On the afternoon of 29 April 1992, the worst civil unrest since the riots of 
the 1960's erupted in the streets of Los Angeles.  Forty-four people died, and 
hundreds of injuries occurred before order was restored.  One billion dollars of 
property damage because of rampaging looters and the thousands of fires that 
they set.  There were many deep-seated grievances in the black community of 
Los Angeles, but the catalyst of this extended riot was the outcome of the 
criminal trial of the police officers who had been taped beating Rodney King after 
a traffic stop in Los Angeles.  The officers were acquitted of all charges by an all-
white jury.  The riot began as a small disturbance in south central Los Angeles, 
but it quickly escalated and rapidly spread throughout the city and county of Los 
Angeles.  The mob violence swiftly overwhelmed city law enforcement 
authorities, although some thought that the police failed to act swiftly to contain 
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the violence, resulting in the burning of large swaths of the city.  Early in the 
morning of 30 April, Governor Pete Wilson made the decision to commit the state 
police and two thousand California Army National Guard soldiers to assist in 
restoring law and order.  A California National Guard military police company 
arrived in the area on the afternoon of 30 April and immediately began operations 
to support local police.  This initial state reinforcement of city law enforcement 
was not adequate to deal with the widespread rioting, arson and looting.314  The 
commitment of even more California National Guard troops to the area appeared 
to stabilize the city and brought about a return to a semblance of law and order.  
However, state and national officials believed that federal troops were needed, 
as there were many criticisms of the performance of the California National 
Guard.315  
 Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a 
Presidential Executive Order 12804 on the evening of 1 May. The Executive 
Order federalized selected units of the California Army National Guard 
(CAARNG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the restoration of law 
and order.  JTF-LA formed and deployed within twenty-four hours, assembled 
from California based U.S. Army and Marine forces. It operated in a unique 
domestic disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, federal 
agencies and the CAARNG. 316  
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 The U.S. 7th Infantry Division headquarters, located at Fort Ord, was 
ordered to form the JTF.  The division headquarters and one of the divisional 
brigades were committed to conduct operations in the Los Angeles area.  
Simultaneous with the commitment of U.S. Army troops, a special Marine Air-
Ground Task Force was formed from the 1st Marine Division and also sent to Los 
Angeles.  JTF-LA’s mission statement was: "JTF-LA assumes command and 
control of federalized National Guard, active duty Marine and Army forces, 
establishes liaison with local law enforcement agencies, and conducts civil 
disturbance operations to restore order in the greater Los Angeles area."317  The 
mission, while straightforward, required great care in execution because of 
political, racial, and organizational sensibilities. 
 When the orders reached Fort Ord, LTC James Marks was serving with 
the 7th Infantry Division on his post-SAMS assignment during which Marks 
served as the G2 planner.  Marks recalled that the plans and operations staff of 
the division had been paying attention to what was going on in Los Angeles but 
that it was not a priority.  Marks and the remaining members of the division 
tactical command post team had barely 12 hours notice from initial alert to arrival 
in Los Angeles.  The tactical command post accompanied the commanding 
general to the riot-torn city.318 
                                                                                                                                                 
proclamation and to restore law and order in and about the City and County of Los Angeles, and other 
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War, Vol. III, Civil Disturbance LA Riots, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p. 3   
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 The Joint Task Force commander, Major General Marvin L. Covault, 
commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division, arrived in Los Angeles shortly 
after the Presidential order was issued.  MG James Delk, military force 
commander for Los Angeles and the staff of the 40th Infantry Division, California 
National Guard briefed Covault on the situation in Los Angeles.  He then moved 
to the tactical operations center (TOC), established by the 7th ID divisional 
assault command post.  Covault’s first act was to name MG Daniel J. Hernandez, 
commanding general of the 40th Infantry Division as the Army Force 
commander, and placed his 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division under the 
operational control of General Hernandez.  Covault’s decision went a long way 
toward restoring the morale of National Guardsmen, for the Guard—both its 
leaders and soldiers--had expected to be supplanted by active component 
officers.319      
The Marine Force (MARFOR) made up the other portion of the joint task 
force. The MARFOR consisted of approximately 1,500 Marines from Camp 
Pendleton, CA, commanded by Brigadier General Marvin T. Hopgood, deputy 
commander of the 1st Marine Division.  The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 
MAGTF, staged out of Tustin Marine Corps Air Station.   All in all, the Joint Task 
Force--active duty U.S. Army troops, Marines, and federalized California National 
Guard soldiers--worked well together, and quickly accomplished the mission of 
assisting in restoring order to greater Los Angeles.  Vitally important, in light of 
the continuous media coverage, no troops were killed or seriously injured and no 
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innocent bystanders were injured by the Soldiers or Marines.320  
 The basis for action by federal troops when committed to conduct of civil 
disturbance operations was in what was designated the “Garden Plot” series of 
standing operations plans.  Every division and corps in the continental United 
States maintained a plan, under Garden Plot, that detailed how Army forces 
would be committed to contain civil disturbances, as well as to defend critical 
infrastructure. 321  The divisions and corps might have had the required plans for 
Garden Plot operations “on the shelf” but training in civil disturbance operations 
was not high on the priority of Regular Army units.  For example, the 7th 
Division’s most recent operations had been in Panama as a part of Operation 
Just Cause.   
 The soldiers of the division were well trained in combat operations and 
small unit tactics.  However, the staff and troop units lacked expertise in the 
nuances of civil disturbance operations.  Covault and his SAMS planners had to 
adapt offensive and defensive operational experience into the conduct of an 
operation other than war, one conducted within the United States.  According to 
Marks and Wells, the foundation of the execution of operations relied on the 
knowledge that the soldiers of the division were well trained, well disciplined, and 
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well led.322   
 The JTF mission required federal forces to assume command and control 
of federalized National Guard, active duty Marine and Army forces, establish 
liaison with local law enforcement agencies, and conduct civil disturbance 
operations to restore order in the greater Los Angeles area.  The federal forces 
also had to bear in mind the requirements of Posse Comitatus and operate within 
these restrictions.  The Posse Comitatus Act within Title 18, U.S. Code states,  
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances 
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of 
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the 
Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to 
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.323  
 
The President’s executive order was carefully crafted in accord with his authority 
outlined in the Constitution and the U.S. Code.  The President delegated 
appropriate authority to the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General to restore 
law and order to the greater Los Angeles area.324  The President’s executive 
order was exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, a fact not 
immediately known by Covault or his advisors. 
 Martial law was not declared; thus, federal forces had to carry out 
operations that would—in theory--support local and state law enforcement 
actions.  According to both Wells and Marks, the staff determined that the 
                                                 
322
     Marks and Wells interviews and Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletters, No. 93-7,  
NOV 93, Operations Other Than War, Vol. III, Civil Disturbance LA Riots, U.S. Army Combined Arms 
Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS 
323
     U.S. Code, Title 18, Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, Part 
I, chapter 67, paragraph 1385, 8 January 2008. 
324
     The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and the Insurrection Act of 1807 limit the ability of the 
federal government to use federal military forces to enforce civil law. 
  
209 
 
analogous tactical mission was follow and support.  The follow and support 
analogy applied a familiar doctrinal term to an unfamiliar situation.325  Marks, 
Wells, and Betros as well as other SAMS educated officers serving on the 7th 
Infantry Division staff believed that the doctrine of AirLand Battle could be applied 
to this mission.  
 The 7th ID applied the concept of depth in a unique manner but one 
consistent with all relevant legal authorities and constraints.  Regular troops and 
federalized National Guard units secured areas already under control of local and 
state police.  This allowed the federal and state police to extend operations into 
areas not under control.  This application of military force in support of civil law 
enforcement extended the area of operations in time and space.  The presence 
of troops in neighborhoods reassured the people that law and order was a priority 
and that they would not be threatened in their homes by disorder, arson and 
looting.  Military forces also established traffic control points to enforce the dusk 
to dawn curfew ordered by the mayor of Los Angeles.  Traffic control points 
expanded the area under control of the police and continued the expansion of 
secure areas in the city, providing depth for operations. 
 The tenets of agility and synchronization were evident in the conduct of 
the JTF operations, for the JTF forces undertook as a first step to establish 
liaison with state and local police forces.  The basis for the conduct of operations 
in accord with these tenets was grounded, one should emphasize, in the superb 
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discipline demonstrated by the federal and National Guard troops.  The best 
example is that only three incidents involving an exchange of gunfire between 
National Guard troops and armed criminals occurred.  The first involved the 40th 
Military Police Company from the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which was 
the first Guard unit on the streets of Los Angeles.  Military Police assisted in the 
arrest of an armed burglar who twice turned his weapon on the MPs.  The 
criminal surrendered after four rounds were fired.  No one was injured.  The 
second shooting incident was the most significant.  A gang member taunted 
Guardsmen, telling them he was coming back to kill them that night.  This was a 
common threat faced by Guardsmen and regulars, but in this instance the threat 
was followed up with almost lethal action.  The gang member returned in his car 
after curfew and attempted to run the Guardsmen down.  All but one of the 
Soldiers was able to jump out of the way of the speeding car.  That National 
Guard soldier was hit, but not seriously injured.  The gang member later returned 
for a second attempt.  When he refused to stop, the Guardsmen fired about 10 
rounds at the tires of the car in an attempt to stop it.  When it was clear the gang 
member was determined to run Guardsmen down, they finally used deadly force 
and killed him with one bullet in the shoulder and two in the head.  The final 
shooting incident involving Guardsmen began when another criminal attempted 
vehicular homicide.  The criminal involved first hit a car and then ran down a Los 
Angeles police officer, breaking his leg.  When the gang member refused to stop, 
two Guardsmen each fired one round each.  The gang member suffered a 
serious wound in the buttocks and groin and was placed in custody.  The 
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California National Guard fired a total of 20 rounds in these three incidents.326  
 Marks was the senior staff officer serving in the division tactical command 
post.  One of the main concerns of the division command group and JTF 
commander was how to handover operations to civil authorities.  Marks looked 
into the level of violent crime that had taken place prior to the riots.  Concluding 
that these pre-riot levels of criminal activity were within the capability of the Los 
Angeles Police and Sheriff Department to handle, Marks tracked the level of 
violent crime post Rodney King trial and since the arrival federal troops in Los 
Angeles on 1 May 1992.  He found that the level of violent crime was dropping to 
pre-riot levels.  Marks graphed this data and presented it to MG Covault.  Based 
on the obvious course of action generated by this data, Covault directed that if 
the level of violent crimes continued to drop or at least hold at pre-riot levels for 
three days conditions would be set for a handover of operations to civil 
authorities.  Army troops and Marines began to redeploy to home stations on 10 
May 1992.327     
 
 The conduct of operations by JTF-Los Angeles was not flawless and was 
the subject of considerable post-riot criticism and debate.  Regarding Army 
doctrine, MG Covault found that “the civil disturbance doctrine in place at the 
time to be unapplicable and explicitly rejected employing his forces as suggested 
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by the doctrine.”328  This decision led to Covault’s planners and operations 
officers to use FM 100-5 doctrinal tenets to develop plans and orders.  This 
decision tested the critical thinking abilities of Covault’s SAMS graduates.   
 The decision to federalize the California Army National Guard had both 
costs and benefits.  The cost of federalization was in the time of response as Los 
Angeles city and county officials used to working with the Guard while under 
state control had to be educated during operations on the legal limits placed on 
federal forces.329  
   Lou Cannon, Los Angeles bureau chief for the Washington Post asserted 
that the federalization order slowed military responses to police requests for 
support.  Regular Army and Marine Corps commanders and legal advisors 
reviewed all police requests for support “in terms of whether troops were being 
asked to perform “military” or law enforcement” functions.  Cannon stated that 
this was due to both military and civilian unfamiliarity with Presidential authority 
and Posse Comitatus.330   
 MG Delk wrote that the call for federal troops was a mistake and 
contributed to the complexity of the operations to establish law and order in Los 
Angeles.  The decision to deploy federal troops and place National Guard troops 
under federal control slowed the response time to the point that few were ever 
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acted on; this was due to the need for a legal review.  Delk believed though that 
in the long term this decision would bode well for the National Guard as police 
forces would argue against the use of federal troops and federalization, and ask 
for National Guard troops under state control if the need for support over what a 
city police force had at hand arose again.331   
 The major subject of criticism of the military forces committed to support of 
civil authority was the speed of response by both National Guard and federal 
forces.  Response times were articulated in the Garden Plot series of plans.  
Regarding speed of response the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, 
California, received orders to move at 0415 hours on May 1, 1992.  Fort Ord is 
322 miles from Los Angeles.  Upon notification of deployment, the first aircraft 
load of 7th Division Soldiers lifted off just in just over 12 hours.  The Army portion 
of the JTF, division headquarters and a brigade combat team, completed air 
movement and staging for action at El Toro Marine Corps Air Station 
approximately 25 hours after the division was alerted for duty.  That is well within 
the standards described in Garden Plot.  California National Guardsmen arrived 
on the streets 18 hours after being notified for mobilization.  None of the military 
units involved received much advanced warning for action.  
 Assorted stories of miscommunication between military and police units 
were reported.  The most widely cited of these “urban legends” being a police 
request that a Marine unit “cover” the police as they approached a building where 
a suspected sniper was located.  To the police "cover" meant having weapons at 
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the ready.  To the Marines, however, cover meant covering fire--which the 
Marines delivered much to police consternation.332  By and large, discipline 
enabled the effective conduct of operations, as the division staff applied familiar 
doctrinal terms to unfamiliar missions.   
 In sum, MG Covault and his staff conducted AirLand operations without a 
familiar framework of battle.  Covault rejected the civil disturbance doctrine extant 
at the time thus turned to the familiar doctrine, AirLand Battle.  The SAMS 
educated officers on Covault’s staff materially assisted in the planning and 
execution of an extremely complex operation under very unfamiliar conditions.  
They did so by apply familiar AirLand Battle concepts and adapting as required.  
This effort conducted by JTF-Los Angeles/7th Infantry Division was the first major 
test of doctrine intended for combat applied to an operation other than war, really 
a civil support operation.  The second major test occurred in southern Florida a 
little more than three months later.     
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Satellite Image of Hurricane Andrew 
 Hurricane Andrew struck South Dade County, Florida, at about 4:35 AM, 
24 August 1992.  The aftermath of Hurricane Andrew was catastrophic.  
President Bush declared four Florida counties disaster areas; Dade, Monroe, 
Coller and Broward.  In these counties an estimated 250,000 people were left 
homeless by the effects of the hurricane.  In Dade County alone one in ten 
people were homeless.  Blown down trees, telephone and power lines blocked 
roads throughout these four counties.  The counties lacked power, running water, 
sewerage and working medical facilities.  Acerbating this situation was an 
uncontrolled mosquito population that hampered relief efforts and attempts to 
return to normality.333  In response to the widespread devastation, the U.S. 
                                                 
333
    Drawn from the Army Material Command Logistics Support Group, A Brief History, 
undated,  USAF Reserve memorandum dated 16 March 1993, Subject: 1992 USAFR Emergency Mosquito 
  
216 
 
Government committed the largest number of troops to civil support operations in 
American history.  Army troops made up the bulk of the committed forces.   
Second U.S. Army headquarters, located at Fort Gillem, Georgia, was 
designated the Joint Task Force that directed military operations.  LTG Samuel 
E. Ebbesen, Commanding General Second U.S. Army, was named the JTF 
Commander.   The mission, commander’s intent, and concept of what was to be 
accomplished outlined the flow of the operation.  These documents were 
developed under direction of COL Roger E. Popham, Chief of Staff, Second U.S. 
Army.  Again, as we shall see, planners applied familiar doctrinal terms to 
unfamiliar situations.   
 The JTF mission was straightforward and focused on the key and 
essential tasks required to provide relief to the population of the area affected by 
the hurricane.  The mission statement read: 
Beginning 28 AUG 92 Joint Task Force Andrew establishes 
Humanitarian Support Operations vicinity Miami, FL in the relief 
effort following Hurricane Andrew.  The Task Force will establish 
field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo 
transferring operations, local/line haul transportation ops, and other 
logistical support to the local population.334 
 The LTG Ebbesen’s commander’s intent provided guidance to begin 
operations by specifying a priority of effort for the initially deploying troops that 
ranged from an area focus as well as a task focus for logistical troops.  He also 
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stated very clearly what JTF troops could not do without his specific approval.  
Finally, the end state he provided spoke in terms of time, the near term and the 
far term.  The far term was especially important as the commander’s intent also 
envisioned the conditions for a handover of operations from federal troops to the 
level of normality required for routine operations executed by local and state 
officials.   
JTF Commander’s Intent:  
Immediately begin to operate feeding and water facilities; priority to 
the cities of Homestead and Florida City.  After assessment, 
expand operations throughout the affected area.  Provide 
assistance to other federal agencies, state/local governments and 
organizations in receipt, storage and distribution of supplies and 
equipment.  Do not engage in law enforcement actions/operations 
without approval of CG, JTF.  End State is to get life support 
systems in place and relieve initial hardships until state and local 
agencies can reestablish normal operations throughout the AO.335 
 The XVIII Abn Corps, commanded by LTG Gary Luck, provided the Army 
Force headquarters for the JTF formed by Second U.S. Army.  At the time the 
hurricane made land fall the XVIII Abn Corps headquarters was at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas overseeing the Battle Command Training Program 
exercise of the 29th Infantry Division, Virginia and Maryland National Guard.  The 
corps headquarters split with a controlling element remaining at Fort 
Leavenworth to complete the exercise and the main headquarters returning to 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina to begin a rapid planning effort to commit corps units 
to the relief and recovery effort.336  The corps staff crafted a plan of operations 
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based on the corps commander’s guidance and developed this plan while the 
corps commander went forward for a reconnaissance of the stricken area. 
 Based on personal reconnaissance and coordination with local, state and 
federal authorities Luck directed his assigned forces to deploy to Florida.  He 
approved the mission statement written by his planning staff, led by COL Robert 
Barefield, a SAMS Fellow.  Barefield crafted the mission in broad terms to enable 
Luck’s subordinate commanders the latitude to use assigned and attached units 
as they saw fit vis-à-vis the situation in their own zones of responsibility.  Corps 
units would conduct “military disaster relief operations in support of civil 
authorities.“  In his intent, which provided personal guidance to subordinate 
commanders, the Luck stressed speed of execution of assigned tasks and 
professionalism.  The corps would be the visible presence of the U.S. 
government response that supported the people of southern Florida.  Luck 
ensured in his guidance that his Soldiers knew they were there to support and 
sustain the people.  The corps mission and Luck’s intent are below.  
MISSION.  
As directed by CINCFOR, XVIII Abn Corps conducts military 
disaster relief operations in support of civil authorities in FLORIDA 
to assist in the recovery from the effects of HURRICANE 
ANDREW. On order, units redeploy. 
 
COMMANDER’S INTENT. 
 
The keys to success in this operation are speed of execution and 
professionalism. The Corps will respond to taskings for support as 
quickly as possible and matching the unit with the proper 
capabilities to the task as required. At all times, stress unit integrity 
and the day-to-day chain of command. Short of deployment for war, 
no other activity has more priority. Success in this operation is 
prompt and effective support to the civil authorities as tasked by 
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CINCFOR.337 
 
 GEN Edwin Burba, the Commander-in-Chief of Forces Command directed 
the XVIII Abn Corps to provide selected Army assets under a Joint Logistics Task 
Force (JLTF DRAGON) for disaster relief to federal and local authorities in 
Florida.  The units came from the Corps Support Command.  These types of 
units were best suited to conduct logistics, humanitarian relief, clean-up, 
engineer construction, and reconstruction.  Military Police and infantry units were 
sent to provide security for federal-facilities and property.  Given the images of 
the devastation, provided initially from CNN, the corps staff anticipated that the 
entire range of forces within the corps; logistic, engineer, military police, aviation, 
signals communications and infantry forces would also be needed.  Barefield and 
the Corps G3 Plans section developed the troop list and coordinated the 
sequence of deployment to Florida.   
 Upon arrival into the designated operations area, XVIII Abn Corps 
elements operated under the control of Second U.S. Army/JTF-Andrew, although 
in the development of the corps mission and commander‘s intent XVIII Abn 
Corps planners, directed by Luck identified the commander-in-chief of Forces 
Command as the senior headquarters.  During Operation Desert Storm LTG 
Luck did not hold Third U.S. Army in high regard and it is quite likely that this 
carried over to the Second U.S. Army.  Second U.S. Army was a holdover 
headquarters from the Cold War with primary responsibility for oversight of Army 
                                                 
337
      Headquarters, XVIII Abn Corps, Operations Order 92-1 Hurricane Andrew Relief, 
Fort Bragg, NC 28 August 1992. Pages unnumbered.  CINCFOR is Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 
Army Forces Command.  Hereafter cited as OPORD 92-1.  I had a hand in developing these two 
statements. 
  
220 
 
Reserve units and coordinating with National Guard units in the Army area.  The 
headquarters was not manned and equipped to the level of the XVIII Abn Corps.  
The Corps plans section and the plans sections of the 82nd Abn and 10th 
Mountain Divisions were filled with graduates of SAMS.  The Second U.S. Army 
did not have any SAMS graduates assigned.338 
 Luck and the corps staff felt that current campaign planning procedures 
were transferable to disaster assistance operations, but the specific criteria for 
mission success and completion had to be war gamed, defined, and 
disseminated as widely as possible to all corps units involved in the operations.  
The corps staff focused on this effort.  An element within the corps planning 
section also began planning for mission handover to federal, state and local civil 
authorities.    The corps staff coordinated the definition of end state, success and 
handover criteria with the principal subordinates of the corps; the 82nd Abn 
Division and the 10th Mountain Division.   
 One of the two main elements of Army ground forces committed to the 
hurricane relief operation was the 10th Mountain Division.  Major General Steven 
Arnold commanded the Mountain Division.  During Desert Storm Arnold was the 
principal operations officer of Third U.S. Army.  A few days after Hurricane 
Andrew made landfall Arnold received a phone call from the XVIII Abn Corps 
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commander, Luck.  Luck told Arnold that, “we needed to get to Homestead Air 
Force Base to do an assessment as the President was going to commit federal 
troops to assist in the relief operations.”339  Luck arranged to send an airplane to 
Fort Drum, a C-130, for division’s reconnaissance team.  Arnold flew down to 
Homestead Air Force base, Florida and met Luck there.  Luck established 
boundaries for the 10th Mountain and 82nd Abn Divisions.  He instructed the 
command groups that they owned the ground in their operating areas.  Arnold 
conducted his reconnaissance and then called the needed troops forward.  The 
82nd Abn Division, under BG Carl Ernst, was conducting a similar 
reconnaissance in its zone of operations.  During the reconnaissance Arnold saw 
no evidence of looting or anarchy.  He allowed his troops to deploy to Florida with 
their personal weapons and later on took the decision to store the weapons in 
secure areas in his divisional base camps.  Both divisions realized the scope of 
the problem and called forward troops to deal with the challenges.  Arnold and 
his 10th Mountain Soldiers experiences are illustrative of the post-Andrew relief 
operations. 
 Based on his reconnaissance Arnold realized there were many things to 
do to restore a level of security to his zone of operations.  Arnold used his SAMS 
educated planners to answer his questions of how would the division leadership 
know it was doing the right things for the people of the area.  He asked the 
planners to determine how he would measure success.  In essence he asked his 
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planners to determine how to define victory in this type of operation.  Arnold and 
his planners set goals on how to complete the tasks they set for themselves and 
means to assess progress toward attaining the goals.  Arnold’s prime example 
was getting the schools in his area back open.  In support of measuring this effort 
Arnold’s planners looked at what the schools would need such as: water, power, 
materials, some rebuilding, and then made school rebuilding a community event.  
Arnold also coordinated with the mayor of Homestead, Florida on this and all 
tasks with the area. 
 Arnold looked on a larger scope and determined the division should: 
Establish distribution sites for food, water, and ice.  Ice was 
important as it was really hot down there. 
Establish shelters for people who could not go back to their homes 
or who had lost their homes. 
And, establish a system for working with volunteers in a coherent 
way.340 
  
Arnold and his planners also worked out criteria for re-establishing the 
public health systems and hospitals.  Arnold and the mayor of Homestead 
determined that one indicator of success was when the power grid was back on 
so the division could remove military generators from the hospitals. 
 To further coordination with the local civic leadership, Arnold put his 
headquarters in the Homestead, Florida City Hall.  He attended the city 
manager’s meetings to ensure the manager knew that Arnold and his troops 
were there to help and to make certain that both Arnold and the city manager 
knew where the division could do the most for the manager and the city.  XVIII 
Abn Corps directed that all units use local civic boundaries where it made sense 
                                                 
340
     Arnold interview. 
  
223 
 
to delineate units’ areas of operations and linked up unit commanders with local 
civic leaders.  The corps and divisions also coordinated with the National Guard 
in a similar manner that the units coordinated with non-governmental 
organizations, NGOs.  The Guard was not federalized so coordination was 
appropriate.341 
  Arnold established a system of coordinating with the NGOs and other 
volunteer organizations that came to Florida to help.  There was a challenge in 
working with the 25-30 non-governmental organizations/volunteer organizations, 
none of which would accept military orders.  Arnold and his staff held a nightly 
meeting and invited the NGOs to attend.  The 10th Mountain division staff used 
these nightly meetings to share information or barter opportunities to match 
needed work with the best organization for that work.  Arnold recalled that a 
church group that came down from another state and wanted to set up a feeding 
station.  Through this meeting this group linked up with a local church of the 
same denomination.  The staff was guided by the tenets of AirLand Battle of 
synchronization and depth, as well as the principles of war economy of force and 
mass.  The staff used the nightly coordination meeting to focus the correct group 
to the correct task thus ensuring the division used its troops to tasks for which the 
military was best suited.   Arnold recalled two other examples: 
The Seventh Day Adventists came down with 1000 people to repair 
roofs.  These people were great and we were able to put them into 
one of our battalion zones to do that work.  They were self-
sufficient, did the job and then left. 
The Salvation Army, another wonderful organization.  These people 
told me they were there for the long haul as it took a great deal of 
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time to truly recover from a hurricane.  The only thing they asked 
me for was a helicopter to fly a possible donor around the area so 
the donor could see the devastation.  We did this.  The donor was 
Ross Perot.  He wrote a check to the Salvation Army and quietly 
left.342 
 
 The absence of a higher level plan and a coordinated "end state" can lead 
to overdependence on military forces by local government.  In developing 
transition criteria planners had to consider a number of competing interests.  The 
local people, especially the less well off people in Homestead and Dade County, 
wanted the military health care units to stay as long as possible.  Local dentists 
and doctors were trying to reestablish their practices thus they wanted military 
hospital and dental units removed.  Schools wanted to retain military power 
generation units to remain as long as possible, mainly because the county was 
not paying for the power.  On the other hand the local power company wanted 
the military generators to be pulled out and the schools as well as private homes 
to come back on the power grid.  Trash removal companies complained to the 
LTG Luck about the amount of debris military engineer units were hauling out of 
the county.  Every truck load of debris an Army unit removed was money not 
going into the pockets of the contractors who were trying to reestablish their 
businesses.  Citizens of the stricken area and Soldiers must know when 
emergency military operations will cease and local civil authorities assume 
complete control of the assistance operations.  In the absence of any higher 
guidance, other than help the people, in this instance the JTF and corps 
proposed what the transition would look like and the specific circumstances of 
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the handover.   
 JTF-Andrew, XVIII Abn Corps, 10th Mountain and 82nd Abn Divisions all 
attempted to articulate handover criteria or transitions from military efforts to civil.  
The military units had an advantage of planning expertise and experience.  The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), along with Mr. Robert Card, 
the personal representative of President Bush, did not have a definitive plan with 
an established end state or transition criteria.  In the absence of this type of 
guidance JTF-Andrew’s Chief of Staff, MG Rich Griffitts, directed the 
development of a new operations plan called OPLAN GOLD.  Griffitts told the 
assembled planners of JTF-Andrew’s subordinate commands that GOLD was an 
acronym for “Get Out of Lower Dade.”  Griffitts did not ask questions about 
transition criteria but instead sent what his view of transition conditions were to 
FEMA.  FEMA accepted this without many questions.343   
 Arnold also got a glimpse of the need to respond swiftly when Army forces 
are committed to assist the American people.  He recalled that the people of 
Florida were looking for the cavalry.  Arnold observed that while the Soldiers and 
leaders of the division thought the response was very quick, “the people in 
Homestead were sort of bitter at the lack of all levels of government response.  
We had to work hard to overcome this feeling.”344 
 SAMS graduate Colonel (ret) Robert Drumm, then assigned to the 10th 
Mountain, compared and contrasted Florida with what was lying ahead for the 
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division, Somalia.  Drumm said that Florida, “was simple operationally - divide the 
area into sectors, go get the resources (shovels, axes, chain saws, dump trucks, 
etc.), and start cleaning up.”345  Somalia was to be a much different proposition.  
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Map 1346 
 MG Stephen Arnold described the situation in Mogadishu to visitors as: “It 
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may not be war, but it sure as hell ain’t peace.”347  The 10th Mountain Division 
had been back at Fort Drum for no more than six weeks when it was alerted for 
deployment to Somalia.  Conflicts were brewing in many places around the 
world.  The situation in the Balkans was growing worse every day.  In Haiti, the 
military removed the elected president from power.  When the Mountain Division 
returned to Fort Drum in late October 1992 after the handover of operations in 
Florida LTG Luck, the Airborne Corps commander called MG Arnold.  Based on 
this talk Arnold told his staff that he was sure that the division would deploy again 
soon.  The Mountain Division staff and commanders focused on the conduct of a 
peacekeeping mission.  Arnold told the commanders and staffs to start figuring 
out how to do a peacekeeping operation under near combat like conditions.  As 
he said, “I had the right mission, but the wrong continent!”  In November 1992, 
the division commanders and staffs conducted a “rock drill”, a large scale 
rehearsal of a peace-keeping mission under near combat conditions, at Fort 
Drum.  Arnold told the brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs to 
study Sarajevo, because he was certain that that was where the division would 
be going.348 
 In October, 1992, President Bush, in a speech at the United Nations, and 
said that the United States and its military were ready to play a wider role in the 
“new world order.”   
 The concept was interpreted differently within the U.S. government.  This 
“new world order” was not viewed by the Defense Department or the armed 
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forces as a commitment to open ended operations but, rather, selective 
operations in support of national interests.  The national interest in Somalia was 
not well articulated although the deluge of media reports and more tellingly 
images of starving children had an effect on the Bush administration.   On 30 
November 1992, Luck called Arnold with a warning order.  Although President 
Bush lost the election in November, he decided to conduct the Somalia operation 
because of the overwhelming media attention paid on the starvation facing the 
Somali people.  The situation in Somalia was grim.  The government collapsed 
and there was no order.  Warlords were using food as a weapon by withholding 
food from regions not loyal to them.  Non-governmental organizations relief 
convoys were hijacked.  Arnold wrote, “It was my first introduction to total chaos, 
complete anarchy and the collapse of a society. The greed and bickering of the 
warlords had ground the relief operations to a halt.349   Somalia news dominated 
the front pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post and CNN.   
 On 23 November 1992 President Bush convened a meeting with key 
security advisors on how to respond to the crisis in Somalia.  GEN Colin Powell, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a plan titled “Operation 
Restore Hope,” to the assembled group.  The purpose of the plan was ensure 
food got to starving Somalis.  The plan called for putting “a substantial number of 
American troops” on the ground in Somalia.  Powell wrote that Brent Scowcroft, 
the National Security Advisor was uneasy and asked about getting out of 
Somalia.  The president wanted the mission to be concluded by 19 January.  
Powell and Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense told the president that a 
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deployment of troops would not be completed until the middle of December and 
that a mission of this scope could not be completed prior to the inauguration of 
President-elect Clinton.350   Nonetheless, President Bush approved the mission. 
 U.S. Central Command, led by General Joseph Hoar, USMC, named 
Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC and commanding general of I 
Marine Expeditionary Force as the headquarters around which Hoar formed JTF-
Somalia.  U.S. Forces Command ordered the 10th Mountain Division to join the 
JTF.  Johnston’s JTF then ticketed the 10th Mountain to act as the Army Forces 
headquarters, ARFOR, for the operation.  This meant that Arnold’s division was 
responsible not only for the operations and sustainment of divisional forces but 
also for all U.S. Army forces in theater and fulfillment of the U.S. Army Title X 
responsibilities to a joint force.351  Complexity ruled. 
 As the ARFOR headquarters the division was responsible for supporting 
all U.S. Army forces in Somalia, as well as conducting its own operations.  The 
division planners derived the mission from information received from corps 
planners, as well as CNN.  As noted in the division after action report while there 
was a great deal of information available from television and news reports there 
was very little official guidance concerning the conduct of operations in Somalia 
beyond, “stop the dying.”  MAJ Dave Stahl, SAMS graduate and the lead planner 
for the Mountain Division relied on the network of SAMS graduates serving at 
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Fort Bragg, Central Command headquarters in Tampa, and in Washington, DC 
for up to date information regarding expectations for the operation. 
 The division's mission statement read as follows:  
Task Force Mountain deploys, serves as ARFOR, and 
conducts military operations in Somalia to secure the 
airfield in Baledogle as well as other key installations 
and to provide security for operations in support of 
relief distribution sites in assigned humanitarian relief 
sectors in order to provide secure passage of relief 
supplies.352   
 
 Initially, the division did not receive any guidance that led the planners to 
focus on specific areas in the country, save Baledogle.  The planners and 
commander assumed that the focus would be in the southern part of the country.  
Arnold directed Stahl and the other planners, not all of whom were SAMS 
graduates, to develop a plan that accomplished this mission by patrolling lines of 
communications used by aid agencies, providing security for the storage and 
distribution sites, developing and maintaining coordination with coalition forces 
and non-governmental organizations, and lastly, establishing liaison with local 
clan leaders, elders, and United Nations forces.   
 The focus of main effort within the division area, physically and 
psychologically, was to break the hunger cycle in the country, establish some 
level of security, and then handover the operation to the UN at a level that UN 
forces could sustain.  Unstated, but relevant to planning was the fact that the 
outgoing Bush administration wanted this mission accomplished before the end 
of the Bush term and the transition to the incoming administration of President-
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elect William J. Clinton.  This proved impossible.  While the division had an alert 
order and a derived mission statement it also had no firm deployment date. 
 Somalia is a big country.  Arnold wanted to bring as many helicopters and 
trucks as possible.  Arnold and his planners were convinced that the division 
would need a great deal of transportation.  The planners worked very hard on the 
Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL).  The time phased force 
deployment list process was devised in the 1950s and revised throughout the 
Cold War as more updated automation became available.  The process matched 
deploying units’ equipment with the required trains to get to a sea port of 
embarkation and buses to bring Soldiers to air ports, airplanes to bring unit 
Soldiers to a theater of operations, matched against the shipping time from ports 
of embarkation to ports of debarkation in the theater of operations.   
 In the end the TPFDL drove the development of courses of action for 
Somalia.  Divisional planners met twice a day for ten days, adjusting their 
proposed deployment and operational plans to respond to last minute changes to 
the mission profile, anticipated force caps and corresponding cuts in space 
allocated on aircraft and ships going to Somalia.  A prime example of a last 
minute change to both mission profile and deployment occurred on 10 December 
1992.   The deployment of Mountain Division units began on 7 December, D-2, 
when the first of seven trains departed for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey.  On 
9 December 1992, D-day, the first Marines landed in Mogadishu.  On 10 
December, D+1, the JTF commander, Marine LtGen Robert Johnson decided 
that the first Army units needed to arrive at Baledogle on 12 December, D+3.  
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This was seven days earlier than Stahl and the Mountain Division planners 
initially forecast.  A Company, 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry and the Task Force 2-
87 Infantry Tactical command post deployed by three C-141s directly into 
Baledogle to conduct a relief in place of Marine units in that town.  On 13 
December 1992, D+4, the division’s assault command post consisting of BG 
Lawson Magruder, the Assistant Division Commander for Operations and 34 
Soldiers deployed to Mogadishu.  On 19 December 1992, D+10, the division’s 
main deployment began.  TF 2-87 Infantry under the command and control of 
2nd Brigade, the 10th Aviation Brigade and TF 5-158 Aviation (from Germany) 
occupied Baledogle airfield. TF Kismayo was established in the southern Somali 
city of Kismayo with TF 3-14 Infantry and the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion. 
The Division support command and the 548th Combat Support Battalion began 
to set up operations in Mogadishu.  TF Kismayo and the 2nd Brigade 
immediately began operations to expand their areas of operation. The DISCOM 
began planning and establishing marshaling areas for the reception of equipment 
in Mogadishu.353 
  The more the division’s space allocations were cut, the more challenging it 
was for the Stahl and the division’s planners had to decide what and who to take 
to accomplish the mission.  This effort did not quite fall into accord with any 
established planning or decision making process; again, planners had to adapt 
the familiar to the unfamiliar. 
 Two of the planners involved in the effort, COL Drumm and LTC Stahl 
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later asserted that the entire approach was backwards, one that required the 
division planners to propose a definitive mission and then to argue for forces to 
accomplish the mission.  Other factors that were mostly political; adhering to UN 
resolutions, the reluctance to commit too many troops to an open ended mission 
with an implied end time but no end state, drove decisions.  The division’s After 
Action Review elaborated on the apparent disconnect between the tactical level 
planning conducted by the division staff and the strategic level planning 
conducted in Washington.  MG Arnold approved the AAR which stated that 
during the division’s planning process and development of courses of action for 
both deployment to Somalia and the conduct of operations in country, “it seemed 
as though the crisis action planning accomplished at the strategic level was 
based on an artificial force cap of 10,200, not based on a mission analysis.”  The 
challenges faced by division planners were further acerbated by a lack of 
collaborative planning between Fort Drum, Fort Bragg, Tampa and Washington.  
The operational and strategic level headquarters were not taking the challenges 
of the tactical headquarters into consideration.354  Drumm, then a major and 
SAMS graduate assigned to the division recalled that “all we were told was take 
a bit of everything and figure it out once you get there.355   
 The problem with “taking a bit of everything” and waiting until arrival in 
theater to figure out what to do was complicated by the fact that, initially, the 
planners assumed the entire division would deploy to Somalia.  In fact, and 
unknown to Arnold and his planners until late December, 1992, the Joint Staff 
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and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had imposed a cap on the U.S. forces 
that could be deployed.  In his address to the American people on 4 December 
President Bush stated that 28,000 American troops would be sent to Somalia in 
accord with UN Security Council resolution 794.  The exact process of how this 
number was reached is unknown but reflects members of the National Security 
Council staff and Defense Department reluctance to commit forces to what was 
viewed as an open ended and ill defined operation.356   
 The planners faced competing demands regarding the tasks assigned to 
the division, the potential operating area of some 21,000 square miles, and the 
need to sustain the division and other Army forces, and they were constrained to 
make use of no more than 10,200 Soldiers with which to accomplish these tasks.  
Given the critical nature of logistics to the accomplishment of what became 
designated Operation Restore Hope, Drumm was amazed that, “The most critical 
piece of equipment in the deployment to Somalia was the forklift - it got bumped 
to the third serial...”357  Clearly, limited space on air and sea-lift drove what the 
division deployed with and not the needs of the mission.   
 In their book, My Clan against the World, Drs. Robert Baumann, Larry 
Yates, and Versalle Washington described the higher level political, strategic and 
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expressed that if the Army went into Somalia, perhaps it would not be called on to go into the Balkans.  
Even so, the ARSTAFF was already looking at possible courses of action for a Balkan intervention at the 
time.” 
357
     Drumm e-mail, 18APR09. 
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operational settings that constrained this mission.  Operation Restore Hope was 
a prime example of the Clausewitzian world of post-Cold War military operations.  
In this environment the military’s needs were clearly subordinate to policy and 
political concerns.  The Department of Defense was not enthusiastic about the 
use of military force to carry out a humanitarian mission.  The White House was 
moved by humanitarian concerns but was also cognizant of the conditions that 
affected the start and finish of such an operation.  The use of force was an 
extension of policy through other means. 
 Exacerbating this situation was a lack of real intelligence on the situation 
in Somalia.  Again, as Baumann and his co-authors point out in their book, while 
the Somali people are of the same ethnic group, over centuries the Somalis 
developed an allegiance to their clan over any national form of government.358  
Clans also competed for political power within the country.  Food and the means 
to deliver and distribute it became weapons and the underlying reason for the 
cycle of starvation in the country.  None of this though was known by deploying 
U.S. forces until they arrived in theater.     
 Without being apprised regarding any of these issues, the 10th Mountain 
Division approached this assignment like any other mission.  Planners applied 
the doctrinal military decision making process, (MDMP).  Arnold’s SAMS-
educated planners laid out the tasks, developed courses of action; conducted 
rehearsals, all in accord with the familiar doctrine that was extant.  The key, 
                                                 
358
     My Clan, p. 9.  Regarding intelligence on the actual situation while the command group and 
staff of the 10th Mountain might not have known about events in Somalia, again from Spiller, there is an 
indication that “some people in the JCS J-3” understood the situation very well.  Clearly, based on 
interviews with Arnold and Drumm, this did not get to the people charged with executing the operation. 
  
237 
 
Arnold decided, was looking for indicators of longer term solutions and how to 
measure success.  Arnold said, “We had to do this because the President’s 
mission, frankly, did not make much sense.  We had to break the starvation cycle 
and leave by 20 January, the inauguration of the new President, Clinton.”  The 
task to complete the mission before the inauguration of the new administration 
was problematic-to say the least- due to challenges with the ever changing 
TPFDL, the division did not arrive in Mogadishu until 20 January. 359 
 Shortly after the division arrived in Somalia, commanders and staffs 
realized that the food needed to break the “cycle of starvation” was there on the 
ground.  The essential dilemma was bandit trouble.  Bandits under the control of 
local warlords choked off the means of distribution.  Food was a weapon for the 
warlords, and they established check points along the limited road network where 
they levied “taxes” in the form of taking food from the NGOs and aid agencies.  
The taxes ranged from with a few bags of food to seizing entire shipments. 
 This was the easiest problem Arnold and his planners had to solve.  The 
Mountain Division simply out-gunned the bandit check points.  The Mountain 
Division established armed convoys with overhead cover from attack helicopters.  
Additionally divisional units such as Task Force 2-87 Infantry made use of “flying 
check points.”  The Task Force used its motorized anti-tank platoon to conduct 
mounted patrols and set up check points at random.  These would remain in 
place for only a few hours and then move.  Somali bandits were never able to 
discern a pattern of activity.  These random check points coupled with armed 
                                                 
359
    Arnold interview. 
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convoy escorts and air support broke the back of the bandit problem.360  As 
Arnold recalled, by April 1993, almost no one in Somalia was dying from hunger.  
The mission was so successful that the “country was glutted with relief supplies.” 
Baumann wrote that by implementing a range of measures designed to establish 
a more secure environment in southern Somalia the US force and the United 
Nations Task Force in Somalia ensured that “that humanitarian aid reached 
Somalis in the famine belt.”361  This part of the mission was successful.   
 
                                                 
360
    Martin Stanton, Somalia on $5.00 a Day, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001, p. 184 and 10th 
Mountain AAR, p. 53.. 
361
    Stanton, p. 259 and My Clan, p. 76 respectively. 
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Map 2362 
 Arnold and his commanders, as well as the JTF commander, determined 
that the first and best condition the division could establish in its zone was 
security.  Arnold directed his planners to come up with four simple rules that the 
war lords and people could understand.  These were: 
No road side check points 
No visible weapons.  We realized that everyone was armed but did not 
want to allow people to carry them openly. 
No bandits 
No technicals363   
                                                 
362
     10th Mtn Somalia AAR, p. iv. 
363
    Arnold interview, Arnold, p. 31, and My Clan, pp. 64/65.  Arnold’s 4 No’s became the basis 
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These were simple rules that the people could rely on and the bandits clearly 
understood.   
 The vast majority of the people shared a common religion, Islam, although 
they were not devout per se, they shared a common language throughout the 
country and they knew their tribal lineage.  Arnold’s instinct was to work with the 
tribal chiefs and elders to get a feel for what was needed for security and 
breaking the cycle of hunger.  These tribal chiefs were the key to stability in 
Somalia.  This was a potentially powerful group that could provide some stability 
for the country, at least in the south where the Mountain Division operated.   
 The division plan, according to the after action report, recognized two 
different types of cultural awareness required for operations in Somalia; the 
Somali culture and the Non-governmental organization culture.  The Somali 
society was in chaos.  Division planners and commanders learned early that a 
key element in gaining some form of control of the security situation required 
close coordination with Somali clan elders.  The elders in Somali society retained 
a sort of authority within towns.  Early recognition of these sources of authority 
assisted in maintaining some limited control once an American or coalition 
presence was established in the areas around Somali towns.  Dealing with the 
culture of the NGO was a major factor in establishing security and delivering 
supplies to starving Somalis.  The division planners and commanders 
established a Civil-Military Operations center in Mogadishu.  Through this center 
efforts of U.S. Army forces were coordinated with NGOs, to either stay out of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
for future JTF and UNITAF proclamations on controlling weapons in Somalia.  A technical was the term 
used to describe the pick-up trucks outfitted with machine-guns that were used by Somali armed groups. 
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way of each other’s operations or to take advantage of security provided by 
military forces.  The experience gained during operations in Florida served the 
division staff well during the Somalia operation.   Stability also depended upon 
the ability to the Mountain Division to operate over extended distance. 
 One of the most challenging aspects of Restore Hope was the distance 
involved in conducting operations.  From Mogadishu (ARFOR headquarters) to 
Kismayo is over 250 miles.  It was 65 miles to Baledogle and another 125 miles 
to Baidoa.  At one point the ARFOR was controlling operations over 500 miles 
from Belet Uen to Kismayo. (See map 2)  These distances called for extended 
communications capabilities, both high frequency radios, HF and tactical satellite 
radios, TACSAT, which stretched the capabilities of the divisional signal 
battalion.  Forward area refueling and re-arming points, FARP, operations 
became critical for the use of attack and reconnaissance aviation assets and 
extended range fuel tanks for UH-60 helicopters. The ARFOR operated over an 
area in excess of 21,000 square miles.364 
 The 10th Mountain Division’s aviation assets were very limited and thus 
the scope of its operations was limited.   The division’s aviation brigade modified 
the classic planning process as the need for flexibility, agility, depth, and 
synchronization was required in the conduct of operations.  Drumm, Stahl and 
the other planners and operations officers in the division had to meticulously 
determine how to logistically support and sustain operations.  There were no 
functional airfields outside Mogadishu, thus the aviation brigade had to establish 
FARPs to conduct operations.  Establishing FARPs allowed extended helicopter 
                                                 
364
     10th Mtn AAR, p. 24. 
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operations as these aviation “gas stations” enabled the helicopters to carry more 
weight; Soldiers and equipment, armament, etc.  Establishing these “gas 
stations” also required additional forces to secure these sites.365 
 The division planners based their operations in the tenets of AirLand 
Battle.  Agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization were evident in the conduct 
of 10th Mountain Division plans and operations.  In general, division operations to 
extend the reach of security for aid agencies were conducted in accord with a 
five-phase concept.  During Phase I, Ambassador Oakley, the representative of 
the President and the UN Secretary General in Somalia would visit the selected 
area and tell the tribal elders and people that coalition forces would arrive soon.  
Oakley was always escorted by a combat air patrol of attack helicopters and a 
security detachment.  Immediately following Oakley’s visit, Phase II, the division 
used its psychological operations (PSYOP) and aviation units to drop leaflets and 
post of handbills throughout the intended area of operations.  The use of leaflets 
and handbills was limited by the fact that the U.N. estimated, in 1990, that the 
Somali literacy was 24% and the location of these literate people was not clear 
outside Mogadishu.366  Phase III was marked by the introduction of forces to 
secure the area.  Phase IV of the overall operation called for a continuation of the 
PSYOP campaign and establishing conditions for sector handover to other 
coalition forces.  These conditions were set by the use of mounted patrols, check 
points to disrupt bandit operations, and continued coordination with Somali 
village elders and NGOs.  Phase V was the redeployment of forces or the 
                                                 
365
     Drawn from Drumm e-mail, 18APR09 and the 10th Mountain AAR. 
366
     My Clan, p.9. 
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transition of operations to coalition forces.367  Airland Battle doctrine, as adapted 
to the situation, worked, at least for the first stage of the overall operation. 
 Baumann and his co-authors concluded that Operation Restore Hope was 
an unqualified success.  Baumann used the criteria developed by Central 
Command and JTF-Somalia as promulgated in the CENTCOM and JTF 
operations orders, to make this determination.  The JTF operations ended the 
worst of the famine in southern Somalia.  The security situation established by 
the U.S. led coalition allowed for an acceleration of humanitarian relief 
operations.  By the time the JTF handed over operations to the follow on United 
Nations mission, UNOSOM II, the international aid community had declared the 
“emergency” in Somalia over.368 
 This challenging operation was not executed perfectly.  There were gaps 
in planning and in conducting the mission analysis required of a very complex 
political-military operation.  The 10th Mountain Division commanders and 
planners were handicapped from the start due to late notification, and distance 
from the I MEF/JTF headquarters.  The 10th Mountain was a light infantry division 
and thus was not equipped with enough trucks and helicopters to ensure the 
sustained mobility differential needed for extended operations in Somalia.  The 
reason for the decision to dispatch the 10th Mountain Division was, apparently, 
that U.S. Forces Command and XVIII Abn Corps, while supportive of the 10th 
Mountain, were still in the grips of retaining better equipped and manned 
divisions, such as the 82nd Abn or 101st Air Assault Divisions for “a real” 
                                                 
367
     10th Mountain AAR, p.7.   
368
     My Clan, p. 88. 
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contingency.369  The arbitrary cap on U.S. forces established by a process 
unknown to the division planners also influenced the decision to deploy a “light” 
division.  Ultimately though the operation ended badly as forces were replaced, 
missions became confused, and there was no clear policy guidance from 
Washington or command guidance from Central Command.  Without this 
direction tactical effects were wasted as they were not linked to some strategic or 
policy objective.   
 JTF-Los Angeles’ civil support operations, JTF-Andrew’s hurricane relief 
operations and Operation Restore Hope are prime examples of post Cold War 
operations conducted by U.S. Army units.  Taken together, these three 
operations, categorized as operations other than war, and conducted in the 
United States and overseas, came to typify the range of operations the U.S. 
Army would face for the remainder of the 20th century.  The operations were in 
line with the Clausewitzian adage that war is an extension of policy by other 
means.  In the post Cold War era the use of military power was an extension of 
policy by other means.  The decisions taken to begin these operations were 
influenced by human events, natural events, and the pressure of a 24 hour a day 
news cycle.  These operations influenced SAMS’ curricula as well as the 
developing new version of FM 100-5. 
                                                 
369
    Drawn from my personal journals of my service at XVIII ABN Corps.  The sentiment that 
operations other than war were not on the Mission Essential Task List of the 82nd Abn and 101st AASLT 
prevailed on the Corps staff.  The 10th Mountain, a division with only two active Army brigades, the other 
brigade coming from the New York National Guard, was more suited to these type missions, according to 
the prevailing attitudes of the Corps staff and command group.  This was never written down in official 
message traffic or orders, but the attitude drove the selection of forces for these types of operations, 
especially Somalia.  There was an expectation that combat operations would be required to restore the 
situation in the Balkans and thus more combat ready divisions were held in readiness for this anticipated 
operation.  During the mid-90s the 10th Mountain would become known as the most deployed division in 
the Army as it deployed to Florida, Somalia, and Haiti. 
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 The school continued to influence its graduates as they returned to the 
field Army.  Not surprisingly, the combat experiences of officers entering SAMS 
also influenced the school.  Combat experience also shaped doctrine as well as 
the continuing discourse within the school as the writing teams therein began the 
process of writing the next version of FM 100-5.  The infusion of combat 
experienced officers into SAMS will be explored in the following chapter. 
 From the end of Operation Desert Storm and the uneasy peace that 
settled in Southwest Asia and the Balkans, School of Advanced Military Studies 
graduates on division and corps staffs adapted existing doctrine to the new set of 
circumstances they faced.  Conditions in the world were changing rapidly, and 
the ability of the SAMS graduates to apply the familiar tenets of AirLand Battle to 
this era of operations other than war served the Army well.   None of these 
operations were perfect, but they met the requirements and objectives set by 
policy.  Despite the fact that SAMS graduates, as shown in the three highlighted 
operations, adapted the doctrine the 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine was losing 
relevance.  Conditions and missions were changing in light of the changing 
political, social and ethnic forces that affected the world wide security situation.  
The Army turned to SAMS to write the doctrine that would mark the end of the 
era of AirLand Battle and bring the Army into the era of operations other than 
war, the continuing “Peace Dividend,” and a changing world.  
 
 
 
  
246 
 
Chapter Eight 
 
A Return of Tensions 
 
Dealing with the Changing Conduct of War 
 
 Just before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Hal Winton, newly retired 
from the U.S. Army and now a member of the SAMS faculty, completed a “back 
of the envelope” analysis of the assignment patterns for the first five AMSP 
classes.  Winton was concerned about the completion rate of the third phase of 
the SAMS educational experience: assignment as a general staff officer to a 
division or corps for a year.  Winton noted that the attention paid to this third 
phase of SAMS was “generally functioning well,” but that the visibility of those 
taking part in the phase three assignment was waning.  Winton related the story 
of LTG Colin Powell, while serving as commanding general of V Corps in Europe 
in 1986, sending a message to the Army deputy chief of staff, personnel, LTG 
Robert Elton, requesting permission to assign a field artillery AMSP graduate to 
the V Corps artillery instead of the corps G3 plans section.  The Chief of Staff of 
the Army, GEN John Wickham, denied Powell permission to do so.  This was 
significant evidence that the follow-on assignment of SAMS educated officers to 
general staff positions in the plans section was very important to the senior 
leaders of the Army.  Wass de Czege succeeded in convincing these leaders that 
the completion of the SAMS education took place while interacting with general 
officers in command of Army divisions and corps.  In his memorandum to the 
director, Winton recommended that the assignment packet for each AMSP 
graduate’s orders explicitly state that the officer was to be assigned to the 
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general staff, that SAMS and the personnel center were then to review 
assignments two months after graduation and to use “moral suasion” to correct 
assignment errors.  Finally, Winton proposed that phase III assignments (the 
AMSP experience was viewed as a three phase process; first was the regular 
course of CGSC, second AMSP, and phase three being the assignment to an 
Army division or corps as a planner) of AMSP graduates be a topic of discussion 
at the next Chief of Staff Army corps and division commanders’ conference.370  
Following Winton’s advice, the SAMS leadership concluded that it was necessary 
to assess the institution’s visibility and presumed value in light of what occurred 
during Operation Just Cause. 
 In the aftermath of two major combat operations and a series of 
peacekeeping operations, the School of Advanced Military Studies faced a series 
of tests.  These ranged from a downturn in volunteers, a reduction in the size of 
the Army that placed career pressures on majors in the U.S. Army, the effect of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, and a growing hostility 
toward a perceived “SAMS elite” on the part of some in of the officer corps.  The 
downturn in volunteers also lead to a perception of a lack of “quality” in SAMS 
graduates on the part of previous graduates of the school.  No real evidence 
supported this save anecdotal stories relayed by graduates back to the school 
and within the SAMS network as it existed.371  Additionally, the leadership of 
                                                 
370
    School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for Director, SAMS, Subject, AMSP 
Phase III Completion, dated 29 June 1990 held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS.   
371
    I encountered this perception personally when I assumed command of my battalion in 1998.  
My brigade commander, a SAMS graduate, told me that he would not hire any of the current SAMS 
graduates on the division staff as they were not resident CGSC graduates and were, in his words, damaged 
goods. 
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SAMS confronted a proposal to refine the Fellows’ program to produce doctors of 
Military Art & Science.  According to its advocates, among them General 
Frederick M. Franks (newly appointed commanding general of the U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command); the doctoral program was designed to meet a 
perceived need for officers with a deeper appreciation of strategy and 
campaigning.372 
 Further complicating the issues facing SAMS (and the U.S. Army), 
dramatically changing conditions in the world dictated that there be a 
reconsideration of the doctrine of AirLand Battle.  The Army was rediscovering 
new “old” missions in support of civil authorities, stability operations overseas, 
and the requirement to rapidly shift from stability operations to combat operations 
and back again, all in the same campaign.  FM 100-5, 1986, having served the 
Army well in two combat operations, was now seen as no longer relevant, given 
perceived new demands on the Army, a changing national security strategy, and 
an increase in the operating tempo due a range of challenges in the U.S. and 
overseas.  In response to this challenge, the director of SAMS established a 
Campaign Operations Group in 1992.  The major task of this group was to write 
the next version of FM 100-5.  The director established this group based on 
guidance received from Franks correctly anticipating SAMS’ involvement in the 
development of the next version of FM 100-5.  
 This chapter explores the changes and tensions facing the three directors 
                                                 
372
     In an e-mail sent on 3NOV09 GEN (ret) Franks wrote, “I remain convinced we need a PhD 
program in military arts.  Military arts is the heart of our profession. It deserves development of a 
continuing core of officers educated in the full dimensions of our profession…We have such in many other 
disciplines in and out of the Army. But we have none dedicated to the military arts.”  
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of the school who served during this turbulent period with a backdrop of two hot 
wars and operations other than war.  The directors were; COL William Janes, 
COL James McDonough, and COL Gregory Fontenot.  Hal Winton remained the 
deputy director in uniform and as a retired officer until he  abruptly departed the 
school in 1991.373 
 COL Janes became the director of SAMS in 1989 immediately after 
completing the two years of the SAMS Fellowship.  Janes was selected as 
director for a number of reasons—the most obvious being the fact that he was at 
the School when COL Holder left.  This was the easiest course of action for the 
assignment officers in the Personnel Center.  Janes was also acceptable to the 
Army’s leadership of the time.  Janes had served as an operations officer and an 
Opposing Force battalion commander at the National Training Center.  He also 
had worked with Holder during an exercise in Germany.  He was selected for 
brigade command in his last year of the Fellowship.  As Holder later said, “That 
experience, his excellence as a trainer and operator, and his knowledge of how 
the School ran all qualified him for the position.”  Holder nominated Janes, and 
GEN Maxwell Thurman, the TRADOC commander, approved the assignment.  
Holder inferred from this approval that there was no worry on the part of the Army 
senior leaders regarding any “inbreeding” as Janes had long experience in the 
Army before he was assigned to SAMS.  Janes expected to serve as the director 
                                                 
373
    Winton left the school abruptly, as there was some controversy over the process of his 
retirement and subsequent hiring as the deputy director with the grade of GS-15.  COL Janes had the 
unfortunate duty to inform Winton that his hiring was revoked and the position of deputy director was re-
opened for competition within the civil service.  Winton had done much for SAMS yet left without 
ceremony.  He moved to the Air University and assisted in the establishment of the USAF School of 
Advanced Air and Aerospace Studies, SAAS.     
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for two years prior to assuming command of an armor brigade.  Events would 
dictate otherwise, and Janes served as the director for only 18 months, from 
June 1989 to December 1990.374  Janes was the director during Operation Just 
Cause and the opening stages of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.   
The tests Janes faced were due to SAMS success as predicted in 
Sinnreich’s almost prophetic assessment at the end of his tenure as director.  
The success also came on the heels of the departure of the final director, COL 
Don Holder, having a personal relationship with any of the generals leading the 
Army.  Janes, an outstanding armor officer with great Army experience, had not 
been a member of the FM 100-5 writing teams as Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and 
Holder had been.  COL (ret) Rick Swain, Ph.D., who was then serving as the 
director of the Fellowship, later termed the beginning of Janes’ term as director 
the beginning of the “bureaucratization” of SAMS.  From Swain’s perspective, 
Janes had to deal with the immediate fallout from SAMS’ successes.  As shown 
below, the Command and General Staff College as well as the Army leadership 
began to ask SAMS to do things outside its charter of educating majors and 
lieutenant colonels for the field forces. 
  At the same time, the College demanded more attention to academic 
bureaucratic requirements as a start to gaining more control over SAMS.  The 
prime example of this interventionism was an attempt by the CGSC Directorate 
                                                 
374
     Electronic mail note from LTG (ret) Don Holder to the author, 23NOV2009.  Holder stated 
that Janes assignment was approved by the TRADOC commander and the Chief of Staff, Army.  Janes also 
had a family medical reason to remain at Fort Leavenworth.  Drawn from an interview with Mrs. Candace 
Hamm, 17NOV09.  Mrs. Hamm served with SAMS in various office positions from travel clerk to office 
manager since 1985.  Janes departed SAMS early to assume command of a brigade in Germany when it’s 
commander was relieved from duty.  Janes did not take the brigade to the Gulf War though.  
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of Academic Operations, DAO, to inject its Standards Division into the SAMS 
curriculum development process.  The Director of Academic Operations at the 
time was COL Lewis I. Jeffries.  There is no indication of malice or jealousy of the 
independent status of SAMS in any records.  The DAO Standards Division was 
primarily interested in the adherence to the requirements of academic 
bureaucracy.  As discussed in chapter one the SAMS’ faculty really did have a 
pattern of disinterest in the more mundane aspects of academic bureaucracy.   
Prior to his Army retirement in 1989, Winton conducted an annual internal 
after action review and assessment of what had transpired during that academic 
year.  Winton’s reports were 12 pages long on average.  The report was done 
and evaluated quickly enough to influence the next academic year, 1989-1990.  
After Winton left the DAO stepped in to perform this task.  The Standards 
Division began its first review in January 1990 with a briefing to Janes.  The 
survey was conducted in May 1990 and the report was finalized and sent to 
Janes as well as the entire Combined Arms Center chain of command, the 
Deputy Commandant and Commandant in October 1990, rather late to influence 
the academic year.  The report was 54 pages long.  It assessed the effectiveness 
of each course in AMSP.  The administrators of the report found that the course 
met student expectations.375   
 Janes also received very painstaking guidance concerning the preparation 
                                                 
375
    The U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Department of Academic Operations, 
Standards Division, Internal Evaluation of the Advanced Military Studies Program (October 1990), held in 
the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  The Standards Division, now titled 
Quality Assurance Division, continues to render long assessments of the programs within SAMS.  
Winton’s reports are also held in the SAMS files.  The methodology used posed statements to the students 
such as, “Ability to assess the moral, physical, and cybernetic domains from the small unit through corps,” 
and then were asked to evaluate how well a particular course in AMSP prepared the student in regards to 
the statement.  The ratings were; very effective, effective, neutral, ineffective and very ineffective. 
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of the Academic Evaluation Report, Department of the Army Form 1059.  Wass 
de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all paid appropriate attention to the form as it 
was placed in an officer’s official file.  These men wrote personal accounts of an 
officer’s work during the academic year, but that approach was not in accord with 
CGSC standards.  The required standard was “achieved course standards.”  
Since SAMS was conducted on a pass/fail basis as the CGSC policy was no one 
could exceed course standards.  Janes made the change to be in accord with 
CGSC policy.  Janes did retain the authority, as previous directors had done, to 
issue personal curriculum development guidance.376 
 Janes promulgated SAMS’ course planning guidance for academic year, 
AY, 1991/92 on 1 January 1991.  The DAO had not fully extended its influence 
into SAMS, for Janes retained the authority to develop and refine his own 
guidance for the school.  As with the previous directors, Janes retained the 
prerogative to take the school in a direction that he, along with faculty input, 
discerned from a review of the conditions facing the Army.  Janes was guided by 
his personal experience and wisdom.  He challenged the students in SAMS to 
think through problems from the Red/enemy perspective as well as Blue/friendly.  
This guidance reflected an appreciation of the changing conduct of war.  Janes 
wrote that the AY 91/92 curricula would build upon the changes in the AY 90/91 
curricula and expand upon the “significant political changes taking place globally 
                                                 
376
    Based on a discussion with Janes, 25 May 2009.  Janes was not the only director to receive 
such guidance.  McDonough also received such a memorandum, dated 25FEB93.  This memorandum was 
eight pages long and included three enclosures.  This memorandum required that “a standard boiler plate 
statement will appear on all AMSP AERs.”  The U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, 
Department of Academic Operations, Standards Division, Internal Evaluation of the Advanced Military 
Studies Program (15 February 1993), held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS.   
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and reflecting current budget constraints.”  Further, Janes directed that the 
course directors place additional emphasis on deployment and employment of 
forces, a greater consideration of the economic element of national power, and 
“an investigation of the role of religion and ideology in modern war.”377  Janes’ 
reading of intelligence data, open source reporting on the demise of the Soviet 
Union, combined with input from Schneider, Swain and Epstein, led him to 
believe that the conditions the Army would face in warfare at the end of the 20th 
century required an exploration of the re-introduction of these ancient motivations 
for warfare.  He started the process of moving SAMS beyond US-Soviet 
confrontations.  This was the only formal, written guidance Janes would issue as 
director.  Janes also faced budget challenges with which previous directors did 
not have to deal.  
 In the aftermath of two hot wars, the Army was beginning to face the 
historical national desire for a “peace dividend” as the end of the Cold War 
dawned.  Swain recalled that Janes had to go to the Commanding General on a 
monthly basis in order to ensure he had the funds to keep the school functioning.  
Swain suspected that the TRADOC commander and the Army staff required the 
Combined Arms Center to pay its own bills out of its own budget.  Janes left no 
notes in the SAMS files about this trying event.  Janes kept much of the external 
pressure on himself in order to keep it away from the faculty and the students.  
There is one copy of a briefing chart on budget in the SAMS files.  This chart 
                                                 
377
     School of Advanced Military Studies, Director’s Memorandum No. 3, School of Advanced 
Military Studies Course Planning Guidance AY 91/92, dated 1 January 1991, not paginated.  Hereafter 
cited as Director’s Memo No. 3.  Held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, 
KS.   
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outlines proposed budget cuts for the fiscal year 1994 budget.  The total 
proposed cuts totaled $90,000.  Proposed cuts ranged from reducing faculty 
professional development funds to reducing funds for guest lecturer travel.  The 
upshot of the reduced SAMS budget was the elimination of the AMSP east coast 
trip to the Pentagon and the trip to Europe.  On the positive side the Janes 
substituted a bus trip to Vicksburg and the study of Grant’s Civil War campaign.  
This trip became the highlight of the AMSP year, a capstone event where 
students put together all they learned in the course of the academic year. 378   
 The Combined Arms Center budget was being squeezed in part because 
the Battle Command Training Program was being established, and “the College 
was getting gutted for that both financially and in personnel.”  Janes worked hard 
to retain the range of trips both AMSP and the Fellows took as a crucial element 
of the education process offered by SAMS.  Swain said that this was a hard time 
for SAMS and that, “Bill Janes was my hero just for keeping the doors open.”  
Swain served as the director of the Fellows in SAMS and thus knew Janes very 
well.  Other faculty members, by design, were shielded from this turmoil as Janes 
wanted the faculty to focus on teaching.  What did all of this mean for SAMS? 379 
 SAMS was successful thus the greater College wanted to bring SAMS into 
the fold.  Janes exerted efforts to retain SAMS independence and he was 
successful to some extent.  Two major combat operations took place while Janes 
was the director.  He began the attempts to bring the curriculum into position to 
                                                 
378
     Undated chart titled SAMS Proposed Cuts (FY 94 Budget) found in the SAMS files, Room 
271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  Janes took part in long range budget discussions since the 
Army had to project costs for the annual Five Year Defense Plan. 
379
     This quotation and the one preceding drawn from a personal electronic mail note from Dr. 
Rick Swain to the author, 29 May 2009. 
  
255 
 
face these changing conditions.  Finally Janes faced the problems of a shrinking 
budget and made tough decisions to continue the quality of the SAMS education.  
There were other issues that Janes and his successors had to face given the 
changing world conditions.  The most urgent was the troubling issue that arose 
with the successful conclusion of the first Gulf War; the perception of elitism on 
the part of SAMS graduates during the conduct of planning and execution of 
combat operations.  The director that faced this issue and others was Colonel 
James R. McDonough.   
 McDonough was appointed the Director of SAMS in April, 1991.  A 1969 
graduate of West Point, McDonough had served in Vietnam as a lieutenant and 
had been decorated for valor in combat.  McDonough had earned a master’s 
degree in Political Science--with an emphasis on security studies--from MIT.  As 
a captain, he taught at West Point in the Social Sciences Department with Wass 
de Czege and Sinnreich.  He was a fellow in SAMS from 1986 to 1988 and 
served as a seminar leader.  Upon arrival at Fort Leavenworth and SAMS 
McDonough was almost immediately confronted by the issue of SAMS elitism.  
The gauntlet was thrown down by Colonel (later Major General) Carl Ernst of the 
Battle Command Training Program.  
 Ernst served as the deputy G3 of Third U.S. Army/ARCENT during the 
later planning stage and execution phase of Operation Desert Storm.  Ernst 
came to Fort Leavenworth to take charge of the Battle Command Training 
Program, BCTP, and in that capacity had seen the performance of all the 
divisions in the Army in the year before the invasion of Kuwait.  He went to Saudi 
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Arabia to assist in the combat preparation and then remained in the theater.   
 Ernst’s BCTP officers served in all Army divisions and corps, mainly in the 
operations and intelligence sections.  These positions afforded Ernst unique 
insights as his officers served as “directed telescopes” into the operations within 
the staffs.380  Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, Ernst reported to the 
commander of the Combined Arms Center, LTG Wishart about his observations 
concerning Army division and corps operations in general and SAMS graduates 
in particular. 
   Ernst believed that while the concept of SAMS was sound the special 
treatment that SAMS graduates received during the war was bad for the officer 
corps.  Worse, some SAMS graduates acted as if they were the ones wearing 
the stars of their commanders.  The fact was that the Army did comb non-
deploying units for SAMS graduates to send to headquarters that were without 
them.  These officers gained immediate access to senior generals simply 
because they were SAMS graduates.  This caused the perception among other 
officers in these organizations that the SAMS educated officers constituted a self-
serving “elite.”  From this perspective, the moniker “Jedi” was used as a 
pejorative.381   
 Ernst proposed to McDonough and Wishart that the follow-on assignment 
of SAMS graduates be changed from division and corps level to brigade level.  
                                                 
380
    A directed telescope is a term used to describe a team of officers within a headquarters that 
reports on the operations within the unit to a higher headquarters.  Ernst’s officers, trained to evaluate the 
functions of the division and corps staffs during BCTP exercises were naturally still reporting to him about 
what was going on within the units to which they were assigned.   
381
    In fact the ARMY Times newspaper ran a story about SAMS in the summer of 1992 with a 
picture of McDonough captioned, “Obi-Wan” McDonough.  McDonough did not think this was good for 
the school as it reinforced the image of an elite.  From the McDonough interview, 11 June 2009. 
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He reasoned that the last experience with troops of most SAMS graduates were 
as company grade officers, captains.  They had no practical experience as field 
grade officers, majors, with troops.  These graduates were well versed in theory 
but had trouble converting theory into practice.  Ernst proposed that after one 
year in a brigade the graduates would be better suited for service at division and 
corps level.  This proposal was not acted on, but the reports of the perception of 
elitism among and about SAMS graduates were troubling.382   
 Certainly, SAMS graduates did have a range of access to general officers 
that was extraordinary.  These officers had to produce at a high level, and by and 
large did so.  The fact that SAMS graduates were reassigned, for example, to 
round out the Third Army plans section from Army divisions that were not 
deploying to the fight caused resentment among officers that missed what they 
perceived was “THE” war of their careers.  It galled that SAMS educated officers 
upon arrival in Saudi Arabia were immediately put into responsible positions with 
access to generals that other officers who were assigned to the Third Army and 
had been in the desert from the start did not enjoy.  Ernst and his officers saw 
this situation as disruptive and evidence of a growing elitism.   
 The egalitarian tendencies of the U.S. Army officer corps would not  
 
                                                 
382
    This paragraph was based on a conversation with MG (ret) Carl Ernst on 31 March 2009 at 
Carlisle Barracks, PA.  Carlisle Barracks is the home of the Army War College.  I was a SAMS student in 
1991/92.  The students at the time understood that Ernst accused SAMS graduates of being obstructionist in 
the planning process due to blind adherence to doctrinal precepts.  McDonough related that this was a 
tempest in a tea pot and no one in the commanding general’s office took notes, the conversation was a 
disagreement among professionals.  No decision meant that SAMS would continue as it had, as well as the 
assignment process. 
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tolerate even the perception of elite and examples of privilege.383  McDonough 
dealt with this problem with a re-emphasis on the dictum of Moltke (originally 
proposed by Wass de Czege) that SAMS graduates should be more than they 
appeared to be.  McDonough also moved to refute criticisms of SAMS graduates 
from other more senior officers.   
 Then MG Barry McCaffrey returned from the first Gulf War with the 
deserved reputation as a highly effective division commander.  He quickly moved 
up in rank into the senior leadership of the Army.  McCaffrey did not write about 
his Gulf War experience but he was talking about his feelings regarding overly 
intellectual SAMS graduates to fellow general officers.  McDonough said that he 
“spoke with MG McCaffrey, whose critique could have been more condemning…”  
McDonough convinced McCaffrey to become “muted on his criticisms of SAMS, 
perhaps as much out of friendship than as a result of being convinced by my 
arguments…”  Due to these efforts McDonough felt that the criticism of SAMS 
and its’ graduates faded quickly to the “normal underswell of anti-intellectualism 
which the Army has been long noted for.”384  The discourse on SAMS value 
became more balanced due to McDonough’s efforts and the passage of time.  
This allowed McDonough to address other efforts on behalf of SAMS. 
 The long service faculty, Epstein and Schneider, felt that the curriculum 
remained applicable even as world conditions were changing and Army 
                                                 
383
     As previously cited in chapter one the Review of the Education and Training of Officers, 
RETO, study completed in the early 1970s, clearly showed that the U.S. Army officer corps did not favor 
the actual establishment of an elite corps of officers based on education and training.  This fact is the reason 
why the Army uses a central selection process with a board of impartial and randomly selected senior 
officers for choosing subordinate officers for promotion and school attendance. 
384
     Drawn from an 18 June 2009 McDonough e-mail.  
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responses to these conditions were adjusting.  Jim Schneider said that “In 
virtually all cases curriculum refinement was INCREMENTAL,” based on the 
course authors’ personal assessment during the preceding academic year.  
Course authors were not teaching the majors in AMSP, second year Fellows 
were the instructors.  The incremental changes in the curriculum were thus 
based on the past year and director guidance.  If for no other reason, however, 
conditions within the school had to adjust due to a change in the makeup of the 
student body in the aftermath of Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm.  
McDonough and his faculty, none of whom had served in Operation Desert 
Storm, found themselves confronting the implications of the arrival of combat- 
experienced officers at Fort Leavenworth.385  
 Until 1989, the only combat experience most Army officers had was as 
junior officers-lieutenants and captains-in the Vietnam War.  This changed in 
1989 with military operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf.  In the aftermath 
of these conflicts, many of the officer-students in both of the programs in SAMS 
possessed combat experience.  Indeed, the Fellows, beginning in 1991, had 
unique combat experiences, for this group consisted of officers who had 
commanded battalions in battle.  The initial vision for the school as articulated by 
Wass de Czege and his colleagues did not anticipate what changes might be 
needed in the curricula as a result of combat experienced officers.  The arrival of 
such officers had an effect on the school, the curricula, and doctrine.  The 
leadership and faculty of SAMS struggled to adapt to a changing world.  The first 
test of the adaptability of the school came with the arrival of the Fellows class of 
                                                 
385
     Drawn from an electronic mail note from Dr. Jim Schneider, 25OCT06. 
  
260 
 
91-92.  The first class of majors with combat experience arrived with the AMSP 
class of 1994.   
 Looking back on 1991, it is clear that the faculty did not realize that the 
approach to education had to change, given the combat experience of the 
officer/students and changing world conditions.  McDonough was influenced by 
his assignment in Europe during which he saw the beginning of the 
fragmentation of the continent with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
McDonough wanted to look beyond the war just fought in Kuwait and Iraq.  The 
new Fellows, recently returned from fighting that war, expected the importance of 
their recent combat experience to be taken into account in the curriculum and 
instruction.  This situation in SAMS represented an example of the traditional 
dichotomy in the Army, the tension between the warrior and the intellectual.  The 
RETO study of 1978 highlighted this tension.   
 As discussed in Chapter 1 just over 21% of the officer corps felt that the 
Army needed more doers, less thinkers and while not opposed to more schooling 
were opposed to a perceived elite.  The Army officer corps equated a perceived 
elite with line officers who were advanced based on education alone and not field 
performance. McDonough’s experience as a Fellow and as the military assistant 
to General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, influenced the 
approach he would take as the director of the school.    
When McDonough arrived at Fort Leavenworth in April, 1991 he found a 
program in some disarray.  The school, while not rudderless, in McDonough’s 
assessment, was subject to the independent direction of the seminar leaders.  
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McDonough’s assessment was that the seminar leaders “had grown very big for 
their britches.”  These officers, successful up to that point but concerned because 
they had missed Operation Desert Storm, were giving more attention to their 
subsequent assignments rather than the majors in their seminars.  This was 
McDonough’s assessment of the immediate situation.  McDonough’s assessment 
of the Fellows from the class of 90-92, was more positive.  These officers were 
preparing properly to lead seminars and accomplish the other tasks they would 
face in his first full academic year as the director.386    
 McDonough’s assessment of the world situation drove the direction he 
took with the curriculum of the school.  This direction set conditions for the 
tension of expectations.  When he arrived in April, 1991, the majors were 
conducting the end of course exercise.  Supported by a team from the Battle 
Command Training Program, they were analyzing a battle set in the central 
region of Europe.387  McDonough was dismayed to see this exercise being 
conducted, a defense of the Fulda Gap in the former West Germany, especially 
given the fact as the Berlin Wall had come done in 1989.  He worried that SAMS 
was in danger of “falling into the normal trap of preparing for the last war.”388  
McDonough moved aggressively to correct this situation.  
                                                 
386
    McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07.  Fellows from the class of 89-91 would not go “on the record” 
to discuss this but in general denied being focused on their own assignments at the price of neglecting the 
majors.  MG Joe Martz and COL (ret) Mark French, AMSP students at the time, recalled that there was a 
general feeling among the majors that everybody in school was concerned about how they would be 
received in units that had been in combat when they were in school. 
387
     The Battle Command Training Program, BCTP, was the training center for U.S. Army 
division and corps headquarters.  The focus of the program was to prepare these two and three-star 
command headquarters to execute and sustain high intensity combat operations.  At the time the opposing 
force was based on the latest interpretation of Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine and used the latest Soviet 
military equipment.  
388
     McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07 and interview 11JUN09. 
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McDonough’s tour of duty as the military assistant to General Galvin 
exposed him to the coming military problems the United States Army faced in the 
latter part of the 20th Century.  He observed the political dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, Poland, and other 
former Warsaw Pact nations.  The successful conclusion of the fighting to eject 
Iraq from Kuwait demonstrated the dominance of the U.S. military on 
conventional battlefields.  The question that arose following this demonstration of 
dominance was what would be the form of war in the future.  
The literature of the time explored the forms and functions of future war.  
For example, Heidi and Alvin Toffler wrote an influential book, WAR AND ANTI 
WAR, in 1993.  This book was widely read, especially in the Army.  The Toffler’s 
suggested that the world was not facing the end of history rather “the end of 
equilibrium.”  The Tofflers wrote, “Ethnic vendettas generate ethnic battles that 
generate ethnic wars larger than a given region can contain.”  Ken Booth wrote 
Strategy and Ethnocentrism in 1979.  This book explored the link and potential 
utility of ethnocentrism in the development of national strategy, and how to 
recognize this trait in strategists.  Paul Kennedy wrote The Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers in 1987 in which he explored the notion of strategic over reach on the 
part of great powers.  Finally, Michael Walzer wrote Just and Unjust Wars in 
1993.  Walzer explored the utility of just war theories in light of changing world  
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conditions and, possibly, the need for external intervention to stop genocide.389  
Reflecting current thinking, McDonough intended to take both programs “into 
possible scenarios for future wars.” 390  He encountered resistance from faculty 
and some high-ranking supporters of SAMS but pushed ahead. 
McDonough’s answer to overcoming what he saw as, “some bit of 
bureaucratic inertia and staid intellectualism …,”391   was to bring in a variety of 
speakers and thinkers on war.  The list ranged from historian Martin van Creveld 
to journalist Robert Kaplan.  At the time, van Creveld had recently published The 
Transformation of War, a review of the changing conduct of war during the latter 
part of the 20th century.  Kaplan, a journalist, was traveling extensively and had 
just published Balkan Ghosts, his review of the forces involved in the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia.392  
In 1991, BG William Steele, deputy commandant of CGSC, began to issue 
very broad guidance as to the direction the college would take in education.  
McDonough wrote his own guidance for inclusion into this broad statement and 
subsequently issued further guidance to the SAMS faculty.393  From the beginning 
of SAMS to this point, the directors enjoyed the unique privilege of determining 
the direction the school would take in terms of educating the Army’s planners.  
                                                 
389
     Alvin and Heidi Toffler, WAR AND ANTI WAR Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 
New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993, pages 249 and 251 respectively.  See also Ken Booth, 
Strategy and Ethnocentrism, London: Croon Helm, 1979, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers, New York: Random House, 1987, and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
390
    All quotations from the McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07.  McDonough would not name the 
high ranking supporters of SAMS who opposed his direction for the curricula. 
391
     McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07. 
392
     See Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: The Free Press, 1991, and 
Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 
393
    Memorandum for School Directors from the Deputy Commandant, CGSC, dated June 1991, 
Subject: Guidance for AY 91/92, held in the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, 
KS.  McDonough told me in an interview on 11JUN09 he wrote his own guidance for this memo. 
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The director issued guidance based on his interpretation of the current conditions 
facing the Army.  McDonough was uniquely qualified in this regard given his 
previous assignment serving GEN Galvin.394   
In 1992, McDonough had both the Fellows and majors programs conduct 
exercises in the Balkans, far in advance of any U.S. involvement in the region.  
McDonough said that he did not seek permission to conduct an “operation other 
than war” exercise in the Balkans.  During an interview in 2009, he stated that he 
figured that once the directive was written and staffed for approval the AMSP 
class of 1997 might be able to conduct such an exercise.  In the tradition of 
Winton and Johnson, McDonough sought forgiveness as opposed to 
permission.395   
 McDonough himself taught a course to the entire student body on the 
subject of ethics and command.  The purpose was to go into greater detail 
regarding the ethical and moral concerns of leadership in war.  McDonough felt 
that since the Army would be conducting more and more operations other than 
war Army units would face ethically challenging situations.  The course 
McDonough taught was on leadership, from platoon and company to the division 
level.  The key element of the course was how the actions of the general 
commanding a division set the tone for the leadership climate throughout the 
division.  The course material included readings from the Peers Commission 
                                                 
394
    As amazing as this appears the privilege of the director of SAMS issuing guidance based on 
his own experience continues to the present.  When I served as the director I received no detailed guidance 
on how to lead SAMS.  The closest guidance I received was from GEN Peter Schoomaker, the Chief of 
Staff, Army.  On 14 June 2004 I briefed him on the direction SAMS would take and after showing him just 
one chart he stopped me and said, “Kevin, I trust you.  Do what you think is right.”  
395
     McDonough interview, 11JUN09. 
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Report on My Lai, and essays about My Lai.396   
 The key demand on McDonough was the need for a new version of FM 
100-5 in light of the changing conditions of warfare in the latter years of the 20th 
century.  McDonough knew that he was going to be deeply involved in the 
development and writing of the 1993 version of the FM.  To sustain this effort 
McDonough established the Campaign Operations Group on 1 June 1991.  This 
group’s purpose was to act as the “operational art spokesman for SAMS.”  One 
of its 20 functions was, “Develop, coordinate, write and publish the next 
generation FM 100-5, Operations.”397  GEN Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army 
directed that LTG Thomas Carney, his deputy chief of staff for personnel, 
DCSPER, assign officers to Fort Leavenworth in support of this effort.  These 
officers would work for McDonough.   
 McDonough related that shortly after he arrived at Fort Leavenworth he 
received a call directly from LTG Carney.398  Carney asked McDonough for a list 
of officers he wanted to work for him in the re-writing effort.  McDonough said 
that had he been savvier he would have asked Carney for some time to reflect 
and then checked in with his immediate superior, LTG Wishart, the commanding 
general of the Combined Arms Center.  As it was McDonough said that since 
                                                 
396
     All quotations on this page are from the McDonough e-mail, 6MAR07.  The My Lai 
massacre occurred in March, 1968 and became public knowledge in November 1969.  The Peers 
Commission Report investigated the breakdown of leadership and command responsibility that allowed the 
incident and subsequent attempt at a cover-up to take place.  The author was in SAMS at that time and very 
clearly remembers this class.  McDonough made us think about what it really meant to be an officer and 
what the burden of command and being a leader really meant.  
397
     Director’s Memorandum Number 5, dated 1 June 1991, Campaign Operations Group 
Purpose, Mission and Functions.  Held in the SAMS papers, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS. 
398
    Principal Army staff general officers at this time in Army history were the Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics.  These general officers were known informally as 
the DCSPER, DCSINT, DCSOPS, and DCSLOG, or “des-per,” des-ops,” etc.   
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Carney was calling in the name of the Chief of Staff he should answer the 
question at that moment.  LTG Wishart was not very pleased, as McDonough 
recalled when he found out that incoming officers were diverted from positions in 
the college to work in the SAMS campaign operations group.399 
 McDonough’s initial efforts in the development of a précis of FM 100-5 
included everybody in the school from the majors in AMSP to the Fellows.  He 
established ad hoc writing teams to flesh out ideas that may or may not enter into 
doctrine.  He felt that future doctrine should be expanded to incorporate our 
evolving missions in areas such as stability operations, nation assistance and 
assisting in the interruption of the flow of contraband and illegal drugs into the 
U.S.  Indeed McDonough wrote an essay for Military Review in which he said, 
“The Army may well participate in each of these as our nation seeks to assist 
emerging nations, instill democratic values and establish legitimate political and 
economic institutions in the process.”400  McDonough implied that the era of 
AirLand Battle was over as the Army sought to change doctrine in light of 
changing world conditions and a change in the national security policy.   
 The National Security Strategy of 1991 stated: “Shaping a security 
strategy for a new era will require an understanding of the extraordinary trends at 
work today -- a clear picture of what has changed and what has not, an accurate 
sense of the opportunities that history has put before us and a sober appreciation 
of the dangers that remain.”  The NSS posed a series of questions ranging from: 
“What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular, 
                                                 
399
     McDonough interview, 11JUN09. 
400
    James R. McDonough, “Building the New FM 100-5: Process and Product,” Military Review, 
Vol. 71, No. 10, 1991, p. 8. 
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poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional 
instabilities?” to, “How should we think about these new military challenges and 
what capabilities and forces should we develop to secure ourselves against 
them?”  Consideration of these questions led McDonough to adjust the 
curriculum of SAMS.401   
 Further, President Clinton reviewed Presidential Review Directive # 13, an 
adjustment of U.S. policy regarding U.S. participation in UN led peacekeeping 
operations, and then issued Presidential Decision Directive, PDD, 25, on 3 May 
1994.  The PDD established U.S. policy on reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations. The directive was the product of a year-long interagency policy 
review “and extensive consultations with dozens of Members of Congress from 
both parties.”  The policy represented a comprehensive framework for U.S. 
decision-making on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement “suited to 
the realities of the post Cold War period.”  The policy stated that peace operation 
could not be the center piece of U.S. foreign policy but recognized that this type 
of operation could serve U.S. interests in preventing small regional conflicts from 
spreading into a wider conflict.  The directive outlined specific steps to ensure the 
U.S. could engage in selected UN operations and make these more effective.  
Consideration of the questions posed in the 1991 National Security Strategy and 
the steps outlined in the Presidential Decision Directives played a role in the 
refinement of FM 100-5.402  
                                                 
401
    The National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, found at The Defense 
Strategy Review Page sponsored by The Project for Defense Alternatives, posted at http://www.comw.org. 
402
    Presidential Review Directive #13 and Presidential Decision Directive 25, found at The 
Defense Strategy Review Page sponsored by The Project for Defense Alternatives, posted at 
  
268 
 
 Overseeing the drafting of this new doctrine was a major effort for 
McDonough, and it consumed a great deal of his time as director.  This was an 
important task as this new doctrine would, conceivably, take the Army to the end 
of the century and guide it through the uncertain period that began with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  McDonough built a case for the new doctrine in a 
series of articles for Military Review.  In one he wrote that Army doctrine was no 
longer simply AirLand Battle.  This doctrine was, “steeped in the Cold War 
assumptions of a forward defense (such as forces in place, a predictable threat, 
supporting infrastructures for resource buildup and movement…)”  McDonough’s 
essays introduced new concepts to the Army such as, full-dimensional 
operations, a force–projection Army and reminded all that Army units will, 
“normally act in conjunction with air, naval and space assets and seldom be 
involved in operations outside the United States separate from the forces of allied 
nations.”403    
 The new version of the doctrine introduced five new concepts in the 
conduct of operations.  Franks insisted on introducing the concept of battle 
command.  Based on his experiences as a corps commander during Operation 
Desert Storm, Franks' intent was that this concept ensure that a commander-not 
command post-centered construct was the focus of combat power.  This was a 
signal to research and development efforts that wherever the commander was on 
the battlefield the commander would have the ability to command.  Franks and 
McDonough believed that the demands of the modern battlefield required the 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.comw.org. 
403
     James D. McDonough, Versatility: The Fifth Tenet, in Military Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 
12, December 1993. pp. 11-14.  Both citations on page 12. 
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ability to rapidly shift “from a process-oriented control system within a tightly 
structured and linear battlefield framework to a commander-oriented method of 
commanding forces.”  Franks envisioned a form of warfare where a commander 
and a smaller staff had immediate access to information and intelligence.  This 
access would be from wherever the commander and his staff felt they needed to 
be on the battlefield to exercise command.404  The second concept expanded the 
concept of the battlefield to the battle space. 
 Franks and McDonough felt that post-Desert Storm operations required a 
new way to view the area of operations.  The concept of battle space was 
needed to expand Army thinking beyond the linear constructs of the Cold War.  
Based on his experience in Desert Storm Franks believed that “battle does not 
have to be linear or contiguous and that concentrating effects, not necessarily 
always forces, is the aim of mass.”405  The other concepts reflected both Desert 
Storm experience and a realization that the Army would be reduced in size as a 
result of the end of the Cold War and the apparently successful conclusion of 
Desert Storm.   
 The final doctrinal concepts were depth and simultaneous attack and force 
projection and early entry.  Decisive victory, the doctrine asserted, required 
simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the battle space.  This concept built 
upon the notion of strategic shock through the combined effect of tactical and 
operational efforts that would overwhelm an enemy‘s ability to respond with 
effective command and control.  Force projection and early entry reflected the 
                                                 
404
      Frederick M. Franks, Jr., “Full Dimension Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change,” in 
Military Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 12, December 1993, p. 8.  Hereafter cited as Franks. 
405
    Franks, p. 9. 
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reality that as the Army was reduced in size the Army would come back to the 
continental United States and thus had to consider going to the war as a matter 
of fact; rather than the forward stationing in the central region of Germany.  Since 
a deployment might take the Army anywhere, the Army had to be able to project 
power everywhere.  This also realized that the Army needed to fight with the Air 
Force and the Navy to get to the conflict zone.  The doctrine recognized the 
importance of intelligence and logistics to both set conditions for success and to 
sustain operations over distance.  In an effort to reduce the size of deployed 
headquarters the idea of split based operations was also introduced into doctrine.  
This was the concept of keeping analysts at a home base relying on links to the 
forward deployed headquarters.   
 McDonough proposed the addition of a fifth tenet to the four that defined 
AirLand Battle.  Full Dimension Operations would require versatile Army units-- 
thus the tenet of versatility.  The concept was defined as: 
Versatility is the ability of units to meet diverse mission 
requirements.  Versatility is the ability of tactical units to adapt to 
different missions and tasks, some of which may not be on the unit 
mission-essential task lists (METL).  Versatility denotes the ability 
to perform in many roles and environments during war and 
operations other than war.  It allows for the smooth transition from 
one mission to another.406  
 
McDonough cited the experiences of the Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division 
as the essence of versatility.  As discussed earlier, the Mountain Division 
assisted in the recovery from the effects of Hurricane Andrew then a few weeks 
following the return of the division to upstate New York the division was sent to 
disarm warlords and assist in the delivery of food to starving people in Somalia.  
                                                 
406
     FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-9. 
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Based on the efforts required of the Mountain Division Franks said, “We needed 
to include operations other than war in our doctrine…it was apparent [after 
Andrew] that the Nation expected us…as a servant of the Nation…to serve the 
Nation and conduct a range of operations that don’t exactly look like combat…”407  
The effort to write this new doctrine involved the entire school; faculty and 
students.  The SAMS push to write the pivotal FM 100-5, 1993 was a success for 
the Army, for this doctrine would guide the Army into the uncertain era of the 
Peace Dividend and that period when U.S. Army units were employed in a range 
of operations other than war.  The final major test that McDonough faced in this 
turbulent tenure as director was an extension of the bureaucratization of SAMS 
and again a result of the successes of SAMS and its graduates.  GEN Franks 
and GEN Sullivan came to believe there was a need for officers educated at the 
doctoral level in the military arts and science, and that SAMS was the perfect 
place for this to happen. 
 On 1 July 1992, the commanding general of the Combined Arms 
Command, LTG Wilson A. Schoffner, received a formal memorandum from the 
commanding general of Training and Doctrine Command, GEN Frederick Franks.  
The memo directed Schoffner to study the feasibility of establishing a doctoral 
level program in military arts and science.  Franks’ intent in establishing this 
program was to develop a body of officers who possessed an in-depth education 
in military arts and science beyond that offered in the Advanced Military Studies 
curriculum.  Franks also directed that Schoffner coordinate this effort with the 
                                                 
407
     Franks interview, 27NOV09. 
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commandant of the Army War College.408  Franks’ memo was not unexpected as 
interest in such a program had manifested itself much earlier. 
 Dr. Robert H. Berlin, deputy director of SAMS, provided documentation of 
a meeting that took place on 27 February 1992 to consider the idea of developing 
a doctoral program in military art and science at the Command and General Staff 
College.  This memo detailed the origins of the effort to develop a doctoral or 
professional degree program.  On 27 February 1992 Berlin met with Dr. Phil 
Brookes, director of the graduate degree program at CGSC, and Brookes told 
Berlin of the results of an earlier meeting with GEN Saint, LTG Schoffner, BG 
Steele, and COL McDonough during which Steele asked Brookes to sketch out a 
plan by May 1992.409  Berlin and Brookes were both skeptical of this notion from 
the start.  They were not convinced that the idea was fully thought through but 
worked with CGSC leaders to explore the concept.  This would be a two year 
effort.  
 The Army had long sent selected officers to obtain graduate schooling at 
the doctoral level.  One example was the Military Academy’s permanent 
professor program that began in 1963.  Officers selected for this program 
remained at the Military Academy for the remainder of their careers.  Officers 
who opted to become “intellectuals” remained at the War College or the Military 
Academy.  The Army gained from their knowledge, but these officers did not lead 
                                                 
408
     Department of the Army.  Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.  
Memorandum for Lieutenant General Wilson A. Schoffner, Commander U.S. Army Combined Arms 
Command, Subject: Doctorate of Military Arts and Science.  Dated 1 July 1992.  Held in the SAMS 
records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
409
     Headquarters, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.  School of Advanced Military Studies.  
Memorandum for Record.  Subject: Doctorate Degree for CGSC/SAMS, dated 27 February 1992.  Held in 
the SAMS records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  
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the Army.  Wass de Czege hinted at the history of the Army placing officers into 
masters’ degree and Ph.D. programs in his study of the Command and General 
Staff College.  He wrote that while the Army thought nothing of sending an officer 
to school for years to learn the intricacies of the comptroller specialty the Army 
would balk at equal time learning the intricacies of warfare.  For the Army war 
was best learned in the field.410 
 Brookes and Berlin, working with McDonough, sorted out the details of a 
proposal for Schoffner to send to Franks.  The ad hoc group looked into the 
requirements for establishing a doctoral program.  The major points of the effort 
would be meeting the requirements of national level accreditation of the program 
and a broadening of the disciplinary backgrounds of the faculty.  Based on this 
perceived need, SAMS hired two political science professors; Dr. William Gregor 
and Dr. Ernest Evans.  The ad hoc group decided that the best possible 
candidates for this program would be the Fellows.  The Fellows for the pilot 
program year would be specially selected for officers who were certain to be 
selected to promotion for colonel but would not likely be selected for brigade 
command.411 
 LTC Ben Elley, a second year Fellow at SAMS at the time, wrote the 
memorandum that contained the outline of the plan to implement a pilot doctoral 
program for a course of studies in military art and science.  The document 
contained a synopsis of the steps required to reach accreditation, facilities, 
                                                 
410
     See Wass de Czege’s paper CGSC Advanced Studies Program held in the Combined Arms 
Research Library.  For information on the USMA Permanent Professor Program see 
http://www.library.usma.edu/index.cfm?TabID=3&LinkCategoryID=23#57 
411
     McDonough interview, 11JUN09 and found in handwritten notes done by Dr. Bob Berlin in 
a file labeled AOASF Semester program, in the SAMS files, room 271, Eisenhower Hall. 
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potential students, and a cost estimate.  At this time, there was no record of any 
interaction with local civilian universities regarding the management of Ph.D. 
programs, nor any input from the CGSC Advisory Board.  All work was done 
within Army channels.  Schoffner accepted this proposal and forwarded it up the 
line.  He believed that the program would fill a “current void” at the military 
strategic level by providing a “bank of experts who can operate at the strategic 
level in a political-military environment that faces an uncertain future.”  The 
potential students for the program would be lieutenant colonels who were 
successful battalion commanders but would not likely be selected for brigade 
level command.  Nonetheless, these individuals would have the potential for 
service on regional combatant commander staffs or on the Joint Staff.  The staff 
and faculty of SAMS estimated the start up costs to be $750,000 and proposed 
to launch a pilot program in academic year 1993/94.412   
  GEN Franks accepted the proposal as transmitted.  Franks presented the 
concept to GEN Sullivan, the Chief of Staff, Army and received his approval.  
Franks then directed the Combined Arms Center and Command and General 
Staff College to begin the process to establish a doctoral program.  The deputy 
commandant, BG Steele, instructed the assistant deputy commandant, COL Dick 
Gibson, to run the coordinating office and named McDonough as the leader of 
the doctoral program.  Steele sent an electronic mail note to Gibson saying, 
“CSA bought into our proposal to have a doctoral program…CG, TRADOC told 
us to do it.”  The intent was to begin with an unaccredited program with the 
                                                 
412
    Official message from Commander, USACAC to Commander TRADOC, dated 26 August 
1992.  Subject Doctorate of Military Art and Science Program.  Held in the SAMS records, room 271, 
Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  
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Fellows class of 1992-94.  Gibson was to coordinate “an execution timeline within 
the DA staff, TRADOC and CGSC” to ensure the program started in 1992.  
Steele concluded by writing that he saw Gibson “as the coordinating office with 
Jim McDonough as the spear point.”413  The program effort began with 
McDonough but faded away as the principals initially involved in the effort retired 
or were transferred.  In the end SAMS never did develop a doctoral program in 
military art and science.  It is interesting to speculate on the potential pros and 
cons of a SAMS doctoral program.  There was real potential for senior officers 
with Ph.D.’s in strategy and operational art to serve at the regional combatant 
command level.  The Fellows program would receive the same treatment as the 
majors regarding the special handling of the follow-on assignments.  The 
planning directorates of these headquarters would have received extremely well 
educated officers specially selected for staff work at higher levels of command.  It 
is not too far a stretch to imagine that the regional war plans would be written at a 
much higher level and with a greater appreciation of the nuances of policy.  The 
con side of that future was AMSP would lose its connection with the Fellows.  
SAMS would have to cajole the Army personnel system for seminar leaders of 
                                                 
413
     Office of the Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College.  
Electronic mail note dated Monday, 24 August 1992, subject: Doctoral Program.  Sent to COL Dick 
Gibson, assistant deputy Commandant, Dr. Phil Brookes, Dr. Roger Spiller, and COL Jim McDonough.  
The e-mail is the initiating document for the execution of an unaccredited program in the coming academic 
year and naming McDonough as the lead agent, supported by Drs. Brookes and Spiller.  Held in the SAMS 
records, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  Body of the note is below, original all in 
lower case. dick: csa bought into our proposal to have a doctoral program within oes; cg, tradoc told us to 
do it.  based upon sams work up cg, tradoc was told we could start an unaccredited program next year with 
the incoming aosf officers for 75-1m.  general franks said to move out. now need to get on an execution 
timeline with an integrated program within the da staff, tradoc and cgsc to get the program going beginning 
next year.  Call together director sams, phil brookes, dao, and roger spiller to lay the campaign plan to 
execute.  Will need to see the campaign plan and present to the cg for approval mid-september.  Keep me 
informed as you work the plan; happy to participate along with you or give additional guidance as 
necessary. i see you as the coordinating office with jim mcdonough as the spear point.  Held in the SAMS 
files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.   
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the same caliber as the Fellows in order to retain the high quality of education the 
Army expected.  As discussed earlier, Wass de Czege realized this was a battle 
he could not win and was one of the reasons why he persuaded Army senior 
leaders to establish the Fellows program.  In the end this program was not 
launched as the interest at the senior leader level was not sustained and multiple 
difficulties were uncovered not the least was the issue of accreditation.  
McDonough also had to judge the effect of two wars on the curricula and how to 
adjust it.    
 Operation Just Cause was a coup de main and was concluded, in the 
eyes of some of the participants, very quickly and successfully.  The first war 
against Iraq, Operation Desert Storm, was over very quickly, four weeks of air 
operations followed by 100 hours of ground operations.  The initial analysis was 
based on a feeling of complete success, success that could breed passivity.  
McDonough recognized this intuitively in his appreciation of the staid (some 
would say arid) intellectualism within the school.   
His experience with the second-year Fellows in the school when he 
arrived in early 1991 likely reinforced his impression that he needed to move 
quickly to shake up the school and refocus on future fights the Army might face.  
The new Fellows brought an appreciation of high-intensity combat and the 
confusion of battle that comes from experiencing the fact that no plan can look 
with certainty beyond initial contact with an enemy.  Wass de Czege’s initial 
vision for the school was to produce majors who would return to the Army and 
raise the general level of understanding of war within the officer corps.   
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The operations other than war that the Army conducted at this time were 
beginning to have an effect, as shown, on the changing doctrine that would guide 
the Army and in the curricula of the school.   
As a measure of the changing conduct of war and the changing 
considerations of the concepts underpinning operational art in the fall term of 
academic year 1991/92 Professors Bob Epstein and Jim Schneider held a 
debate on the origins of operational art.  While both men were educated as 
historians, Schneider was the theorist in SAMS.  Epstein traced the roots of 
operational art to the campaigns of Napoleon.  Napoleon communicated his 
operational design through instructions to his Marshals and the use of the 
battalion carre or battalion square of corps.  Acting as the head of state and 
commander-in-chief in the field Napoleon and his Marshalls conducted policy at 
the point of the bayonet.  Napoleon, as Epstein put it, used war to extend the 
French Empire and conclude treaties favorable to France.  Schneider held an 
alternate view.  He believed that the origin of operational art was a Russian 
refinement on the campaigns of U.S. Grant during the American Civil War.  
Grant, acting as the commanding general of the armies instructed the Union 
armies in the west and east to operate in accord with his intent, to constantly 
attack the armies of the Confederacy.   Grant made use of the command and 
control technology of the time, the telegraph.  The Russian Red Army leadership 
in the 1920s, according to Schneider, studied the campaigns of Grant and 
incorporated the execution of modern campaigns with the radio, the airplane and 
the tank.  Schneider’s argument was operational art was a 20th century 
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phenomenon as the true expression of operational art required sustained 
duration campaigns linked from the lead tank to the operational level 
headquarters all acting in accord with a common intent and with the ability to 
adjust as conditions dictated.414  The students in SAMS at the time were split 
regarding who “won” the debate.  The origin and the changing nature of what 
constituted operational art and the operational level of war carried over into the 
tenure of COL Greg Fontenot, the sixth director of SAMS. 
 Fontenot was the first AMSP graduate to become the director of SAMS.  
He was a member of the second class in AMSP and studied under Wass de 
Czege, Sinnreich and Holder.  Fontenot commanded a tank battalion during 
Operation Desert Storm and was decorated for valor.  He served as the initiatives 
group director for GEN Franks and was intimately familiar with the development 
and writing of the 1993 version of FM 100-5.  His tenure as director of SAMS 
included the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the school.  Fontenot faced a 
decreasing pool of officers willing to volunteer for AMSP due to the pressures of 
a shrinking Army and the majors’ timeline and becoming qualified in a branch of 
service in key field grade positions; battalion operations officer, S3, executive 
officer, XO, and brigade operations officer, S3.  Fontenot, as his predecessors, 
retained the four seminar structure in AMSP.  He worked very hard to fill the 
seats with the kind of quality officers he felt the Army required as SAMS 
graduates.  His most immediate difficulties though were deconstructing the 
doctoral program, acting as a planning staff adjunct during saber rattling 
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    I favored Schneider as I felt his was the more persuasive argument.  Sadly the tape of this 
debate was destroyed in a routine cleaning of a storage closet.  It was taped in an old version of a VHF tape 
and was incompatible with more modern machines.  Not knowing what was on the tape it was destroyed.   
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conducted by Saddam Hussein, and providing support to the CGSC exercise 
Prairie Warrior and the Army Warfighting Experiment on future division designs. 
 Overall the SAMS flirtation with a doctoral program faded away but there 
were practical elements left over that Fontenot had to deal with as the director.415  
First of all there were several Fellows who had been specifically recruited into the 
program to be the first Army doctors of military arts and science.  Fontenot’s 
solution to this was to propose a trial whereby these Fellows would focus on a 
regional combatant command through in depth study and also service while a 
Fellow as an intern on the regional commander-in-chief’s personal staff or J5 
Plans and Policy staff section.  Over the course of the two years of the 
Fellowship these officers would also attend the Joint Professional Military 
Education level II schooling at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, 
Virginia.  This effort had the second order effect of requiring permanent seminar 
leaders for AMSP. 
 This effort did not last.  As Wass de Czege predicted from the beginning of 
the program the Personnel Center could not sustain an effort of selecting well 
                                                 
415
     Dr. Bob Berlin left three key memoranda for record, MFR, in the SAMS files as well as his 
handwritten notes on the demise of the doctoral program in 1993 and 1994.  In his hand written notes dated 
27April93 Berlin recorded a meeting on AOASF and penned “Many, many administrative and curricular 
programs, not thought out - no real regard for implications.”  In an MFR dated 2FEB94 Berlin recorded his 
notes from a conversation with Prof. Ted Wilson of the University of Kansas.  Wilson and Berlin spoke 
about Wilson’s meeting with KU administrators regarding a possible affiliation with KU for granting a 
Ph.D.  Berlin recorded that while no one at KU said no they were very concerned about the costs involved.  
On his hand written notes from this conversation, and significantly not recorded on the official MFR was 
“in some way has to be a KU program.”  This was the deal breaker as SAMS and CGSC would not 
relinquish control of an Army program to a civilian university.  In an electronic mail note dated 03/09/94 
Dr. Phil Brookes related a conversation he had with Prof. Wilson on that date regarding setting up a 
meeting at KU, the purpose of which was to garner KU support for the Ph.D. initiative.  The final MFR was 
dated 29 March 1994, almost two full years after the concept was first proposed.  In this MFR Berlin 
related a conversation with Wilson in which Wilson advised that he had received “negative comments 
concerning affiliation between KU and CGSC on and AOASF Ph.D. program.  Wilson recommended that a 
meeting scheduled for 5 April be delayed for two weeks.  The files have no other reference to the Ph.D. 
program. 
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educated, well experienced lieutenant colonels for three years assignments as 
teachers at the School of Advanced Military Studies.  The competing demands 
for this type of “quality” officer were too great.  The risk of having a “slightly 
above average” officer teaching the caliber of officers in AMSP was too great and 
after the initial two year trial of Fellows as joint interns the school went back to 
using second year Fellows as seminar leaders for AMSP.  While some senior 
leaders in the Army, Franks and Sullivan, perceived a knowledge gap and a need 
for more highly educated officers in the particular discipline of arms this program 
was doomed to failure from the start.  The real difficulties of getting this program 
accredited by the civilian academic community and then accepted even within 
the Army never allowed for conditions of success to develop.416  Fontenot had 
other problems to deal with, one in particular in the world of operational planning. 
 Operation Desert Storm appeared to end decisively, but Saddam Hussein 
was still in power in Iraq.  Moreover, with the perceived decisive finish to the war 
the Army personnel system went back to assigning officers in accord with the 
needs of the Army.  The needs of the Army placed SAMS graduates, by and 
large, in Army divisions and corps and on staffs that enjoyed a much higher 
priority than the Army component of U.S. Central Command, the Third U.S. 
Army.  The team of “long ball hitters” that assembled in Third Army during Desert 
Storm had moved on.  Saddam, however, was still in place. 
 In 1994 and again in 1995 Saddam rattled his sabers and the U.S Army 
was directed to send a reinforced brigade to Kuwait.  Third Army was the 
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    Interview with COL (ret) Greg Fontenot on 1 June 2009.  The original tape of this interview 
and the transcript are held on the third floor of the Combined Arms Research library.  Hereafter cited as 
Fontenot interview, 1JUN09. 
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controlling land force headquarters and faced the problem of developing sound 
plans with a limited planning staff.  The commander of the Third Army at the time, 
LTG Steven Arnold, asked for help from the school.  Fontenot responded by 
going to Third Army himself, accompanied by students from AMSP and the 
Fellowship.  This event set a precedent that was not seen at the time.  Where 
McDonough had used the student body of SAMS as adjunct support for the 
writing effort on FM 100-5, Fontenot now used the study body as ad hoc planners 
for actual headquarters engaged in planning operations that had the potential of 
being executed.   
 This effort, though short in duration and, it must be said wildly popular with 
the students, became rather widely known in and outside the Army.  Planning 
exercises, Army war-games, and other worthy events were now placed on the 
school as “educational experiences” for the SAMS students.  While it is true that 
this could be viewed as a natural extension of the experiences of the first few 
AMSP classes, when Wass de Czege took the class to Europe for annual war 
games and seconded the students to various corps and division level staffs, this 
would in fact be a stretch as no one in the Army at the time could recall this fact.  
It was indeed making use of an available resource, SAMS students, and once the 
precedent was set other headquarters, strapped for people, would call on SAMS 
for help.  This was another manifestation of the successes of SAMS, highlighted 
by Sinnreich.  The demands of the present trumped the thoughts of preparing the 
students for the future.417  The other event that is evidence of this was the 
Command and General Staff College wide exercise Prairie Warrior. 
                                                 
417
     Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09. 
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 The first Prairie Warrior exercise was conducted in 1989 as a division level 
exercise.  By 1991 this exercise grew to the corps and Joint Task Force level.  
This, most involved believed, was a “good idea” in that it served as the 
graduation exercise of the Command and General Staff College class in session 
at the time.  Students were placed into command and staff positions of divisions, 
corps and a Joint Task Force and then planned and executed an exercise 
supported by the simulations of the Battle Command Training Program.  Officers 
selected for the next AMSP class, 1991/92 were placed in planning positions on 
the student staffs.  The CGSC class made use of an existing BCTP higher 
headquarters plan for the exercise.  The divisional and corps plans drawn up by 
the CGSC class were based on this BCTP plan and then executed in accelerated 
time against the BCTP opposing force.  The students then participated in after 
action reviews where the planning and execution were dissected, examined and 
from which lessons were drawn.418  It was in fact a good idea, so good in fact that 
the corporate Army could not resist “improving” upon it. 
 In 1993, Fontenot was informed that SAMS would act as the staff of the 
Joint Task Force, JTF, and develop the plan for Prairie Warrior.  This required an 
adjustment of the AMSP and Fellows curricula as the College leadership was 
interested in the development of the JTF order that the CGSC class would 
execute in the spring of 1994.  The only time available in the curricula was the 
exercise program, thus the development of Prairie Warrior plans became the 
SAMS exercise program with milestone presentations established in accord with 
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     I was a member of the CGSC class of 1991.  This paragraph is based on my recollections of 
that time, my CGSC year book, and my personal journal.  The transition sentence is my own judgment, 
based on my experience as an officer. 
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the military decision making process and the Deputy Commandant or 
Commandant’s calendar.  The first effort at this was, as Fontenot described it, 
okay.  The students in SAMS’ programs did learn about the development of a 
JTF level order and the effort it takes to promulgate a plan properly to ensure 
understanding.  This was worth the effort, in Fontenot’s judgment, but that was 
about all and was likely not worth the disruption in the SAMS program of 
education.  The improvement of Prairie Warrior continued though.419 
 The 1994/95 effort to develop the JTF plan for Prairie Warrior was 
“enhanced” by the addition of an Army brigadier general, Geoffrey Miller, to act 
as the JTF commander.  This was done to avoid scheduling problems with the 
Deputy Commandant and Commandant’s calendars.  The presence of a JTF 
“commander” in SAMS would also, it was thought; materially improve the SAMS 
product as the commander could continually interact with the students in the 
development of the plan.  The educational benefit to the SAMS students was that 
they would learn how to interact with a flag officer.  This was the rationale.420 
 The Army does make good decisions in many instances.  In this case, 
while Miller was an experienced Soldier he was also not the correct person for 
the effort.  According to Fontenot Miller became caught up in the notion of 
command as opposed to teaching SAMS students the intricacies of developing 
JTF level orders.  The demands of having a flag officer in SAMS outweighed the 
benefit.  The Army also decided that Prairie Warrior would be the perfect vehicle 
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     Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09. 
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     MG Geoffrey Miller retired in 2006.  He was the officer responsible for running the 
Guantanamo Bay enemy combatant holding facility and went to Iraq in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal. 
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for an Army Warfighting Experiment. 
 Here again Fontenot had to deal with the successes of SAMS.  While 
Fontenot had a personal relationship with both the Chief of Staff, Army, Sullivan 
and the Training and Doctrine Command Commander, Franks, it was not enough 
to be able to call off the compounding effect of good ideas.  The ready pool of 
staff officers in training and especially the SAMS student body was very attractive 
for experimentation of new notions of warfighting.  Fontenot and SAMS crafted 
the plans for the employment of the concept of the Mobile Strike Force.421 
 The demands of developing the plans for both the JTF level for Prairie 
Warrior and the Army Warfighting Experiment on the concept of the Air-
Mechanized Division caused culmination in SAMS.  The requirements of 
education were suffering from the demands of exercise and experimentation.  In 
the end Fontenot called the effect as he saw it, and while he might have ruffled 
some feathers among the ranks of general officers, he successfully convinced 
Sullivan and Franks that a school house exercise was not the correct vehicle for 
experimenting with future concepts.422  
 The era of AirLand Battle was indeed over.  This was heralded by more 
than the inclusion of a new tenet, versatility, into the doctrine.  There was a 
growing perception that with the demise of the Soviet Union and no “near peer 
competitor” on the horizon the Army would be reduced while being asked to do 
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     Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1JUN09.  The Mobile Strike Force was built around a 
so called Air-Mechanized Division was a concept based on an extension of the thought of vertical 
envelopment and the tenet of depth which remained in FM 100-5.  The essence of the concept was an Army 
division supported by aircraft capable of delivering light mechanized equipment at operational depth in an 
enemy force’s rear area and enabled by digitized information systems.  This concept had its roots in the 
Soviet airborne structure as Soviet paratroop divisions were equipped with light armored vehicles. 
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more for the Nation, at home and abroad.  Chapter 7 explored some examples 
these “wars of the peace dividend.”  These actions, abroad and at home, were an 
indicator of a world that enhanced the importance of more than war, but the use 
of force being seen as an extension of policy by other means.  SAMS as well as 
the Army was refining the understanding of operational art as the bridge between 
tactics and strategy.   
 The SAMS method of instruction might not have changed outwardly, but 
the inclusion of different texts and especially, under McDonough first and then 
Fontenot, the exercises reflected the changing conduct of war.  McDonough’s 
end of course exercise for the AMSP class of 1992 was a Joint Task Force level 
exercise scenario with a NATO force operating in a peace enforcement role in 
Croatia.  This exercise took place well before the government decided to 
intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina; indeed McDonough was directed that the 
exercise not take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The liaison officers from 
European armies, assigned to the Combined Arms Center and the Command 
and General Staff College attended the exercise and reported back to their 
respective army leadership.  Fontenot continued the refinement of the exercise 
program, starting from brigade combat team level but ending up with an exercise 
in the Trans-Caucus region because, as he said, “this was the toughest place to 
get into and sustain operations that I could find.”423 
 Janes highlighted the role of ideology and religion in his only curricula 
development guidance.  McDonough intuitively sensed that world conditions 
were changing and SAMS graduates needed different educational experiences to 
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prepare them for the new missions and tasks given to the Army.  Fontenot 
continued this movement of SAMS and set conditions for the next ten years of 
SAMS.  The three directors, who brought SAMS up to the completion of ten 
years of service to the Army, by and large continued in the spirit of the vision of 
the school established by Wass de Czege.  They also added something to that 
vision by force of their own personalities.  Many of these changes were 
ephemeral and some of them effected change that could only be seen from the 
vantage of point of the future, looking back.  Time would tell whether or not 
changes would last and improve the school.   
 COL Sinnreich, the second director, was indeed prophetic when he wrote 
in his end of tour report that the challenges SAMS would face were a result of its 
successes.  SAMS and its graduates were extremely successful thus the Army 
wanted more and more from SAMS.  The tension of external expectations and 
internal expectations became a part of the balancing effort that was required of 
the directors, who were faced with growing demands from the Army and internal 
pressures from the faculty.  In an interview on 17 November 1994 GEN Franks 
stated that the Army needed to get its leaders into a posture, “where they could 
take themselves from one particular set of circumstances and quickly adapt 
themselves mentally, intellectually, and adapt their organizations to a totally new 
set of operational circumstances.”424  Franks and Sullivan used doctrine as an 
engine of change to redirect the Army, and SAMS played a role in this effort 
through its graduates and the role the school played in re-crafting doctrine.  The 
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     Oral History Interview, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commanding, U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. , 17 November 1994, by Mr. John L. Romjue. 
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question of “Whither SAMS” formed one component of “whither the Army” by 
1994.  SAMS as an institution was accepted by the Army through being validated 
by the contributions of its graduates. 
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Epilogue 
 
Into the Future 
 
 
 The first “official” reference to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 
graduates as Jedi Knights occurred on 12 May 1992, during a meeting of the Committee 
on Armed Services Military Education Panel in Washington, DC. The panel met at 9:05 
a.m. in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building. In his opening statement, the 
Honorable Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) said: 
 The panel is quite pleased by the Advanced Military Studies Program 
concept and I commend the Army Command and General Staff College for its 
vision in initially establishing the school of advanced military studies at Fort 
Leavenworth. Of course, we all know that the real stamp of approval came when 
General Schwarzkopf requested SAMS graduates, sometimes referred to as 
“Jedi Knights,” be sent to his headquarters in Riyadh to assist in developing the 
campaign plan.425 
 
 On 21 May 1994, SAMS celebrated its tenth anniversary.  The guest speaker at 
this graduation ceremony was BG Wass de Czege.  COL Greg Fontenot, the director 
and a member of the second class to graduate from SAMS, invited Wass de Czege to 
speak at this graduation both to honor the first director and because of a statement 
Wass de Czege made in 1985.  Fontenot recalled a conversation with Wass de Czege, 
Sinnreich and Steve Rippe in a German Gasthaus during a reconnaissance prior to the 
conduct of the class staff ride of the World War II battle of the Kall Gorge, one of the 
battles of the greater battle in the Huertgen Forest in 1944. 
 During this conversation, conducted over glasses of Moselle wine, Wass de 
Czege observed that if the school lasted ten years it would be institutionalized; that is, 
the Army would have accepted the value of the school and its graduates.  Indeed, the 
Army had embraced SAMS by the tenth year of its existence.  SAMS graduates, from 
                                                 
425
     House Committee on Armed Services, Advanced Military Studies Programs at the 
Command and Staff Colleges, Hearings on H.A.S.C. No. 102-80, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1993, 5. 
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AMSP and AOSF, were moving into positions of greater responsibility and being 
promoted into the senior leadership of the Army.  The world was different, the doctrine of 
AirLand Battle was changing, and indeed SAMS itself was changing.  As the Army faced 
different tasks under rapidly changing conditions, the Army was turning to SAMS 
graduates for answers. 
 Operational art and the refinement of the understanding of this level of war 
spread throughout the Army during the period from its introduction in 1982 through 1994.  
The graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies facilitated the breadth and 
depth of the understanding of this level of war through the performance of its graduates 
in divisions and corps, as well as in subsequent assignments as the graduates 
proceeded up the chain of command and staffs in the Army structure.     
This concluding chapter reviews the initial vision for the school, draws 
observations on the evolution of the vision, and offers an analysis of the increased 
effectiveness of general staffs in the US Army, if any, as a result of the placement of 
graduates of the school.  One conclusion is that graduates of SAMS indeed raised the 
general level of understanding of the art and science of war in our Army, but also 
became a default group to take on the “hard” problems in the Army.  They confronted the 
task of developing strategy and then linking that strategic/operational vision to 
successful tactics. 
 As discussed in chapter two COL Harry Summers’ book on the failure to develop 
and refine a strategy during the Vietnam War was a guide to strategic thinking.  
Summers’ aim was to warn Army officers that they cannot ignore strategy.  Summers did 
not, as some have alleged, tell the Army to ignore counter-insurgency; he urged the 
officer corps to learn the interrelationship of tactics, operations and strategy.  The 
primary failure of Vietnam was that the Army squandered tactical success because the 
U.S. had no coherent strategy, hence the iconic story at the front of the book about an 
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exchange between Summers and a North Vietnamese Army colonel.  As Summers told 
the story, the Army officer corps ignored his advice in the aftermath of Vietnam.  The 
officer corps focused exclusively on the tactical domain, and only there at the battalion 
level.  The Army built the National Training Center as a place for battalions to train 
against superior numbers; only later, in the late 1980s, did the Army send brigade 
combat teams to train at the NTC.  Given the big five decision, the 1982 FM 100-5 
AirLand Battle doctrine, and the training centers, the Army focused exclusively on and 
rewarded tactical success.   
However, wars are won at the operational and strategic level.  The initial 
directors of SAMS, Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder, all realized the tactical 
instruction at the Command and General Staff College was not sufficient to ensure 
widespread understanding of the new doctrine.  They were convinced, as well, that the 
Army needed a group of officers educated at a level above what was presented in the 
regular course of the Staff College to ensure that increased tactical awareness was not 
squandered through a failure to link tactical success to operational and strategic 
objectives.426  The SAMS curriculum was devised to ensure this link would be made in 
Army plans and operations.  
The first curriculum developers of SAMS, the self titled “Curriculum Carpentry 
Corporation,” of Doug Johnson and Hal Winton worked to ensure that SAMS graduates 
would see the necessity of this linkage of tactical to strategic as they wrote and refined 
the lesson plans of SAMS.  Johnson described this effort as working from the ground up, 
beginning with the fundamental theory of ground combat and then moving up the levels 
of war as far as possible, in the time SAMS had with its officer/students.  Johnson later 
                                                 
426
    This is a continuing concern of senior Army leaders.  During a discussion on 12 June 2004 in 
a SAMS class room the Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Peter Schoomaker told the author that he wanted me to 
make sure that SAMS graduates understood that tactical success must be linked with attaining operational 
and strategic objectives. 
  
291 
 
said that the course would ultimately focus, “on the operational level – at that time very 
badly understood and not on the tips of the tongues of more than a very few people.  
That meant we were going to develop planners at the division level and or above.”427  
The evidence is overwhelming that Wass de Czege, Johnson, Winton, and the faculty 
members at SAMS who signed on succeeded in this effort.  Their influence was also felt 
well beyond the Army.  The U.S. Air Force established a sister school to SAMS, the 
School of Advanced Air and Aerospace Studies, at Maxwell Air Force Base in 1992.  
The Marine Corps established a School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico Marine 
Corps Base in 1994.  The British even established a School of Higher Command and 
Staff for specially selected colonels and brigadiers, based on the work of UK COL Gage 
Williams at SAMS.  SAMS also influenced Army doctrine from the 1982 version of FM 
100-5 to the 1993 version. 
 With the introduction of the 1993 version of FM 100-5, the era of AirLand Battle 
was over.  A fifth tenet, versatility, made its debut in FM 100-5.  Versatility was the result 
of SAMS thinking, as well as others, most notably GEN Fred Franks, about how to 
represent the changing conditions the United States faced in the world and how the 
Army would adapt to them.  The range of military operations and full dimension 
operations, other terms introduced in the 1993 FM, attempted to articulate the diverse 
environments - peace, conflict, and war - in which the U.S. and the Army would seek to 
attain strategic and policy objectives.  The doctrine reflected the Army’s appreciation of 
the nature of modern warfare and how Army units would conduct operations to achieve 
the goals of policy.  Viewed from the perspective of the post-Cold War/post Operation 
Desert Storm world, AirLand Battle and the focus on fighting the Soviet Union in the 
central region of Europe served its purpose.  The changing conditions of the world 
environment and the three broad states of the environment as written in the doctrine 
                                                 
427
     Taken from an electronic mail note from Dr. Doug Johnson to the author, 9 September 2006. 
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described a much different world view than the Cold War.  SAMS was changing as well 
as Army doctrine, and trying to balance change with what worked in the curriculum and 
the school’s manner of operating. 
 A comparison of Wass de Czege’s initial guidance and Fontenot’s curricula 
guidance will assist in better identifying the refinements of SAMS over its first ten years.  
Comparing visions, guidance and concepts will show the adjustments made by the 
school as the conditions in which its graduates operated changed.  It will also show the 
changing conditions in which the school itself operated as the Army accepted SAMS 
graduates and then came to depend upon them for their critical thinking abilities.  
Wass de Czege postulated that the growing complexity of war made it necessary 
for the Army to educate a small group of officers in the theory and practice of war 
beyond what was done in the one-year regular course of the Army’s Command and 
General Staff College.  Given the pace of operations and flow of information in the early 
80s, Wass de Czege observed that the margin for error and corresponding speed of 
response was much reduced, given the technology of the time, and that this fact would 
continue as faster and faster information and battlefield systems came available.  The 
requirement for critical thinking and the ability to see an increasingly larger battle space 
demanded that the Army invest time and money in the development of a school for a 
selected group of officers.  This one-year course would educate this group and then, by 
sending them back to the field Army, ensure that these officers would have a multiplier 
effect on the entire officer corps.  The hope was that they would teach others to 
understand the continuously-growing complexity.  This “leavening influence” over time 
would raise the level of competence of the entire officer corps.428    
Fontenot, the sixth director of SAMS, was a product of the effort to provide the 
                                                 
428
    Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Staff College Level Training Study.” Final Report. 13 June 
1983, p. 4.  Hereafter cited as Wass de Czege report. Held in the SAMS files, room 271, Eisenhower Hall, 
Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
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leavening influence Wass de Czege asserted that the Army required, as well as being a 
thoughtful professional in his own right.  When Fontenot took over SAMS, he faced the 
dual task of how to execute the doctoral program as well as continuing the standard of 
excellence that previous directors established for the school.  It was no small effort.  In 
his curriculum guidance for the 1994/95 academic year, Fontenot only addressed AMSP.  
The curriculum for AMSP would continue to build upon the previous year, developed 
under McDonough’s guidance.  The broad outlines of the courses of AMSP - Foundation 
of Military Theory, Tactical Dynamics, The Contemporary Practice of Operational Art, 
The Historical Practice of Operational Art, and Preparing for War - remained the same 
and would be subject to update and review as the course directors gave presentations 
on the lesson outlines to the faculty and director.  Fontenot did think about the 
impressive victory the Army and joint forces achieved in the war to liberate Kuwait.  He 
asked himself and the faculty to think about where the next fight would be and in what 
form it would manifest itself.  He intended to use the SAMS exercise program to stress 
this point as he directed the exercise section to devise scenarios in nearly inaccessible 
parts of the world.  While Fontenot issued written guidance to the faculty on the 
development of the curriculum for AMSP, he did not issue similar written guidance for 
the Fellowship.429 
Fontenot took the decision to use informal and unwritten guidance in the 
development and execution of the Fellows’ curriculum, given the expectation on the part 
of senior leaders that there would be a test of a doctoral program at SAMS during the 
execution of the Fellows’ academic year, 94/95.  This was a clever move on Fontenot’s 
                                                 
429
    School of Advanced Military Studies, Memorandum for School of Advanced Military 
Studies Faculty, Subject: SAMS Course Planning Guidance for AY 93/94, 3 May 1993, signed by COL 
James McDonough and Memorandum for School of Advanced Military Studies Faculty, Subject: SAMS 
Course Planning Guidance for AMSP AY 94/95, 22 April 1994, signed by COL Greg Fontenot.  Held in 
the SAMS files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall.  Hereafter cited as McDonough guidance, 93/94 and 
Fontenot guidance, 94/95. 
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part, as the support for a doctoral program was fading with the retirement of the senior 
leaders who began the effort and the lack of any real effort to attain accreditation of such 
a program.  Still, Fontenot had to deal with lingering expectations for a test run at a 
doctoral program on the part MG Steele, GEN Franks and GEN Sullivan, and on the part 
of those Fellows who had been induced to apply for the Fellowship with the 
understanding that they would be a part of a doctoral program.430   
Fontenot’s program for the Fellows included a focused study on a regional 
combatant command area of operations and attending the National Defense University 
at Norfolk, Virginia.  This was Fontenot’s best good-faith effort at fulfilling the 
requirement to test the concept while realizing little ground work was done to sustain the 
effort.  He told the Commandant, LTG John Miller, of his intentions, and Miller 
approved.431  Fontenot knew that this program had to be an Army program, but for 
recognition as a legitimate doctoral program, even as a professional degree, the 
program had to have a relationship with a university.  The final momentum breaker came 
in a conversation Fontenot had with a professor at the University of Kansas.   
Fontenot learned that in order to have a relationship with the University of 
Kansas, the fellows would have to be accepted and then enrolled into a University of 
Kansas doctoral program, and thus he would no longer control the program.  Fontenot 
executed the best possible program for the Fellows without written guidance for this 
particular academic year.  This was a circumstance that Wass de Czege could not have 
foreseen in his original efforts at establishing the school.  Wass de Czege never 
intended the school to produce an elite or a “shadow general staff, “in the manner of the 
                                                 
430
    Based on conversations with Fontenot and drawn from his interview, 1 June 2009. 
431
    Drawn from the Fontenot interview, 1 June 2009.  The professor was Dr. Ted Wilson.  
Fontenot did not recall the date.  Judging from the sequence of notes written by Dr. Bob Berlin the 
conversation must have taken place in February or M
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German General Staff.432  Those holding doctorates conferred by SAMS would run into 
the noted Army bias against “intellectuals.”  Wass de Czege and Fontenot wanted SAMS 
graduates to rise on their own merit instead of some perceived advantage of attending a 
school.  In fact, Army divisions and corps as well as higher echelons of command in the 
Army and joint arena continued to seek SAMS graduates.  This was, in part, based on 
the rigor of the selection process.433 
Wass de Czege articulated the requirements for the selection of officers to attend 
the Advanced Military Studies Program in his originating paper.  Wass de Czege 
counted on the Army to continue selecting the upper 50% of each year group of officers 
for Command and General Staff College education.  Officers from this pool of the upper 
50% had to be volunteers who received a nomination from the CGSC faculty and who 
were interviewed and screened through a board selected by the Commandant of CGSC.   
The Military Personnel Center screened selected officers’ files, and the Commandant 
provided final approval.  Fontenot did not materially change this selection process; thus, 
over the first ten years of the existence of SAMS, it remained the same and, based on 
the performance of graduates of the school, worked fairly well.  Fontenot continued this 
search for top quality officers during his execution of the selection process, but with 
some difficulty.   
In his original paper Wass de Czege looked forward to Fiscal Year 95 and 
projected by that time that graduates of the school would, of their own merit, be moving 
into the ranks of the senior leadership of the Army and commanding battalions and 
brigades, as well as holding key principal staff positions in Army divisions and corps.  
This projection came true as in 1994 e.g.; Wass de Czege and Holder were general 
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      Wass de Czege report, p. 5. 
433
      Based upon a conversation with COL (ret) Greg Fontenot on 25JUN09.  See also MFRs 
done by Dr. Bob Berlin dated 2FEB94 and 29MAR94, as well as his handwritten notes held in the SAMS 
files, Room 271, Eisenhower Hall. 
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officers, Janes and McDonough were commanding brigades, Marks, one of the 7th 
Infantry Division planners during JTF-Los Angeles, was commanding a battalion, and 
Drumm, one of the officers in the G3 of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia, was 
serving as the deputy G3 of the division.  Wass de Czege set the goal of looking for 
officers with the potential for 30 years of service and who would ultimately serve as 
colonels in the Army.434  A condition that Fontenot had to deal with in the tenth year of 
SAMS, and one that Wass de Czege did not foresee, was the reduction of the size of the 
Army, the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols bill, and the corresponding timeline 
pressure on majors.  This realization of five years of service as a major had a 
corresponding effect on applications to SAMS. 
Swain, director of the SAMS Fellows, commented that while the Army had 
always been somewhat anti-intellectual in its overall attitude, in 1987, this reaction really 
took effect.435  In 1987, the National Training Center had been in operation for five years.  
The Army’s Project Warrior, where successful company commanders were assigned to 
the National Training center for two years as an observer/controller followed by two 
years teaching at one of the Army’s branch basic or advanced courses, was attracting 
many of the Army’s brightest and ambitious officers, especially from the combat arms.  
During this four year period, many of these officers were selected for promotion to major 
and thus used up at least one of the five years an officer had in his timeline as a major.  
The most ambitious officers wanted to remain in contention for selection for promotion to 
lieutenant colonel but, more importantly, battalion level command.  In a shrinking Army, 
between 1989 and 1998 the Army would reduce in size from 18 divisions to ten with a 
corresponding reduction in the number of battalions available to command.  Command 
of a battalion demanded service as a major in a battalion, as the operations or executive 
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      Wass de Czege report, p. 5. 
435
      Drawn from an interview with Dr. Rick Swain on 23 June 2009.  Hereafter cited as Swain 
interview. 
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officer, preferably in both positions.  The measure of excellence during this time was 
found at the National Training Center where success at the battalion level was 
recognized with the rewards an Army could grant: early selection for promotion, service 
as a senior observer/controller for successful battalion commanders, and Army-wide 
recognition as one who defeated the Opposing Force.  Whereas an ambitious lieutenant 
colonel with a successful battalion command once looked for service in the Pentagon 
and on the Army staff, these men now looked to serve at the NTC.  With this emphasis 
on tactical excellence now supplanting service at the operational and strategic level, 
service as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy was less attractive for captains.  
This meant that there were fewer and fewer Fellows arriving with previous duty as an 
instructor and fewer new majors with time to spend in school for another year of their five 
years as a major. 
Fontenot faced this situation and attempted to solve the problem through a 
concerted effort at recruiting.  Fontenot even brought in an association of black Army 
officers to assist in recruiting minority officers.  The students in the CGSC class of 
1994/95 told Fontenot that the presentations were terrific, but at the end of the recruiting 
effort, there were only 87 volunteers for the 54 seats available.  Fontenot realized that 
the particular problem was not easy to solve under current conditions.  The type of 
officer he really wanted to apply for AMSP was not going to apply in the same previous 
numbers, as this type of officer wanted to remain competitive for battalion command.  To 
do this, the officer needed to have two outstanding officer evaluation reports in two of 
three positions within a brigade: battalion operations officer, executive, or brigade 
operations officer.  To get into these competitive positions, a new staff college graduate 
knew he would spend one year on the division staff, and this sequence used up all of the 
five years an officer promoted on time had as a field grade officer.  Officers also needed 
to deal with the provisos of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
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Among the requirements articulated in the Goldwater-Nichols bill, designed to 
improve the quality of joint service officers and the attractiveness of serving on a joint as 
opposed to service staff, was the Congressional mandate for joint service as a 
precondition for selection for promotion into general officers ranks.  This requirement put 
additional stress on an officer’s career timeline.  Joint service required attending a joint 
education school and three years of service, waiverable to 30 months, to qualify as a 
joint service officer.  The extra year spent at SAMS put in jeopardy, in most officers’ 
minds, their timeline-limited chance to get into the correct jobs to ensure they would be 
on an equal footing with other officers in the competition for selection to battalion 
command.  Successful battalion level command was the hurdle an officer had to 
overcome to be considered for promotion to colonel.436  Filling the available seats in 
AMSP seminars, not to mention any thought of expanding the size of AMSP, had to take 
into consideration the “tyranny of the timeline” resulting from a shrinking Army and 
Goldwater-Nichols.  Finding qualified applicants for AMSP was only one challenge 
Fontenot faced.  Like Janes and McDonough, Fontenot also faced budget limitations.   
In Wass de Czege’s 1983 paper he wrote about the logical expansion of SAMS 
and budget resources as a natural limit on the possible expansion of SAMS.  He wrote, 
“A course over 96-100 students may be too expensive in terms of high quality faculty 
(meaning uniformed faculty) and travel funding.”437  During the early years of SAMS, 
Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder did not have to worry about the SAMS budget, 
and the decision these men took to remain at four seminars had to do with retaining 
quality officers in AMSP and quality education.  Fontenot had four seminars of AMSP 
                                                 
436
    Davis, the director who followed Fontenot, filled seats in SAMS with officers who had not 
been selected for resident CGSC education.  The impact of this decision is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation but the perception in the Army, where many SAMS graduates were entering brigade level 
commands and general officer positions was that there was a lessening in the “quality” of SAMS graduates.  
Perception, especially on the part of people in senior and influential positions, can have extraordinary 
effect.   
437
      Wass de Czege report, p. 32.  Parenthetical note added by the author. 
  
299 
 
officers and one of AOASF.  In his guidance for the planning of the academic year 
1994/95, Fontenot wrote that AMSP officers would visit the National Training Center and 
conduct a three-day staff ride to Vicksburg, “as funding and scheduling permit.”438  The 
extended Europe trip for AMSP did not survive the budget cuts required of Janes in 
1988 and 1989.  The AMSP trips were limited to the National Training Center, a 
Vicksburg staff ride to walk the ground of Grant’s 1863 campaign, and an east coast trip 
to visit the Joint and Army staff, Central and Special Operations Command.  The Fellows 
trips to all the regional combatant commands were protected as these trips were really 
an integral part of the operational and strategic focus of the Fellowship.  The travel that 
was an “essential” part of the SAMS education under Wass de Czege’s creation and 
Winton’s and Johnson’s refinement fell to the sharp pencils of the comptrollers of the 
Combined Arms Center and AMSP expansion to four seminars. 
Wass de Czege likely anticipated pressure on SAMS to do more for the Army but 
did not write about this in his original paper proposing the establishment of SAMS.  
Sinnreich foresaw this event in his end of tour report.  Fontenot did have to cope with 
real pressure for SAMS to do more for the Army and the corresponding effect on the 
curricula.  Fontenot was directed to incorporate SAMS into the greater Staff College war 
game PRAIRIE WARRIOR and Army Warfighting Experiments that tested futuristic 
concepts such as the air-mechanized division.  These war games and experiments 
demanded time, and this time was taken from the AMSP exercise program.   
Wass de Czege initially envisioned the AMSP exercise program as the device 
through which AMSP students would see the execution of concepts, theory meeting the 
constrained reality of a war game.  These war games would reinforce the conceptual 
learning.  While this was still true as Fontenot’s students participated in PRAIRIE 
WARRIOR as the higher headquarters for the Staff College, as well as participating in 
                                                 
438
      Fontenot guidance, 94/95.   
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the Warfighting Experiments, the faculty and students had to mentally stretch to link their 
education to controlled experiments that were designed to test concepts as opposed to 
test students.  Continuing along the path of Wass de Czege’s initial concept, Fontenot 
did test his students.  
 In this tenth year of SAMS’ existence, Fontenot directed the execution of an 
AMSP curriculum that continued to emphasize the theoretical foundations of war, tactical 
expertise, operational art, and joint and combined operations.  His exercises, given the 
conditions of participating in PRAIRIE WARRIOR and Army Warfighting Experiments, 
challenged students to develop theater campaigns and study the development of 
doctrine.  Under Fontenot, the Fellows’ curriculum continued to focus on the operational 
and strategic levels of war, and provided the best course of study at least on par with the 
Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.  The Fellows’ first year program 
assured the provision of high quality faculty for SAMS as the permanent seminar 
leaders, assigned in anticipation of a long term Fellows doctoral course of studies, left 
SAMS.  The SAMS’ curriculum supported the development of potential senior 
commanders and General Staff officers thoroughly grounded in tactical, operational and 
strategic theory and methods.  In retrospect, Fontenot met the requirements of his 
mission statement: “The SAMS mission is to produce military officers with the ability to 
plan and execute campaigns across the spectrum of war in a changing world.”439  SAMS 
incorporated the tenets of changing Army doctrine into the curricula, as expressed in the 
1993 version of FM 100-5. 
The 1993 version of FM 100-5 added the tenet Versatility to the now familiar four 
tenets of AirLand Battle.  The end of the Cold War, the apparent decisive victory in the 
gulf, and the call for a “Peace Dividend,” expanded the range of potential operations the 
Army would be called upon to conduct and SAMS graduates would be called upon to 
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    Fontenot guidance, 94/95. 
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plan and execute.  Franks and others at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
attempted to find a framework for the Army to apply the familiar, AirLand Battle and the 
decision making process, to the unfamiliar, Operations Other Than War, stability and 
support operations, and operations in support of civil authority.  The understanding and 
application of operational art was evolving during this era of change as force in many 
forms was used as an extension of policy.  Operational art was still the means to link 
tactical actions to strategic and policy objectives, but how to think operationally was 
changing as the opponents of U.S policy expanded from only state controlled armies to 
state supported actors and trans-national groups, or regionally based ethnic groups 
seeking territory of their own or domination of a natural resource.  As Fontenot wrote in 
his curriculum development guidance, SAMS graduates had to plan and execute 
campaigns across the spectrum of war and under changing conditions. 
SAMS directors from Fontenot on would attempt to find the balance of 
Warfighting and operations other than war by adjusting the curricula in AMSP and 
AOASF, challenging the officer students in both programs to stretch their ability to think 
critically and creatively.  Of necessity, SAMS would begin to change when Fontenot, the 
first director with combat command experience not from Vietnam, began to bring into 
SAMS a combination of his experience as a SAMS educated planner, his battalion 
command in combat, and his experience as General Franks’ executive officer.  Fontenot 
would set conditions for SAMS to enter its next ten years of service to the Army and in 
educating future Army leaders.   
Senior leaders in the Army sensed that the world was changing and that the 
Army must understand the depth of the changes and how to operate in this new 
environment.  The environment was bound by new technology, a U.S. drive for smaller 
yet technologically superior forces, and a growing number of ethnically driven tensions.  
The conduct of war was changing, but the nature of war - passions, greed, ethnic 
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animosity, religious differences, etc - were all unchanging and yet even more lethal given 
the availability of weapons of greater destructive power. 
 Swain said that the story of the development of SAMS and the introduction of the 
concept of operational art into the lexicon and thinking of the U.S. Army was a result of 
multiple agendas and lines of operation.  Many senior generals as well as Wass de 
Czege were involved in the development of both concepts.  For example, when he was 
the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College, Major General 
Dave Palmer used to send a letter to each incoming Fellow explaining his vision for 
SAMS and for the Fellowship.  The Chief of Staff of the Army was personally involved in 
the selection of the Director of SAMS.  The senior leaders of the Army continued to look 
at SAMS and especially SAMS graduates to solve tough problems. 440 
 As SAMS looked to the future, the school faculty, as well as the wider group of 
similarly concerned officers in the U.S. Army, was searching for a way to define the 
changing conditions of war in the late 20th and looming 21st century.  When the Army 
came to grips with the definition of war and how to prosecute it in the 21st century, the 
Army would know the path to 21st century victory.  Rupert Smith’s 2007 book, The Utility 
of Force, opens with the sentence, “War no longer exists.”  More to the point though, the 
last sentence of his opening paragraph states his thesis more clearly, “Nonetheless, war 
as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a massive deciding event in a 
dispute in international affairs: such wars no longer exist.”441  Smith might be on the right 
                                                 
440
    Conversation with Colonel Rick Swain, U.S. Army (retired) and Ph.D., former director of 
Fellows at the School of Advanced Military Studies conducted on 27 October 2007 at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas.  Dr. Swain is the author of Lucky War, a history of the Third U.S. Army during Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm, the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion.  According to Swain the only director who 
was picked without the concurrence of the CSA was Colonel Danny Davis, the seventh director.  Davis 
served in Alaska with the deputy commandant at the time, BG Randy Rigby.  Swain also related that when 
the Chief of Staff, Army, General Gordon Sullivan was informed of the selection he was more than a little 
upset. 
441
    Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force The Art of War in the Modern World, New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2007, p. 3.  
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track as a narrative for coming to grips with the war the United States is presently in and 
the wars she will face in the future.  Clashes of arms will continue, but the path to victory 
and victory conditions will have to be defined differently given globalization, instant 
media, blogs, and cellular structured adversaries, to name a few.  SAMS in 1994 could 
only speculate on the way ahead and attempt to educate its officers broadly enough to 
enable them to take sensible decisions in the uncertain future. 
SAMS was also dealing with the beginning of a changing sense of the future of 
war, indeed the utility of continuing to look at war in terms of state versus state violence.  
SAMS was coming to view war as less and less a clash of titans, massed armies 
contending in the central region of Europe or the deserts of Saudi Arabia, and more 
towards trying to describe war and more broadly the use of force in a more 
Clausewitzian sense of an extension of policy by other means.  SAMS was clearly still 
on the path its founder, Wass de Czege, originally outlined.  SAMS was producing 
critical thinkers who were raising the bar of understanding within the larger Army of the 
linkage between tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. 
Wars and uses of force in operations other than war lay ahead for SAMS.  At the 
start of SAMS’ next ten years of existence, the U.S. Army was in Somalia and was also 
planning for an entry into the war-torn Balkans and the island of Haiti.  SAMS graduates 
were also on the Korean peninsula, facing an old enemy and a war that would be unlike 
Desert Storm, but as SAMS graduates knew, all wars were similar in nature but vastly 
different in conduct.  Sir Michael Howard, eminent British military historian, articulated 
the challenge for all SAMS graduates at that time and on into an uncertain future when 
he said,  
I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces 
are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it 
does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to 
get it right quickly when the moment arrives .... Still it is the task of military 
science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly 
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wrong.442 
 
 SAMS at ten years was well on its way to internalizing Moltke’s dictum.  The Gulf 
War of 1991 did in fact nurture the notion that SAMS was producing a privileged elite 
within the Army.  Newly arrived SAMS graduates did have extraordinary access to 
general officers other staff officers did not enjoy, and some graduates did indeed act 
arrogantly.  The effort to combat this behavior led directors and faculty to stress that the 
privilege of being selected for SAMS was just that, a privilege.  Accompanying the 
privilege of another year of studying the profession of arms was the commitment to do 
the very best for the remainder of a career.  A graduate of SAMS was always going to be 
associated with the school and always thought of as a “smart” guy or gal.  As LTG David 
Huntoon said at the celebration of the 25th anniversary of SAMS, “this program is a rare 
gift that merits an equally exceptional return on the investment.”443   
The Army demanded a great deal from SAMS graduates.  There is persuasive 
evidence that SAMS graduates raised the level of understanding of Army doctrine, the 
quality of operational plans and campaigns, and continued the process of refining 
doctrine to reflect the lessons drawn from operational experience in war, operations 
other than war, and preparing for war. 
 Clausewitz wrote, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is 
difficult.”  The simple thing that SAMS conveyed, from Wass de Czege to Fontenot, was 
based on another line from Clausewitz’s On War, namely that the use of war as an 
extension of policy, the use of maximum force is, “in no way incompatible with the 
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    Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," p. 7. 
443
    Cited from a speech delivered by LTG David Huntoon on 24 May 2009 at Fort Leavenworth, 
KS at a gathering of SAMS graduates celebrating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the school.  LTG 
Huntoon asked the author to review his speech in advance of its delivery and sent me a copy of his final 
remarks for the author’s personal files, to be deposited in CARL upon completion of the dissertation effort.   
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simultaneous use of intellect.”444   The focus of the SAMS curricula on theory, history 
and doctrine set a base line of knowledge and a shared educational experience for 
SAMS graduates.  This shared educational experience, and interaction with professors 
such as Epstein and Schneider, directors from Wass de Czege to Fontenot, and Fellows 
from Swain to Dubik, established a bond between graduates and fostered links that 
made the effort directed at the development and execution of plans and orders that 
much better.  The SAMS education established a foundation for continued personal 
study of the art and science of war.  There was somewhat of a downside to this fact.  
SAMS graduates were sought after, but this fact acerbated a tendency on the part of 
other staff offices to leave the “deep thinking” to SAMS graduates and focus on the 
immediate execution of operations. 
 Doctrine is never easy to read, and thinking about the conceptual constructs 
that underpin doctrine is even more difficult.  The fact that SAMS incorporated not only a 
study of the theoretical underpinning of doctrine but doctrine itself became a convenient 
excuse for harried staff officers.  They knew that the generals were not going to ask 
them what doctrine said; these questions would be asked of the SAMS guys.  The 
experience of then Major (now Lieutenant General) Mark Hertling supports this point.  
Hertling, a 1988 graduate of AMSP, was assigned to the 1st Armored Division as a 
planner in the G3, Operations staff.  Hertling’s first experience as a “SAMS guy” came 
during a preparation session for a division exercise.  Hertling described entering the 
Plans section’s “expando van” and observing fellow SAMS graduate MAJ Russ 
Goehring lead the division planning group through a portion of the decision making 
process.  Goehring knew Hertling was his relief and that he would soon be reassigned 
within the division to a battalion S3 or executive officer position.  Goehring greeted 
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Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 119 and p. 75 respectively. 
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Hertling by saying, “welcome, Mark, you just got your first lesson as a SAMS grad.  
You're the traffic cop of the division, because everyone thinks since you're a SAMS 
graduate that you have all the answers for any of their problems...which, of course, you 
do."  At that moment Hertling realized that the SAMS guy in the division headquarters 
was the, “go-to person for everyone....not only for the CG in his planning efforts, but for 
all the staff as they worked through the planning process.”445   
 This experience was, in fact, typical of the experiences of SAMS graduates 
throughout the Army at that time.  The expectations were very high, and the pressure to 
produce top quality plans and orders was enormous.  The directors of SAMS, from Wass 
de Czege to Fontenot, successfully built and sustained a program that met a goal set for 
the school by Wass de Czege and approved by Richardson.  The influence of the 
doctrine was also evident as SAMS graduates moved into the field Army. 
 It is realistic to pose the question of what if the decision to start a school for 
advanced military studies had not been taken, and what would the Army have done.  
The senior leaders of the Army; Saint, Richardson, Vuono, and Starry all perceived a 
need to educate officers in the art of maneuvering large formations.  There was the need 
to look beyond the initial line of contact and deeper into Soviet Army formations.  
General Saint recounted in his oral history interview that he was being “beaten up” about 
the need for strategists.  The analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war led to the conclusion 
that there was a need to disrupt the following echelons of forces behind the initial array 
of forces in contact lest a defense be overwhelmed.  With the introduction of the concept 
of operational art into Army doctrine came a corresponding need for staff officers and 
commanders who had the intellectual preparation to employ the art and turn concepts 
into action, which on the battlefield meant movement and maneuver of large formations.  
                                                 
445
    Drawn from an electronic mail note from then MG (now LTG) Mark Hertling, 26 March 
2009.  This note is in the author’s personal files.  Quoted with permission of LTG Hertling.  
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The time was right for the Army to do something; adjust doctrine, training or tactical 
procedures senior leaders and thoughtful members of the Army officer corps recognized 
change was needed.  The changes in doctrine led the way in this regard.   GEN 
William E. Depuy, the catalyst of the changes in the Army, wrote about the evolution of 
doctrine beyond the time of his own efforts on the 1976 version.  Depuy said that the 
awareness of operational art was not at the level of general officers; rather, it was “at the 
lieutenant colonel level…the Wass de Czege, the Richard Sinnreich and Don 
Holders.”446  As shown, these first directors of SAMS were at the heart of the efforts to 
refine the doctrine of the Army.  Doctrine became the engine for change.  The doctrinal 
focus on the operational level had another effect on the Army officer corps. 
 SAMS rightly focused on the operational and tactical levels of war at its inception, 
in accord with what Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all felt what was wrong about 
the education officers received at the Staff College.  In this first ten years of SAMS, 
SAMS graduates and their influence that very operational focus stayed there and 
actually created a wall between it and strategy and policy.  There was actual and 
perceived success during combat operations and operations other than war, and the 
Army reinforces success.  The focus on the familiar and successful levels of war 
precluded a focus on the higher echelons.  So in a sense the Army has the same 
problem that it did in the 80s, in trying to get over Vietnam the Army focused overly 
inward and lost sight of the strategic and political aspects of war.   In a sense the Army 
faces the same problem today.  
 SAMS and the doctrine introduced in FM 100-5, versions 1982, 1986, and 1993 
is a success story.  The Army faced difficult tests in the first ten years of the existence of 
the school and the doctrine, and did extremely well.  However, patterns were established 
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in these years that would place obstacles in the path of the directors to come in the next 
ten years.  Hertling saw this in his story of becoming the “go to” guy in his division.  I saw 
this pattern emerge in my own service at XVIII Abn Corps when all the generals there 
turned to the handful of SAMS educated officers for everything from invasion plans for 
Haiti to the preparation of Senate testimony.  The successful conclusion of the first Gulf 
War became the start point for the second Gulf War of 2003.  If SAMS educated officers 
ensured success how will history judge the second Gulf War?  In 1994 all of this was in 
the unknowable future.  
 By the tenth year of the school’s existence, SAMS was deeply embedded within 
the culture of the Army.  The officer corps did pay attention to doctrine even if FM 100-5 
of any version was not on the best seller list and on night stands for bed time reading.  
Doctrine was an engine of change for the Army, and the Army continued to meet the 
requirements of the Nation to deter war and win wars when deterrence failed.  The 
challenge for SAMS as it entered its next decade of service was to maintain its 
standards and prepare for the wars, and operations other than war, that were an 
extension of policy by other means in an uncertain future. 
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Appendix 1 
 
THE DIRECTORS OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES 
 
Colonel Huba Wass de Czege 1983 - 1985 retired as a Brigadier General 
 
Colonel Rick Sinnreich 1985 - 1987 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel L. Don Holder 1987 – 1989 retired as a Lieutenant General 
 
Colonel William Janes 1989 - 1990 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel James McDonough 1990 – 1993 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel Greg Fontenot 1993 – 1995 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel Danny Davis 1995 - 1998 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel Robin Swan 1998 – 2001 on active duty as of 2010 and serving as a 
Brigadier General 
 
Colonel James Greer  2001 – 2003 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson  2003 – 2007 retired as a colonel 
 
Colonel Stefan Banach  2007- 2010 - retired in 2010 as a colonel 
 
Colonel Wayne Grigsby  2010- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
310 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Staff and Faculty 
1983 to 1994 
 
LTC Doug Johnson 1982-1985 
LTC Hal Winton 1982-1989 
SFC Dan Mills 1985-1990 
SPC “Pete” Peterson 1985-1988 
Dr. Robert Epstein 1983-2011 
Dr. James Schneider 1983-2008 
Ms. Candace Hamm 1988-present 
Ms. Jackie Kania 1984-2000 
Dr. Robert Berlin 1992-2004 
Dr. Ernest Evans 1993-1995 
Dr. William Gregor 1993-present 
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